Philosophical Works

"৳ From such extravagant principles,—that man has not the freedom of choice,—and that every event is disposed and constrained by Divine prescience,—we are forced to conclude, that all our vices ought to be ascribed solely to God... the source of every virtue, and of all goodness. Supposing this... it will be of no use either to hope or to pray... for why... do either, when all... is irreversibly predestined? Hope and prayer, becoming... ineffectual, the only intercourse betwixt God and the human race is cut off: for as by offering up our supplications with due reverence and humility, we merit the inestimable reward of the Divine grace and counsel; so it is by means of prayer... that we... associate... with the Deity, and to unite... to that inaccessible light. But if a fixed irrevocable necessity... is admitted, prayer can have no effect; and what other way is there then left, wherewith we can be connected..? Man therefore... being... detached and disunited from the source of his existence, must sink into nothing."

"That God doth all events foresee— That every human aft is free— Are truths, when sep'rate, plain and clear; But join'd,—perplex'd and dark appear. Declare then, what discordant cause Puzzles and clouds perspicuous laws? Can things indisputably true Involve an inconsistence too? Who can the unloose, And this deep mystery disclose? The Heav'n-born mind, perhaps, you'll say, Encumber'd with this load of clay, Cannot perceive the secret ties Of things, and nice dependencies.— Why does she then with ardour glow, Matters beyond her reach to know? Knows she the secret she would gain? Then Sure—She would not toil in vain. If, weak and blind, she knows it not, Why gropes she for she knows not what? None wish for what they never knew, Nor matters wholly hid pursue.— But grant,—that after search profound She finds it;—can she say 'tis found? Each mark unknown of what she sought, Dares she assert—the prize is got? The soul at first, then, shall we say, Illum'd with a celestial ray, From Wisdom's beaming source that springs, Knew all the secret chains of things:— But sent from Heav'n's pure light to dwell In this corporeal sluggish cell; Tho' clouds the intellectual bright O'ercast, and dim her native light. Clear marks of her celestial strain, And Heav'n-taught knowledge, still remain; Truth's outlines fair are still imprest Distinctly on the human breast; Tho' individuals are forgot, The sum of things unknown is not. In Science, then, who strive to grow, Studious reflect on what they know, And calm investigate again The truths their minds did once retain. Hence learn they to philosophize, And open Nature's mysteries."

"[L]et us admit a prescience... that... imposes no necessity upon what is to happen; the freedom of the will... would... remain uninfluenced and intire. But although prescience, you may say, is not the necessary cause of future events, yet it is a sign that they shall necessarily happen; and hence it follows, that, although there were no prescience, future events would still be bound in the chain of necessity. But here it ought to be considered, the sign of a thing is not really the thing itself, but that it only points out what the individual is. For which reason it must be first made appear, that every thing happens by necessity, before we can conclude that prescience is the sign of this necessity: for if there be no necessity, prescience cannot be the sign of that which does not exist. To prove that nothing happens but by necessity, the arguments for this purpose must not be drawn from signs, or foreign causes; but from causes intimately connected with, and belonging to this neccesity."

"৳ But how is it possible... that those things which are foreseen should not befal?"

"৳ No... for if every thing were moved by compulsion, the effects of art would be vain and fruitless."

"If things then which are doing under our eye... are under no present necessity of happening; it must be admitted that these same things, before they befel, were under no necessity of taking place. It is plain, therefore, that some things... [are] unconstrained by necessity. For I do not think any person will say that such things as are at present done, were not to happen before they were done. Why therefore may not things be foreseen, and not necessitated in their events? As the knowledge then of what is present imposes no necessity on things now done; so neither does the foreknowledge of what is to happen in future, necessitate the things which are to take place. But you may say, you hesitate with regard to this point; whether there can be any certain foreknowledge of things, of which the event is not necessitated? For here there seems to he an evident contradiction. If things are, foreseen, you may contend they are under a necessity of happening; but if their event is not necessary, they cannot possibly be foreseen, because prescience can foresee nothing but what is absolutely certain: and if things uncertain in their events are foreseen as certain, this prescience, you may maintain, is nothing more than a false opinion: for when we comprehend things differently from what they really are, we have but imperfect ideas of them, very remote from the truth of science. To this I would answer, that the cause of this mistake is, that men imagine that their knowledge is derived entirely from the nature of the things known; whereas it is quite the reverse; since things are not known from properties inherent in the object of knowledge, but by faculties residing in the perceiver."

"Few books have been more popular: it has gone through a multitude of editions; has been commented upon by many eminent men; has been translated into a great variety of languages; and has been universally acknowledged a work replete with erudition and instruction, and executed with much delicacy and good taste. When we consider the distressed situation of our author when he wrote it, we are filled with wonder that he was capable of composing a performance of so much real genius and merit."

"Upon the whole then it must be concluded, the freedom of the human will remains unconstrained and inviolable; and that those laws cannot be considered as unjust, which assign rewards and punishments to men, whose actions are in no respect under the compulsion of necessity. We ought therefore to comfort ourselves with this reflection, that God, who sits on high, perceives every thing, knows perfectly what is to happen; and that the eternal presence of his knowledge, concurring with the future quality of our actions, engages him always to dispense rewards to the good, and punishments to the wicked."

"Thus the imagination, though at first she learned by the senses to distinguish and to form figures, acts afterwards by her own power, and brings all sensible objects to her view without the aid of the senses."

"For instance, reason defines her general conception, thus, Man is a rational creature with two feet; which, though it be a general idea, yet every person knows that man, thus defined, is perceivable both by the imagination and the senses; notwithstanding that in this instance reason does not make use either of the imagination or the senses, but employs her own proper faculty of perception."

"For this reason... nature has varied the powers of knowledge... distributed to created beings. Thus, animals that have no motion, as fishes that are nourished in their shells and adhere to rocks, are endowed with sensation only, and have no other knowledge; whilst imagination is given to... brutes... capable of motion, and seem naturally to desire some things, and avoid others: but Reason is the attribute of man alone, as Intelligence is that of God. Hence... God's knowledge exceeds... all other beings; as it not only comprehends... his own nature, but what... is perceived by beings inferior..."

"What would you think, if the Senses and the Imagination should oppose Reason, and endeavour to persuade her that the general ideas... are nothing? for what falls under the cognizance of the senses and imagination, cannot be general. Perhaps you would say, either Reason judges true, that nothing is apprehended by sense; or, since she knows many things are perceived by the sense and by the imagination, she must judge falsely, when she considers as general that which is sensible and particular. But if Reason should answer to this, that in her idea of what is general, she comprehends clearly whatever is sensible and imaginable; but as to the senses and imagination, they cannot possibly attain to the knowledge of what is general, since their perception cannot reach beyond the material figures that strike them; and therefore, in all matters of science, the greatest credit is due to the judgment of that guide, whose powers are the most discerning and perfect. In a controversy of this kind, ought not we, who are possessed of the powers of reason, imagination, and sense, to enlist ourselves on the side of Reason, and to espouse her cause? The case is entirely similar, when human reason thinks the divine understanding cannot behold future events, in any other way than she herself is capable of perceiving them: for your reasoning... is... "That things... cannot be foreseen, unless their events are necessitated; therefore there can be no... prescience; for... every thing would be fixed by... absolute necessity." In answer... I... say, If it were possible for us... endowed only with reason, to become, possessed of the Divine Intelligence, we should then discover... that both sense and imagination should submit to reason... likewise... human reason should submit to an all-knowing Mind. Let us therefore strive to elevate ourselves to the exalted height of the Supreme Intelligence; there shall Reason behold what she cannot discover in herself... how things, which in themselves have no certain event, are... certainly foreseen by a clear and infallible prescience; and... that this is no conjecture or vague opinion, but a simple, supreme, and unlimited knowledge."

"Since then every thing which is known is not, as I have before proved, perceived by its own inherent properties, but by virtue of powers residing in the person comprehending it; let us now examine, as far as it is possible for us, the disposition of the Divine Nature, that we may thence derive a clearer conception of the knowledge of God."

"It is the sentiment of all reasonable creatures, that God is eternal. Let us then consider what eternity is; because this will discover... the nature of God, and of his knowledge."

"Here then is a solution of what you objected to me formerly, that it is a preposterous thing to say, that our temporal events are the causes of the Divine prescience: for the quality of the Sovereign Mind is such, that every thing is subordinate to the eternal presence of his knowledge; that he plans and directs all events, without being in the least dependent upon futurity."

"The confidence which, for this reason, we repose in God, cannot be vain or fruitless; neither will the prayers we address to him be inefficacious, when they proceed from a heart which is pure and upright. Detest, then, and flee every vice; cultivate and pursue every virtue; exalt your mind to God, the only true hope; and offer up your prayers with humility to his throne. If you are ingenuous, you must confess the strict obligation that you are under, to live agreeably to the rules of wisdom and probity, as you know that all your actions are performed under the eye of an all-discerning Judge. FINIS."

"'The Consolation of Philosophy' was throughout the Middle Ages, and... to the beginnings of the modern epoch in the sixteenth century, the 's familiar companion."

"The Consolation of Philosophy is... as Gibbon called it, "a golden volume, not unworthy of the leisure of Plato or of Tully." To belittle its originality and sincerity, as is sometimes done, with a view to saving the Christianity of the writer, is to misunderstand his mind and his method. The Consolatio is not... a mere patchwork of translations from Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. Rather it is the supreme essay of one who throughout his life had found his highest solace in the dry light of reason. His chief source of refreshment, in the dungeon... was a memory well stocked with the poetry and thought... The development of the argument is anything but Neoplatonic; it is... his own."

"৳ But it is a matter of no moment, whether things in their own nature are necessary or not, since, by this circumstance of the Divine knowledge, to which they are all subject, they fall out in every respect as if they were constrained by necessity."

"All things therefore which God by his prescience knows will happen, shall undoubtedly come to pass; but as many of these events proceed from free-will, which, although they do befal, yet their existence changes not their nature, as, before they happened, they had it in their power not to happen."

"This... is explained, in the instance... of the sun rising, and a man walking. Now as you see both of these occurrences happen under your view, they assuredly do happen; but nevertheless there is this difference, that the event of the former was necessary before it befel, whereas that of the latter was altogether free. Thus, all things which are present to the view of the Deity unquestionably exist; but some of them proceed from a necessity belonging to their own natures, as in the instance of the rising sun; while others flow from the will and power of the agent, as in the other example. It is then with reason we have asserted, that in respect of the Divine apprehension, things are necessary; but that they are absolutely free from the chains of Fate, when considered in themselves. In the same way, every thing which is an object of sense, is general in regard to its relation with reason, but particular when considered by itself."

"If you still insist, that what God foresees will befal, must befal; and that things which cannot do otherwise than happen, must necessarily happen (if in this way you force me to admit a necessity, it must be acknowledged, it is unquestionably true that things are under such a constraint; but this is at the same time a truth which can scarce be comprehended by any man, unless he, is acquainted with the Divine counsels)."

"When you see... a man walking... and the sun rising... although you see both... at once... you plainly perceive... the former is voluntary, whilst... the latter is necessary. Thus the eye of Providence contemplates all things, without altering their nature and properties; for every thing... is present to him; though, with regard to its temporal event, it may be still future. Hence it follows, that when God knows a thing will be, although... he perceives it is under no necessity of being, we must nevertheless allow, that this knowledge is not an uncertain conjecture, but... founded upon truth."

"But, in answer to the above objection, that what God foreknows will take place, must come to pass; I would hive you to consider, that every thing which happens, as it bears a relation to the Divine knowledge, is necessary; but when considered in its own nature, it is altogether free and unconstrained: for there are two kinds of necessity; the one simple and absolute, as, men must necessarily die; the other conditional, as, if you know that a man walks, he must certainly do so: for that which is known cannot be otherwise than it is apprehended to be. But this circumstance or condition does by no means infer the other absolute necessity: for the nature of the thing itself does not here constitute the necessity, but the necessity arises from the conjunction of the condition. Thus, no necessity compels a man to walk, who voluntarily steps forward; yet when he steps forward, he must of necessity walk: so every thing which is present to the eye of Providence must assuredly be, although there be nothing in its own nature to constitute this necessity. Since Deity then beholds all future events, proceeding from the freedom of the will, as actually present; these events by that condition become necessary, in relation to the Divine apprehension; although, when considered in their own nature, they be at absolute liberty."

"But you may say, If it be in my power to change my purpose, I can deceive Providence, since I may not carry into execution those things which she foresaw I would do. To this I answer. It is indeed in your power to deviate from your purpose; but as Providence sees really and actually what you can do; since she knows whether you will alter your resolutions or not, and upon what resolution you will fix; it is as impossible for you to deceive the prescience of God, as it would be to escape the notice of a present and steady observer of your actions; though, from the freedom of your will, you have it in your power to vary and diversify them ever so much."

"If therefore you would properly define this prescience which gives to God the cognisance of every thing, it must not be considered as an anticipated knowledge of the future, but... more justly... esteemed a knowledge of the never-failing now."

"Since then every being judges of the things that are the objects of its understanding, according to the faculties of judgment which it possesses; and as God is in a state immoveable, and eternally present to every thing, his knowledge soars above the progression of time, brings together the past and the future, though at infinite intervals, and comprehends, in his capacious intellect, all things, as if they were now transacting."

"Hence, the word prescience, or foreknowledge, is not so applicable to the Divine Intelligence, as the word providence, or superintendence; for the exalted and sovereign Ruler looks down as it were from the summit of his universe, and beholds every thing moving in obedience to his infinitely wise direction."

"Ah! hapless state of human race! How quick do all their pleasures pass! And too, too weak their minds to bear Life's varied scenes of woe and care. When grief's sharp thorn the heart assails. Of wisdom's sons the purpose fails; Their boasted vigour soon gives way, Dark melancholy clouds their day; The helm no longer reason steers, But lawless passion domineers. Too sad a proof of this, alas! Ah, wretched mortal, is your case! Whilst undisgrac'd and unconfin'd, How firm and vigorous was your mind! Still ranging with unwearied view Creation's ample circuit thro'. The sun, refulgent source of day, You trac'd o'er all his radiant way; The moon that shines with borrowed light, And cheers with radiance mild the night, The silver moon's mysterious round Was by your magic numbers bound; The planets too that wand'ring go. And seem no settled course to know, Their periods, various and perplex'd, Were, by your art victorious, fix'd; Your tow'ring genius could resolve, What makes the heaven's vast frame revolve, Whilst all the lights that gild the skies, In order, daily set and rise; You too could tell, where nature forms Her mighty magazines of storms, Which with impetuous fury roll, And shake the earth from pole to pole; Why Spring awakes the genial hours, And decks th' enamell'd field with flow'rs, You knew;—and why kind Autumn's hand Diffuses plenty o'er the land: Thro' all her mazes you pursued Coy Nature, and her secrets viewed. But ah! sad change! that soaring mind Is now disconsolate and blind; To earth-born cares a wretched prey. And all the man is sunk away. Relentless fate has fix'd those eyes To earth, that whilom pierc'd the skies."

"There is no reasonable being... who has not freedom of will: for every being distinguished with this faculty is endowed with judgment to perceive the differences of things; to discover what he is to avoid or pursue."

"But can you imagine that God imposes a necessity upon events by beholding them, when men, by seeing things, do not make them necessary? for you before acknowledged to me, that your viewing an action happening under your eye, lays no necessity upon it. If we then may be allowed to compare the knowledge of man with that of God, it is plain, that whilst you see only some things in a limited instant, God sees every thing present to him at once, in an unlimited eternity. His Divine foresight does not therefore change the nature and properties of things; but they are present to his view in the very order as they shall in time befal: nor does he judge confusedly of them, but distinguishes with precision the events which will necessarily happen, from those which will take place unconstrained by necessity."

"What!—shall the Divine knowledge, will you farther say, be changed according to my dispositions; and when my desires vary and fluctuate, fixing now upon this thing, now upon that, will the apprehension of the Deity vary with them? No, certainly, it will not. For the view of Deity, if I may speak, out-runs every future event, and brings it back into the presence of his own apprehension; which does not vary, as you imagine, to conform itself to your caprices, but remains immoveable, and anticipates and comprehends at once all your variety of changes: which faculty of comprehending and seeing all things as present, God doth not derive from the issue of future events, but from the simplicity of his own nature."

"If it is asked why the Consolation of Philosophy contains no conscious or direct reference to the doctrines... in the Tractates... and is, at most, not out of harmony with Christianity, the answer is simple. In the Consolation he is writing philosophy; in the Tractates he is writing theology. He observes what Pascal calls the orders of things. Philosophy belongs to one order, theology to another. They have different objects. The object of philosophy is to understand and explain the nature of the world around us; the object of theology is to understand explain doctrines delivered by divine revelation. The scholastics recognized the distinction, and the corresponding difference in the function of Faith and Reason."

"Consider education not as the painful accumulation of facts and dates and reigns, nor merely the necessary preparation of the individual to earn his keep in the world, but as the transmission of our mental, moral, technical, and aesthetic heritage as fully as possible to as many as possible, for the enlargement of man’s understanding, control, embellishment, and enjoyment of life."

"History is, above all else, the creation and recording of that heritage; progress is its increasing abundance, preservation, transmission, and use. To those of us who study history not merely as a warning reminder of man’s follies and crimes, but also as an encouraging remembrance of generative souls, the past ceases to be a depressing chamber of horrors; it becomes a celestial city, a spacious country of the mind, wherein a thousand saints, statesmen, inventors, scientists, poets, artists, musicians, lovers, and philosophers still live and speak, teach and carve and sing. The historian will not mourn because he can see no meaning in human existence except that which man puts into it; let it be our pride that we ourselves may put meaning into our lives, and sometimes a significance that transcends death. If a man is fortunate he will, before he dies, gather up as much as he can of his civilized heritage and transmit it to his children. And to his final breath he will be grateful for this inexhaustible legacy, knowing that it is our nourishing mother and our lasting life."

"Civilization is not inherited; it has to be learned and earned by each generation anew; if the transmission should be interrupted for one century, civilization would die, and we should be savages again."

"This selective survival of creative minds is the most real and beneficent of immortalities."

"As education spreads, theologies lose credence, and receive an external conformity without influence upon conduct or hope."

"History is so indifferently rich that a case for almost any conclusion from it can be made by a selection of instances."

"History repeats itself in the large because human nature changes with geological leisureliness, and man is equipped to respond in stereotyped ways to frequently occurring situations in stimuli like hunger, danger, and sex."

"We have defined civilization as “social order promoting cultural creation.”"

"When the group or a civilization declines, it is through no mystic limitation of a corporate life, but through the failure of its political or intellectual leaders to meet the challenges of change."

"We shall here define progress is the increasing control of the environment by life. It is a test that may hold for the lowliest organism as well as for man."

"War is one of the constants of history, and has not diminished with civilization or democracy. In the last 3,421 years of recorded history only 268 have seen no war."

"It may be true, as Lincoln supposed to, that “you can’t fool all the people all the time,” but you can fool enough of them to rule a large country."

"The Ten Commandments must be silent when self-preservation is at stake."

"All deductions having been made, democracy has done less harm, and more good, than any other form of government. It gave to human existence a zest and camaraderie that outweighed its pitfalls and defects. It gave to thought and science and enterprise the freedom essential to their operation and growth. It broke down the walls of privilege and class, and in each generation it raised up ability from every rank and place. Under its stimulus Athens and Rome became the most creative cities in history, and America in two centuries has provided abundance for an unprecedentedly large proportion of its population. Democracy has now dedicated itself resolutely to the spread and lengthening of education, and to the maintenance of public health. If equality of educational opportunity can be established, democracy will be real and justified."

"In England and the United States, in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, in Switzerland and Canada, democracy is today sounder than ever before. It has defended itself with courage and energy against the assaults of foreign dictatorship, and has not yielded to dictatorship at home. But if war continues to absorb and dominate it, or if the itch to rule the world requires a large military establishment and appropriation, the freedoms of democracy may one by one succumb to the discipline of arms and strife. If race or class war divides us into hostile camps, changing political argument into blind hate, one side or the other may overturn the hustings with the rule of the sword. If our economy of freedom fails to distribute wealth as ably as it has created it, the road to dictatorship will be open to any man who can persuasively promise security to all; and a martial government, under whatever charming phrases, will engulf the democratic world."

"Should the leaders of America consider only the reluctance of this epicurean generation to face so great an issue, or should they consider also what future generations of Americans would wish that these leaders had done?"

"Some time ago a convention of morticians discussed the danger threatening their industry from the increasing tardiness of men in keeping their rendezvous with death. But if undertakers are miserable progress is real."