Ethics (Spinoza book)

"When we love a thing similar to ourselves, we endeavor, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love us in return."

"The greater emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected toward us, the greater will be our complacency."

"If anyone conceives, that an object of his love joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object and with envy towards his rival."

"This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy is called Jealousy..."

"He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein."

"Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater."

"If a man had begun to hate an object of his love, so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love."

"He who hates anyone will endeavor to do him an injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the same law, seek to benefit him."

"The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is called timidity, which may accordingly be defined as the fear whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as future by encountering a lesser evil. But if the evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bashfulness. Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the fear of another evil, so that the man knows not which to choose, fear becomes consternation, especially if both the evils feared be very great."

"He who conceives himself to be hated by another, and believes that he has given no cause for the hatred. will hate the other in return."

"He who conceives, that one whom he loves hates him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love."

"If a man conceives that one, whom he has hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in kind."

"The endeavor to injure one whom we hate is called Anger; the endeavor to repay in kind injury done to ourselves is called Revenge."

"If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love that other in return."

"This reciprocal love, and consequently the desire to benefit him who loves us, and who endeavors to benefit us, is called gratitude or thankfulness. ...men are much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits."

"He who imagines, that he is loved by one whom he hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love."

"If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavor to injure him who loves him; this emotion is called cruelty, especially if the victim be believed to have given no ordinary cause for hatred."

"He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives of love or honor will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is received without gratitude."

"Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on the other hand be destroyed by love."

"Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love: and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not preceded it."

"If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate that person."

"If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone, of a class or nation different than his own, and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or nation: the man will feel love or hatred, not only to the individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation whereto he belongs."

"Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate has been destroyed, or suffers from injury, is never unaccompanied by a certain pain in us."

"Love or hatred towards, for instance Peter, is destroyed if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of another cause: and will be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion."

"Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, must, other things being similar, be greater than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity."

"Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear."

"Different men may be differently affected by the same object, and the same men may be differently affected at different times by the same object."

"We thus see that it is possible, that what one man loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may not fear; or again, that one and the same man may love what he once hated, or may be bold where he was once timid, and so on. Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good, what bad, what better, and what worse, it follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their emotions, hence when we compare some with others, we distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet. For instance, I shall call a man intrepid, if he despises an evil which I am accustomed to fear; if... he is not restrained by the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him daring. Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears an evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take into consideration that his desire is restrained by a fear of an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that he is cowardly; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment. ...from this inconsistency in the nature of human judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges of things solely by his emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavors to promote or prevent, are often purely imaginary... we may readily conceive that a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another with pain, accompanied by himself as cause. Thus we can easily understand what are Repentance and Self-complacency ...Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause; Self-complacency is pleasure accompanied by the idea of oneself as cause, and these emotions are most intense because men believe themselves to be free."

"An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with others, and which we do not conceive to have any property that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long, as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar to itself."

"This mental modification, or imagination of a particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called Wonder; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called Consternation, because wonder at an object keeps a man so engrossed in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil. If, however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or anything of that sort, inasmuch as the man is thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called Veneration; otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, etc., be what we wonder at, the emotion is called Horror. Again, if it be the prudence, industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our love on this account will be greater, and when joined to wonder or veneration is called Devotion. ...To wonder is opposed Contempt... to think rather of those qualities which are not in it, than of those which are in it. ...As devotion springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does Derision spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and Scorn from contempt of folly, as veneration at wonder at prudence."

"When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity, it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of activity."

"This pleasure is fostered more and more, in proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others. For the more he conceives himself to be praised by others, the more he will imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself; thus he is himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself."

"The mind endeavors to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity. ...The endeavor or power of the mind is the actual essence thereof; but the essence of the mind obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do; not that which it neither is nor can do."

"It therefore comes to pass that everyone is fond of relating his own exploits and displaying the strength both of his body and his mind, and that men are on this account a nuisance one to the other."

"When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain thereat."

"The pain is more and more fostered, if a man conceives that he is blamed by others..."

"This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness, is called humility; the pleasure, which springs from the contemplation of ourselves, is called self-love or self-complacency. And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and his mind, and also that, for this reason, men are troublesome to one another. Again, it follows that men are naturally envious, rejoicing in the shortcomings of their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenever a man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure, in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and he conceives them more distinctly--that is, in proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard them as something special. Therefore, a man will take pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some quality which he denies to others. But if that which he affirms of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall short when compared with those of others. This pain he will endeavor to remove, by putting a wrong construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he can, embellishing his own. It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred and envy, which latter is fostered by their education. For parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely by the spur of honor and envy, but perhaps, some will scruple to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's virtues, and venerate their possessors. In order to remove such doubts I append the following corollary."

"No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his equal."

"When, therefore, we said we venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude, etc., we do so, because we conceive those qualities to be peculiar to him, and not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more envy their possessor, than we envy trees for being tall, or lions for being courageous."

"There are many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear, etc., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected."

"Among the kinds of emotions... the chief are luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition, being merely species of love or desire, displaying the nature of those emotions in a manner varying according to the object, with which they are concerned. For by luxury, drunkenness, lust, avarice, ambition, etc., we simply mean the immoderate love of feasting, drinking, venery, riches, and fame. Furthermore, these emotions, in so far as we distinguish them from others merely by the objects wherewith they are concerned, have no contraries. For temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which we are wont to oppose to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emotions or passive states, but indicate a power of the mind which moderates the last-named emotions. ...It is sufficient for our purpose, namely, to determine the strength of the emotions, and the mind's power over them, to have a general definition of each emotion. ...to understand the general properties of the emotions and the mind, to enable us to determine the quality and extent of the mind's power in moderating and checking the emotions."

"Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of the one individual differs from the essence of the other."

"Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals which are called irrational only differ from man's emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human nature. ...Thus, although each individual lives content and rejoices in that mature belonging to him wherein he has his being, yet the life. wherein each is content and rejoices, is nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and hence the joy of one differs in nature from the joy of another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the essence of another. ...Thus far I have treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is passive. It remains to add a few words on those attributable to him in so far as he is active."

"Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active. ...desire is also attributable to us in so far as we understand, or in so far as we are active."

"Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active, there are none which cannot be referred to as pleasure or pain."

"All actions following from emotion, which are attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set down to strength of character (fortitudo), which I divide into courage (animositas) and high-mindedness (generositas). By courage I mean the desire whereby every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason. By high-mindedness I mean the desire whereby every man endeavors, solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to unite them to himself in friendship. Those actions, therefore, which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to high-mindedness. I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit, which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions, to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain. ...we are in many ways driven about by external causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But... I have set forth only the chief conflicting emotions, not all that might be given. ...the emotions may be compounded one with another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However, for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most important... It remains to remark concerning love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment, acquires a new disposition... the new disposition of the body will feel repugnance to the desire or attempt... This revulsion of feeling is called satiety or weariness. Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be supplemented in a few points... [Definitions of the Emotions follows}"

"I refer those actions which work out the good of the agent to courage, and those which work out the good of others to nobility. Therefore temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind in danger, etc., are species of courage; but modesty, clemency, etc., are species of nobility."

"Hope is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue."

"Fear is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue"

"From these definitions it follows, that there is no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope. For he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the existence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to this extent, feels pain; consequently, while dependent on hope, he fears for the issue. Contrariwise he, who fears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something which he hates, also conceives something which excludes the existence of the thing in question; to this extent he feels pleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will turn out as he desires."