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April 10, 2026
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"A final aspect of all open access orders is Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction, one of the most powerful descriptions of a competitive, open access economy. When Schumpeter wrote Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy in the early 1940s, the economic theory of perfect competition among atomistic firms (i.e., firms too small to have market power) had come under sustained attack as unrealistic. Large and powerful economic organizations dominated the new economy, and their behavior did not match the textbooks. Despite this dominance, the economy produced historically unprecedented, sustained economic development. Schumpeter asked, How could large businesses that were supposed to choke off competition and growth nonetheless generate such spectacular productivity increases in a world that seemed ever more competitive?"
"Economists with a historical bent have only just begun to study institutional change and its impact on industrial organization. Douglass C. North has been the innovator here. In his work with he outlined a most useful theory of institutional change and applied it to American economic growth. In his study with Robert Paul Thomas he demonstrated how the changing industrial organization affected the rise of the west. The works of North and his colleagues use this sweeping panorama of history to test, buttress, and refine their theory. They have not yet focused on a detailed analysis of the historical development of any specific economic institution."
"Schumpeter’s approach has an important implication for political behavior. If the constellation of economic interests regularly changes because of innovation and entry, politicians face a fundamentally different world than those in a natural state: open access orders cannot manipulate interests in the same way as natural states do. Too much behavior and formation of interests take place beyond the state’s control. Politicians in both natural states and open access orders want to create rents. Rent-creation at once rewards their supporters and binds their constituents to support them. Because, however, open access orders enable any citizen to form an organization for a wide variety of purposes, rents created by either the political process or economic innovation attract competitors in the form of new organizations. In Schumpeterian terms, political entrepreneurs put together new organizations to compete for the rents and, in so doing, reduce existing rents and struggle to create new ones. As a result, creative destruction reigns in open access politics just as it does in open access economies. Much of the creation of new interests is beyond the control of the state. The creation of new interests and the generation of new sources of rents occur continuously in open access orders."
"Specialization in this world is rudimentary and self-sufficiency characterizes most individual households"
"International specialization and division of labor requires institutions and organizations to safeguard property rights across international boundaries so that capital markets as well as other kinds of exchange can take place with credible commitment on the part of the players."
"Robert Fogel and Douglass North have been awarded this year's Prize in Economics for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change."
"Order in the societies they describe is the result of a dense social network where people have an intimate understanding of each other and the threat of violence is a continuous force for preserving order because of its implications for other members of society."
"We are far from understanding how to achieve adaptively efficient economies because allocative efficiency and adaptive efficiency may not always be consistent. Allocatively efficient rules would make today's firms and decisions secure - but frequently at the expense of the creative destruction process that Schumpeter had in mind."
"The first economic revolution was not a revolution because it shifted man's major economic activity from hunting and gathering to settled agriculture. It was a revolution because the transition created an incentive change for mankind of fundamental proportions. The incentive change stems from the different property rights under the two systems. When common property rights over resources exist, there is little incentive for the acquisition of superior technology and learning. In contrast, exclusive property rights which reward the owners provide a direct incentive to improve efficiency and productivity, or, in more fundamental terms, to acquire more knowledge and new techniques. It is this change in incentive that explains the rapid progress made by mankind in the last 10,000 years in contrast to his slow development during the long era as a primitive hunter/gatherer."
"By that time a structure of property rights had developed in the Netherlands and England which provided the incentives necessary for sustained growth. These included the inducements required to encourage innovation and the consequent industrialization. The industrial revolution was not the source of modern economic growth. It was the outcome of raising the private rate of return on developing new techniques and applying them to the production process."
"Karl Marx and Adam Smith both subscribed to this view. They both saw successful growth as dependent on the development of efficient property rights. Their followers appear in the main to have forgotten this."
"Effective institutions raise the benefits of cooperative solutions or the costs of defection, to use game theoretic terms."
"Economic growth occurs if output grows faster than population. Given the described assumptions about the way people behave, economic growth will occur if property rights make it worthwhile to undertake socially productive activity. The creating, specifying and enacting of such property rights are costly... As the potential grows for private gains to exceed transaction costs, efforts will be made to establish such property rights. Governments take over the protection and enforcement of property rights because they can do it at a lower cost than private volunteer groups. However, the fiscal needs of government may induce the protection of certain property rights which hinder rather than promote growth; therefore we have no guarantee that productive institutional arrangements will emerge."
"In some respects this is intended to be a revolutionary book, but in other respects it is very traditional indeed. It is revolutionary in that we have developed a comprehensive analytical framework to examine and explain the rise of the Western world; a framework consistent with and complementary to standard neoclassical economic theory."
"Its objectives to suggest new paths for the study of European economic history rather than fit either of these standard formats. It is more than anything an agenda for new research."
"Regarding social order, Fukuyama writes, "The systematic study of how order, and thus social capital, can emerge in spontaneous and decentralized fashion is one of the most important intellectual developments of the late twentieth century." He correctly attributes the modern origins of this argument to F.A. Hayek, whose pioneering contributions to cognitive science, the study of cultural evolution, and the dynamics of social change put him in the forefront of the most creative scholars of the 20th century. But Hayek's views about the "spontaneity" of social order remain controversial. In their extreme form, they imply that all deliberate efforts to manipulate social order — social engineering — are doomed to failure because the complex nature of our cultural heritage makes a complete understanding of the human condition impossible. Hayek was certainly correct that we have, at best, a very imperfect understanding of the human landscape, but "spontaneous" it is not. What distinguishes human evolution from the Darwinian model is the intentionality of the players. The mechanism of variation in evolutionary theory (mutation) is not informed by beliefs about eventual consequences. In contrast, human evolution is guided by the perceptions of the players; their choices (decisions) are made in the light of the theories the actors have, which provide expectations about outcomes."
"Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, tradition, and code of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)."
"The factors we have listed (innovation, economies of scale, education, capital accumulation, etc.) are not causes of growth; they are growth."
"Information costs are reduced by the existence of large numbers of buyers and sellers. Under these conditions, prices embody the same information that would require large search costs by individual buyers and sellers in the absence of an organized market. (footnote 4: The original contributions were those of Hayek (1937 and 1945))."
"Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). Throughout history, institutions have been devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange."
"Even Ricardo's most famous accomplishment, the law of comparative advantage in foreign trade, is incomplete, though not wrong."
"The implications for planning are ambiguous. On the one hand, the optimal allocation under increasing returns will not be obtained under free markets. In fact, as I have already remarked, the competitive equilibrium is not even viable, and the outcome will be some kind of imperfect competition. But optimal allocation under increasing returns is difficult. For one thing, the optimisation requires the use of integer programming, a procedure intrinsically more complex than linear programming, and impossible to carry out for large systems even with the most powerful computers. Even more serious are the data demands. The information needed is widely dispersed among the industries and cannot be effectively communicated. It is for these reasons that decentralised decision-making with some element of monopoly is likely to be more efficient."
"The tension between chaotic behavior and perfect foresight was observed. Start with an equilibrium dynamics of a standard type derived from the hypothesis that future prices are predicted perfectly. Suppose that the solution to the difference equations characterizing the solution exhibits chaotic behavior. Is it realistic to assume that the future, even though deterministic, is in fact predictable? Clearly, part of the lessons drawn by natural scientists, especially meteorologists, from nonlinear dynamics is precisely the opposite; chaotic behavior implies that small errors of observation in the starting position may lead to virtually total unpredictability after some period of time. This creates no difficulties of consistency when the predictor is not part of the system being predicted. But when the predictors are the economic agents being examined, there is a fundamental inconsistency. This epistemological antinomy is reinforced by the empirical observation that actual behavior of prices of assets such as securities could never reasonably have been predicted; if it had, there would have been much more buying or selling at earlier stages."
"The problem I have with utilitarianism is not that it is excessively rational, but that the epistemological foundations are weak. My problem is: What are those objects we are adding up? I have no objection to adding them up if there's something to add. But the one thing I retain from utilitarianism is that, basically, judgements are based on consequences. Certainly that's the sort of thing we do in the theory of the single individual under uncertainty; you make sure utility is defined only over the consequences. I view rights as arrangements which may help you in achieving a higher utility level."
"Gibbard's work was a bombshell. That was very exciting. I didn't know about Satterthwaite's work for a couple of years, but it was very much the same thing. I had taken the liberty of abstracting from manipulability in my thesis and I never went back to that issue. What's surprising is not really that there is an impossibility of non-manipulability, but that the issues should be essentially the same. That strikes one as a remarkable coincidence."
"Certainly, there is no general principle that prevents the creation of an economic theory based on other hypotheses than that of rationality."
"I want to stress that rationality is not a property of the individual alone, although it is usually presented that way. Rather, it gathers not only its force but also its very meaning from the social context in which it is embedded."
"Studying oneself is not the most comfortable of enterprises. One is caught between the desire to show oneself in the best possible light and the fear of claiming more than one’s due."
"I was early regarded as having unusual intellectual capacity. I was an omnivorous reader, and I added to that a desire to systematize my understanding. As a result, history, for example, was not merely a set of dates and colorful stories; I could understand it as a sequence in which one event flowed out of another. This sense of order crystallized during my high-school and college years into a predominant interest in mathematics and mathematical logic."
"The Soviet Union and its satellite Socialist countries in Eastern Europe have typically avoided unemployment and business cycles, except as they are induced through their trade with the Western World. But on the other hand they are clearly inefficient and wasteful, at least relative to the West. As repeated statements by the socialist economists themselves make clear, the excessive concentration of economic decision-making is a prime cause of the inefficiency. There are recurring demands for "liberalization," even by the highest authorities (Yuri Andropov, the effective head of the Soviet Union, being the latest example), but they are responded to only mildly or not at all. Clearly, a really major step toward decentralization of economic power, to the plant managers or the workers themselves, is perceived as a threat to the system."
"Any argument seeking to establish the presence of irrational economic behavior always meets a standard counterargument: if most agents are irrational, then a rational individual can make a lot of money; eventually, therefore, the rational individuals will take over all the wealth. Hence, rational behavior will be the effective norm. There are two rebuttals to the counterargument. (1) Not all arbitrage possibilities exist. For example, corporate profits, even though they may be down, are very distinctly positive in real terms after all necessary adjustments, including taxes. Yet there seems no way by which the average investor in corporate securities can get a positive real rate of return. (2) More important, if everyone else is “irrational,” it by no means follows that one can make money by being rational, at least in the short run. With discounting, even eventual success may not be worthwhile. Consider, for example, a firm that engages in research and development which depresses the current profit and loss statement. Irrational investors look only at this information, and therefore the price of the stock is below the expected value of future dividends based on the profitable outcomes of the research and development. In a perfectly working market with rational individuals, stock prices would gradually rise as the realization date approached, but prices in the actual market would be constant. A rational investor would understand the future value of the stocks, but he or she could not realize any part of this gain during the gestation period. Although the rational investor may get rewarded eventually if the stock is held long enough, he or she is losing liquidity during an intervening period which may be long. Hence, the demand for the stock even by the rational buyers will be depressed. As Keynes argued long ago, the value of a security depends in good measure on other people’s opinions."
"In eras when authority or at least specific authorities have been questioned, there is more tendency to examine the roots of and the need for authority. The owl of Minerva flies not in the dusk but in the storm."
"Uncertainty means that we do not have a complete description of the world which we fully believe to be true."
"The purpose of organizations is to exploit the fact that many (virtually all) decisions require the participation of many individuals for their effectiveness."
"It is this thinking which I think gives rise to the greatest tragedies of history, this sense of commitment to a past purpose which reinforces the original agreement precisely at a time when experience has shown that it must be reversed."
"There are many other organizations beside the government and the firm. But all of them, whether political party or revolutionary movement, university or church, share the common characteristics of the need for collective action and the allocation of resources through nonmarket methods."
"As is by now well known, attempts to form social judgments by aggregating individual expressed preferences always lead to the possibility of paradox."
"Trust is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people's word. Unfortunately this is not a commodity which can be bought very easily. If you have to buy it, you already have some doubts about what you have bought."
"Collective action is a means of power, a means by which individuals can more fully realize their individual values."
"Multiple discoveries are in fact very common in science and for much the same reason. Developments in related fields with different motivation help one to understand a difficult problem better. Since these developments are public knowledge, many scholars can take advantage of them. It is pleasant to the ego to be first or among the first with a new discovery. However, in this case at least, the evidence is clear that the development of general equilibrium theory would have gone on quite as it did without me."
"I was a very polite person, though. Paul Samuelson tells these stories how he used to correct his professors. I assume that’s true. But I wasn’t that type."
"Finding out the prices of a large range of commodities is itself a costly enterprise, and knowledge of this fact by price setters is itself enough to create incentives for inefficient market behavior. If one individual has more information about the quality of a good than the second, the first may exploit the situation, and the second, distrusting him, may not take advantage of what is in fact a desirable trade."
"The competitive system can be viewed as an information and decision structure. Initially, each agent in the economy has a very limited perspective. The household knows only its initial holdings of goods (including labor power) and the satisfactions it could derive from different combinations of goods acquired and consumed. The firm knows only the technological alternatives for transforming inputs into outputs. The “communication” takes the form of prices. If the correct (equilibrium) prices are announced, then the individual agents can determine their purchases and sales so as to maximize profits or satisfactions. The prices are then, according to the pure theory, the only communication that needs to be made in addition to the information held initially by the agents. This makes the market system appear to be very efficient indeed; not only does it achieve as good an allocation as an omniscient planner could, but it clearly minimizes the amount of communication needed."
"Not only is it possible to devise complete models of the economy on hypotheses other than rationality, but in fact virtually every practical theory of macroeconomics is partly so based. The price- and wage- rigidity elements of Keynesian theory are hard to fit into a rational framework, though some valiant efforts have been made. … But if the Keynesian model is a natural target of criticism by the upholders of universal rationality, it must be added that monetarism is no better. I know of no serious derivation of the demand for money from a rational optimization. … The use of rationality in these arguments is ritualistic, not essential."
"The need for coordination has two basic causes: the various members (e.g., production units) are competing for a common pool of resources, financial and material; and different decisions complement or substitute for each other. For both reasons, the effectiveness of decisions made by one participant is influenced by the decisions of another. With limitations on the flow of information, the decisions themselves cannot be coordinated. That would require transferring all the information available, precisely what is to be avoided. It has been emphasized earlier that when information will be available, the individual should choose a decision function, a policy or strategy that determines what his actual decision should be for each possible signal he receives. Hence, ideally, in an organization there should be prior agreement on decision functions or strategies for all participants."
"If the state of information (the set of signals received) is given and constant, then optimal choice is a problem of decision making under a given uncertainty, a situation that has been the subject of considerable analysis in the last thirty years. The problems of the economics of information proper arise when the probability distribution of states of the world is a variable. In the language adopted here, the signals received can vary. The existence of signals creates two important possibilities for the improvement of decision making. The first is taking advantage of the existence of signals. If the individual knows that a signal will be received before the decision has to be made, his optimal choice should be a function of the signal. We can think, alternatively but equivalently, of making the decision after the receipt of the signal and basing it on the probability distributions of consequences conditional on the signal, or of making the decision in advance for all possible values of the signal."
"The meaning of information is precisely a reduction in uncertainty. From the viewpoint of economics or decision theory, uncertainty is relevant because it concerns the consequences of decisions. An individual making a decision may be supposed to be choosing one among a set of feasible alternatives. In general, these alternatives are themselves plans extending in time, and he will want to choose the one that yields the most satisfying consequences. These may be profits in successive periods for a business firm, or they may be other satisfactions, such as consumption, power, bequests, or interesting challenges. It can be assumed that the individual compares the entire set of consequences deriving from each alternative in his decision set with those of the others and chooses the preferred one."
"I have argued that forecasts will be based on more information than is contained in econometric models and in general on information differing from agent to agent. I also want to argue that they will not necessarily use all the information contained in an econometric model. In fact, the two propositions are intimately linked though they seem to move in opposite directions. We have to assume that information-processing ability is scarce. As I have already said, this is one of the main justifications for and explanations of a decentralized economy. But then it follows that an individual concentrates on acquiring the information most useful to him and will have to crowd out the information which is less useful. In particular, information that is broadly pertinent to the economy as a whole may have very little predictive power for the future of an individual."
"I disagree with the widely accepted proposition that econometric models should have expectations consistent with them. To the extent, it is argued, that the economic theory underlying the model involves anticipations, the anticipations that appear in the model as determining individual behavior should be equal to the forecasts made from the model. More generally, in fact, I would disagree with the weaker proposition that anticipations made by individuals should be necessarily dependent on broadly available general data about the economy and in particular about government actions."
"If the markets for durable goods are peculiarly sensitive to price anticipations, while those for perishable goods are more sensitive to current prices, then there is a little more scope for explaining economic fluctuations."