Ethics (Spinoza book)

"The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas. ...The idea constituting the actual being of the human mind is the idea of the body, which is composed of a great number of individual parts. But there is necessarily in God the idea of each individual part whereof the body is composed; therefore the idea of the human body is composed of these numerous ideas of its component parts."

"If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature if any external body, the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way, as to exclude the existence or the presence of the said external body."

"The mind is able to regard as present external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even though they no longer be in existence or present."

"The human mind has no knowledge of the human body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected."

"The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God, following in God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human body. ...Thought is an attribute of God; thus there must necessarily be in God the idea both of thought itself and of all its modifications, consequently also of the human mind."

"Mind and body are one and the same individual which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, and now under the attribute of extension."

"The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body, but also the idea of such modifications."

"The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts of the human body."

"The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body."

"In so far as the human mind imagines an external body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof."

"The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused."

"All particular things are contingent and perishable. For we have no adequate idea of their duration, and this is what we must understand by the contingency and perishableness of things. For except in this sense, nothing is contingent."

"All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true. ... All ideas which are in God agree in every respect with their objects, therefore they are all true."

"Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and perfect, is true. ...When we say that an idea in us is adequate and perfect, we say, in other words, that the idea is adequate and perfect in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of mind; consequently we say that such an idea is true."

"Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve."

"That which is common to all, and is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any particular thing."

"Those things, which are common to all, and are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except adequately."

"Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to all men; for all bodies agree in certain respects, which must be adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all."

"That which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies that are wont to affect the human body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind."

"Hence it follows that the mind is fitted to perceive adequately more things, in proportion to its body has more in common with other bodies."

"Quaecumque ideae in mente sequuntur ex ideis, quae in ipsa sunt adaequatae, sunt etiam adaequatae."

"We should see what notions are common to all men, and what notions are clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by by prejudice, and we should detect those that are ill-founded. ...From similar causes arise those notions which we call general... They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the human mind, that the powers of the imagination break down, not indeed utterly, but to the extent that the mind losing count of small differences between individuals and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by them, agree... this the mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of individuals. We must, however, bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the point varies, whereby the body has been most affected and which the mind most easily remembers. ... It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers who attempt to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them, so many controversies should have arisen."

"From all that has been said above it is clear, that we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions: (1) From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses; I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things. I shall call both these ways of regarding things knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination. (3) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things; this I call reason and knowledge of the second kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things."

"Knowledge of the first kind is the only source of falsity, knowledge of the second and third kind is necessarily true."

"Knowledge of the second and third kinds, not knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false."

"He, who knows how to distinguish between true and false, must have an adequate idea of true and false. That is, he must know the true and the false by the second or third kind of knowledge."

"He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived."

"To have a true idea is only an expression for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one, indeed, can doubt this, unless he thinks that an idea is something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of thinking — namely, the very act of understanding. ...Even as light displays both itself and darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity. ...our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God; therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God."

"It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent but as necessary."

"It is the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity (sub quâdum æternitatis specie). ...It is the nature of reason to regard things, not as contingent, but as necessary. Reason perceives this necessity of things truly — that is, as it is in itself. But this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity. We may add that the bases of reason are the notions, which answer to things common to all, and which do not answer to the essence of any particular thing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity."

"Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God."

"By existence I do not here mean duration — that is, existence in so far as it is conceived abstractly, and as a certain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal necessity of God's nature. I am speaking, I repeat, of the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in God. For although each particular thing be conditioned by another conditional thing to exist in a particular way, yet the force by which each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature."

"The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. ...The human mind has ideas from which it perceives itself and its own body and external bodies as actually existing; therefore it has adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God."

"Hence we see, that the infinite essence and the eternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God, and conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that third kind of knowledge... Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the name God with images of things that they are in the habit of seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they are, men, and continually affected by external bodies. ...Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret the meaning of others. For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider mistaken and absurd in their opponents."

"In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity."

"There is in the mind no volition or affirmation and negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves."

"Will and Intellect are one and the same thing."

"It remains to point out the advantage of a knowledge of this doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered from what has been said. The doctrine is good, (1) Inasmuch as it teaches us solely according to the decree of God, and to be partakers of the Divine nature, and so much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more and more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely tranquilizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as for having endured the direct slavery; as if virtue and the service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom. (2) Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not in our power, and do not follow from our nature. For it shows us that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity... (3) This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be content with his own, and helpful to his neighbor, not from any womanish pity, favor, or superstition, but solely from the guide of reason, according as the time and occasion demand... (4) Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and lead, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do whatsoever things are best."

"They seem to have conceived man in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they believe that man disturbs rather than follows the course of nature, and that he has absolute power in his actions, and is not determined by anything else than himself. They attribute the cause of human weakness and inconstancy not to the ordinary power of nature, but to some defect or other in human nature, wherefore they deplore, ridicule, despise, or what is most common of all, abuse it: and he that can carp in the most eloquent or acute manner at the weakness of the human mind is held by his fellows as almost divine. ...For the present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or deride human emotions than understand them. Such persons will doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. However, such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action: that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and always the same; so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature's universal laws and rules. Thus the passions of hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from this same efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself affords us delight."

"Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas it is necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas it is necessarily inactive."

"Hence it follows that the mind is more or less liable to be acted upon, in proportion as it possesses inadequate ideas, and, contrariwise, it is more or less active in proportion as it possesses adequate ideas."

"Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state different from these, if such there be."

"...no one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the body, that is, no one has as yet been taught by experience what the body can accomplish solely by the laws of nature, in so far as she is regarded as extension. No one hitherto has gained such an accurate knowledge of the bodily mechanism, that he can explain all its functions... no one knows how or by what means the mind moves the body, nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to the body, nor how quickly it can move it. Thus when men say that this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which latter has dominion over the body, they are using words without meaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at it. ...I ask such objectors, whether experience does not also teach, that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted for thinking? ...the mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given subject, but as according as the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object. ...I would further call attention to the mechanism of the human body, which far surpasses in complexity all that has been put together by human art... from nature, under whatever attribute she be considered, infinite results follow. ...I submit that the world would be much happier, if men were as fully able to keep silence as they are able to speak. Experience abundantly shows that men can govern anything more easily than their tongues, and restrain anything more easily than their appetites; whence it comes about that many believe, that we are only free in respect to objects which we moderately desire, for such can easily be controlled by the thought of something else frequently remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect to what we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be allayed with remembrance of anything else. However, unless such persons had proved by experience that we do many things which we afterwords repent of, and again that we often, when assailed by contrary emotions, see the better and follow the worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that we are free in all things. ...men believe that themselves to be free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby these actions are determined; and further, it is plain that the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and therefore vary according to the varying states of the body. Everyone shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who are assailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish; those who are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this way or that. All these considerations show that a mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are simultaneous, or rather are one and the same thing, which we call decision, when it is regarded under and explained through the attribute of thought, and a conditioned state, when it is regarded under the attribute of extension, and deduced from the laws of motion and rest... we cannot act by the decision of the mind, unless we have a remembrance of having done so. ...Again, it is not within the free power of the mind to remember or forget a thing at will. ...the decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing. ...those who believe, that they speak or keep in silence or act in any way from the free decision of their mind, but do dream with their eyes open."

"Surely human affairs would be far happier if the power in men to be silent were the same as that to speak. But experience more than sufficiently teaches that men govern nothing with more difficulty than their tongues."

"The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on inadequate ideas."

"Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to itself. ...the definition of anything affirms the essence of that thing... it postulates the essence of the thing, but does not take it away. So long therefore as we regard only the thing itself, without taking into account any external causes, we shall not be able to find in it anything which could destroy it."

"Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the other."

"Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being."

"The endeavor, wherewith everything endeavors to persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question."

"By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent."