Businesspeople From The United States

"An event is not triggered by a chain of being, but by a field of causes spreading horizontally, like creeping tide."

"The future of machines is biology."

"A mind cannot possibly consider anything beyond what it can measure or calculate; without a body it can only consider itself. Without the interruptions of hellos from the eye, ear, tongue, nose, and finger, the evolving mind huddles in the corner picking its navel."

"The "I" of a vivisystem is a ghost. Like the transient form of a whirlpool held upright by a million spinning atoms of water, it can be scattered with a fingertip."

"We can only get smart things from stupid things."

"A system is anything that talks to itself."

"The only organization capable of unprejudiced growth, or unguided learning, is a network."

"A network nurtures small failures in order that large failures don't happen as often."

"To err is human; to manage error is system."

"There is nothing to be found in a beehive that is not submerged in a bee. And yet you can search a bee forever with cyclotron and fluoroscope, and you will never find a hive."

"Complexity must be grown from simple systems that already work."

"The central act of the coming era is to connect everything to everything."

"The world of our own making has become so complicated that we must turn to the world of the born to understand how to manage it."

"Graham's approach is cogent, well argued and has a substantial following among successful investors. There is some modern evidence to support him. It may well be worthwhile to sharpen his methods along modern lines and to test them thoroughly."

"Graham strongly felt that market prices could be considerably out of line with values. The reason for this discrepancy he took to be psychological. ...[T]he overall level of the market could go to extremes in either direction, as optimism or pessimism holds sway. ...[F]avored stocks would sell at unduly high prices, while unpopular stocks would sell at unduly low prices."

"There are perhaps four points where Graham departs radically from conventional practice: ...The "value" ...is not a short-term price forecast ...The "value" is a medium-term sustainable value for the firm as on on-going operation. ...The future is estimated conservatively, using realistic estimates of earnings, and prudent multipliers ...[O]nly ...purchase when price is substantially below value, thus using a considerable "margin of safety". The security should be sold when price begins to exceed value by a given proportion. ...[P]articularly at times when the market is low, a sufficiently large number of under-priced securities will exist ...This insight is perhaps his most unusual one. ...[U]nderpriced shares almost disappear when the market is historically high, and reappear when it falls."

"There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham and Dodd will continue to prosper."

"[T]he secret has been out for 50 years, ever since Ben Graham and Dave Dodd wrote Security Analysis, yet I have seen no trend toward in... 35 years... There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things difficult."

"You... have to have the knowledge to... make a very general estimate about the value of the underlying businesses. But you do not cut it close. That is what Ben Graham meant by having a margin of safety."

"Tom [Knapp] was a chemistry major at Princeton before the war; when he came back... he was a beach bum. And then one day he read that Dave Dodd was giving a night course in investments at Columbia. Tom took it on a non-credit basis, and he got so interested... that he enrolled at Columbia Business School where he got the MBA... He took Dodd's course again, and took Ben Graham's course. ...35 years later ...I found him on the beach ...he owns the beach!"

"Ben Graham was a truly formidable mind, and he also had a clarity in writing. And, we've talked over and over again about the power of a few simple ideas thoroughly assimilated. ... that happened with Graham's ideas, which came to me indirectly through Warren — but also some directly from Graham. ... And, by the way, Buffett was the best student Graham had in 30 years of teaching at Columbia. ... Buffett became way better than Graham. That is a natural outcome. ... Newton said that, "If I've seen a little further than other men, it's by standing on the shoulders of giants." ... Warren may have stood on Ben's shoulders, but he ended up seeing farther. And, no doubt, somebody will come along in due course and do a lot better than we have."

"In his first edition of Security Analysis, back in 1933, Graham expressed disdain for Wall Street's near-obsession with earnings in determining the value of a public company. For Graham, book value was a better guide. ...Bill Graham was right. ...We took the largest 1,500 companies... for the 25-year period ended Dec. 31, 1994. ...We calculated returns for the 20% of stocks with the lowest and highest price-to-book ratios. ...[I]t was no contest. ...If you had invested $10,000 in the lowest... it would have returned $364,000... This more than doubled the return of the market as a whole... an equally weighted market index provided... $163,000. ...[S]tocks that sold at the handsomest premiums to book value... ended up with a miserable $92,000, about 55% of the market's return and only one-fourth ...the lowest price-to-book group. ...[E]motion favors the premium priced stocks. They are fashionable. They are hot. ...Emotion overrides logic time after time."

"A story that was passed down from Ben Graham illustrates the lemminglike behavior of the crowd: "Let me tell you the story of the oil prospector who met St. Peter at the Pearly Gates. When told his occupation, St. Peter said, “Oh, I’m really sorry. You seem to meet all the tests to get into heaven. But we’ve got a terrible problem. See that pen over there? That’s where we keep the oil prospectors waiting to get into heaven. And it’s filled—we haven’t got room for even one more.” The oil prospector thought for a minute and said, “Would you mind if I just said four words to those folks?” “I can’t see any harm in that,” said St. Pete. So the old-timer cupped his hands and yelled out, “Oil discovered in hell!” Immediately, the oil prospectors wrenched the lock off the door of the pen and out they flew, flapping their wings as hard as they could for the lower regions. “You know, that’s a pretty good trick,” St. Pete said. “Move in. The place is yours. You’ve got plenty of room.” The old fellow scratched his head and said, “No. If you don’t mind, I think I’ll go along with the rest of ’em. There may be some truth to that rumor after all.""

"[Shorter variant:] In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run, it is a weighing machine."

"In the short-run, the market is a voting machine - reflecting a voter-registration test that requires only money, not intelligence or emotional stability - but in the long-run, the market is a weighing machine."

"To achieve satisfactory investment results is easier than most people realize; to achieve superior results is harder than it looks."

"Do not let anyone else run your business."

"Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike."

"Observation over many years has taught us that the chief losses to investors come from the purchase of low-quality securities at times of favorable business conditions."

"Wall Street has a few prudent principles; the trouble is that they are always forgotten when they are most needed."

"Unusually rapid growth cannot keep up forever; when a company has already registered a brilliant expansion, its very increase in size makes a repetition of its achievement more difficult."

"Good management are rarely overcompensated to an extent that makes any significant difference with respect to the stockholder's position. Poor management are always overcompensated, because they are worth less than nothing to the owners."

"Readers of this book, however intelligent and knowing, could scarcely expect to do a better job of portfolio selection than the top analysts of the country. But if it is true that a fairly large segment of the stock market is often discriminated against or entirely neglected in the standard analytical selections, then the intelligent investor may be in a position to profit from the resultant undervaluations."

"The value of the security analyst to the investor depends largely on the investor's own attitude. If the investor asks the analyst the right questions, he is likely to get the right—or at least valuable— answers."

"Nearly everyone interested in common stocks wants to be told by someone else what he thinks the market is going to do. The demand being there, it must be supplied."

"If we assume that there are normal or standard income results to be obtained from investing money in securities, then the role of the adviser can be more readily established. He will use his superior training and experience to protect his clients against mistakes and to make sure that they obtain the results to which their money is entitled."

"Good managements produce a good average market price, and bad managements produce bad market prices."

"The investor would not be far wrong if this motto read more simply: "Never buy a stock immediately after a substantial rise or sell one immediately after a substantial drop"."

"The investor's primary interest lies in acquiring and holding suitable securities at suitable prices."

"Basically, price fluctuations have only one significant meaning for the true investor. They provide him with an opportunity to buy wisely when prices fall sharply and to sell wisely when they advance a great deal. At other times he will do better if he forgets about the stock market and pays attention to his dividend returns and to the operating results of his companies."

"The investor has the benefit of the stock market's daily and changing appraisal of his holdings, for whatever that appraisal may be worth, and, second, that the investor is able to increase or decrease his investment at the market's daily figure—if he chooses. Thus the existence of a quoted market gives the investor certain options which he does not have if his security is unquoted. But it does not impose the current quotation on an investor who prefers to take his idea of value from some other source."

"The true investor scarcely ever has to sell his shares, and at all other times he is free di disregard the current price quotation. He need pay attention to it and act upon it only to the extent that it suits his book, and no more. Thus the investor who permits himself to be stampeded or unduly worried by unjustified market declines in his holdings is perversely transforming his basic advantage into a basic disadvantage. That man would be better off if his stocks had no market quotation at all, for he would then be spared the mental anguish caused him by other persons mistakes of judgement."

"If General Motors is worth $60 a share to an investor it must be because the full common-stock ownership of this gigantic enterprise as a whole is worth 43 million (shares) times $60, or no less than $2,600 million."

"The purchase of a bargain issue presupposes that the market's current appraisal is wrong, or at least that the buyer's idea of value is more likely to be right than the market's. In this process the investor sets his judgement against that of the market. To some this may seem arrogant or foolhardy."

"The graph does show one tremendous rise and collapse which stands out starkly from all the other fluctuations. This is commonly called the "new era" stock market of 1927-33. The striking feature of this phenomenon was that the new era existed solely in the minds of market speculators. The whole episode, in retrospect, now seems to have been one of those rare manifestations of mass financial madness which we used to study in our history books under the titles of "the South Sea Bubble", "the Mississippi Bubble" and so on."

"Whenever the investor sold out in an upswing as soon as the top level of the previous well-recognized bull market was reached, he had a chance in the next bear market to buy back at one third (or better) below his selling price."

"It is worth pointing out that assuredly not more than one person out of a hundred who stayed in the market after after 1925 emerged from it with a net profit and that the speculative losses taken were appalling."

"Why could the typical investor expect any better success in trying to buy at low levels and sell at high levels than in trying to forecast what the market is going to do? Because if he does the former he acts only after the market has moved down into buying levels or up into selling levels. His role is not that of a prophet but of a businessman seizing clearly evident investment opportunities. He is not trying to be smarter than his fellow investors but simply trying to be less irrational than the mass of speculators who insist on buying after the market advances and selling after it goes down. If the market persists in behaving foolishly, all he seems to need is ordinary common sense in order to exploit its foolishness."

"A price decline is of no real importance to the bona fide investor unless it is either very substantial—say, more than a third from cost—or unless it reflects a known deterioration of consequence in the company's position. In a well-defined bear market many sound common stocks sell temporarily at extraordinary low prices. It is possible that the investor may then have a paper loss of fully 50 per cent on some of his holdings, without any convincing indication that the underlying values have been permanently affected."

"In most cases the favorable price performance will be accompanied by a well-defined improvement in the average earnings, in the dividend, and in the balance-sheet position. Thus in the long run the market test and the ordinary business test of a successful equity commitment tend to be largely identical."