Military Leaders From The United States

"The admirals' academy careers are a study in contrasts. King made the best record. He was one of the lucky plebes who reached the Caribbean during the Spanish-American War, although he missed the Battle of Santiago. A star man in academic standing and a member of the junior varsity football team, the Hustlers, throughout his four years at the academy, in his first-class year he was chosen to command the battalion and graduated number four in a class of sixty-seven. His last year was dangerous, however. Put on report three times for smoking, he narrowly escaped a spell in the Santee and invited much more serious trouble by Frenching out to visit a girl in Annapolis. On one occasion a friend, learning of an unscheduled inspection at 10:00pm, loyally frenched out himself to bring King back on time. A few years later King was assigned to the Executive Department at the academy. At dinner with the midshipmen in Bancroft Hall one evening he was asked if he had ever frenched out. He admitted that he had. The next question was, "Did you ever get caught?" "No," King replied, "but I almost did." "How did you manage not to?" the midshipman persisted. "I am afraid I cannot tell you now," King parried, "but when you graduate, come out to my house and I will give you a drink and tell you how to French out and not be caught.""

"Neque Glauci regno nec Neptuni nec ipsis Iovis Tonantis intemerato."

"We knew that America needed a shot in the national arm. Since December 7, 1941, our national heritage had yielded to a prideless humiliation. Half of our fleet still sat on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. The Philippines were gone, Guam and Wake had fallen, the Japanese were approaching Australia. What Admiral King saw, and what he jammed down the throats of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was that just possibly the mighty Japanese had overextended. He saw that just possibly a strike by us could halt their eastward parade. The only weapon he held, the only weapon America held, was a woefully understrength fleet and one woefully ill-equipped and partially trained Marine division."

"Sir John Dill was a gentle genius at covering the waterfront in Washington for King and Country and for the ever present (in person or in spirit) Winston Churchill. During the critical war days he insinuated himself into the confidence of almost every important American. He enjoyed perhaps the most preferred position of any foreigner in our nation's capital. His diplomatic skill, tact, and calm philosophical manner were all disarming. I was always mindful of the fact that his first loyalty was to England. Although I admired and respected him, I tried never to forget for a moment that day and night his efforts were concentrated on furthering British interests. When British interests contravened American, I simply resisted Dill's maneuvers. Unfortunately there was no one in a high American position who seemed as alert to American interests as Dill was to British, except possibly Admiral King."

"Fourth, Lieutenant Commander Edward Ellsberg, Construction Corps, the salvage officer, was in direct personal charge of the actual salvage work and diving operations; his technical knowledge and resourcefulness were adequate for all of the innumerable setbacks and difficulties; he developed an improved underwater cutting torch, worked out the technique of handling the pontoons, learned to dive during the months the actual operations were suspended and actually went down on the wreck some three times during the spring operations; he was the embodiment of perseverance and determination."

"To Admiral of the Fleet Ernest J. King, an Undistinguished Service Stripe and Promotion to Grand Old Salt of the Alexandria Reserves: For conspicuous bravery and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in performance of which he brilliantly rejected his best professional advice and daringly ignored his own natural instincts, and alone and single-handedly, at a moment when adverse winds of publicity were threatening to sink the whole fleet, exposed himself to a frontal assault by the picked shock troops of the journalistic enemy led by some of the most reprehensible and blood-thirsty Washington correspondents, and from that moment on, never retiring to cover from their incessant salvos of cross-fire, stormed the enemy in its own defenses and in the decisive and little-known Battle of Virginia conquered and captivated them completely."

"You have invaded alike the realms of Glaucus, of Neptune, and of Jove the Thunderer."

"Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, was a spare, no-nonsense officer with a strong distaste for publicity, some enemies among the Army and British brass, and one of the sharpest strategic minds in Washington."

"In my judgment King was the strongest man on the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had a keen, analytical mind. He was incisive and direct in his approach to the solution of a problem. He did not understand and could not engage in small talk. Perhaps he took himself too seriously, for he seemed outwardly to be devoid of a sense of humor. Years of military training had left their stamp- a rigidly self-disciplined man who did not ask anyone to conform to a strict code unless he himself within his own conscience knew that he was capable of performing in a similar manner. He never engaged in a sarcasm and was completely selfless. If he had been a smoothie or a person given to double talk, he might have easily assuaged the hurt feelings of the British when he took a definite position against their efforts to commit practically everything to the Mediterranean."

"Although reputed to be a real "hard-nose", King could never feel that a ship was merely an inanimate assembly of pieces of wood and metal; to him it was a living thing with a soul that one could love."

"King had earned a reputation for brilliance and toughness, not to say harshness. He was generally reputed to be cold, aloof, and humorless. Ladislas Farago, who served under King, in his book The Tenth Fleet describes the new commander in chief: "Tall, gaunt and taut, with a high dome, piercing eyes, aquiline nose, and a firm jaw, he looked somewhat like Hogarth's etching of Don Quixote but he had none of the old knight's fancy dreams. He was a supreme realist with the arrogance of genius... He was a grim taskmaster, as hard on himself as others. He rarely cracked a smile and had neither time nor disposition for ephemeral pleasantries. He inspired respect but not love, and King wanted it that way." The description is, of course, as stereotype, as Farago readily admitted. King could turn a reasonably benevolent eye upon a subordinate who produced to suit him, and in return elicit a degree of wry affection. On the other hand, he was utterly intolerant of stupidity, inefficiency, and laziness. He hated dishonesty and pretension, despised yes-men, and had no patience with indecisive Hamlet types. He could be completely ruthless. On one occasion he sent a commander to relieve a rear admiral who, in King's opinion, had failed to measure up- with orders that the admiral be out of the Navy Department building by five o'clock that afternoon."

"In actual practice much of the Pacific war was devised by Admirals King and Nimitz. They were thus thrown into the closest cooperation, though most of the time they were far apart geographically. They maintained a constant dialogue in the form of radio dispatches, often several a day, letters, exchanges of representatives, and periodic meetings, usually in the Federal Building, San Francisco, King flying there from Washington and Nimitz from his headquarters in the Pacific. Though Admiral King's tone in communicating with Nimitz was occasionally acerbic, as was his nature, it is clear that the two commanders greatly respected each other. At the end of the war, King recommended Nimitz to be his successor as Chief of Naval Operations. Although their styles were in sharp contrast, King and Nimitz were more alike than different. Simplicity and directness were the keynotes of their characters. They were both dedicated to their country and to the Navy, though King's interests were more narrowly naval. Both were men of integrity and keen intelligence, and both were born strategists and organizers, with a genius for clarifying and simplifying and a jaundiced eye for the useless complications and waste emotion. Their chief difference lay in their attitudes toward their fellow human beings. King had little of Nimitz's understanding of, and empathy for, people. Said one of King's wartime associates, "Every great man has his blind spot, and his was personnel." King went to great lengths to draw into his command the sort of men he wanted and to eliminate those he did not. The results were not always fortunate. Several cases of his placing the wrong man in the wrong spot for the wrong reasons could be cited."

"While directing the movements of his ships in the western Pacific, Yamamoto, who fully realized the potential strength of the United States, was watching for the reaction of Nimitz and the possible approach of reinforcements. Neither King nor Nimitz could be lured into false moves by any of his strategems or taunted into premature action by newspaper critics at home."

"So what, old top?"

"Ever since General Billy Mitchell had demonstrated twenty years before that warships could be bombed successfully from the air, the US Navy had been alive to the significance of naval aviation. In the 1920s the Navy commissioned the carriers Lexington and Saratoga, the largest ships afloat until the war. Under Admiral King's leadership in the 1930s naval aviation made great strides in tactics and training. King's own career was linked with naval aviation. He had taught himself to fly when he was well over forty, and was commander of the carrier forces in the late 1930s. He was not a big battleship sailor; certainly not the man to pick up Yamamoto's challenge to a fleet duel."

"Summoned to Washington to assume the post of commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet after Admiral Kimmel's relief, King was a vigorous, aggressive leader whose masterful performance as head of the Atlantic Fleet during 1941 had won him the respect and admiration of Knox and Roosevelt. An old friend and associate of Admiral Stark, he had- even before the latter's departure- assumed the leading role in shaping the Navy's approach to grand strategy. Arrogant, aloof, and suspicious, a "sundowner," or strict disciplinarian, King inspired respect in many but affection in few. His admirers professed to see in him a brilliant strategist. To be sure, in sheer intellect he far overmatched his JCS colleagues, but his outlook was so strongly shaped by his intense and narrow devotion to Navy interests that he was seldom able to take a detached view of any strategic problem."

"Whether or not the British would in the end have baulked at Overlord remains an open question. By late 1943 a great deal of planning and force preparation had already been carried out, and they risked a serious breach with a watchful ally, growing more confident of its power month by month. But in the end the decision was taken out of their hands. At the end of November the three Allied leaders agreed to meet at Teheran. Rather than argue any more with the British, American leaders planned to outmaneuver them. The two western Allies met first at Cairo to discuss issues from the Far East and, so the British expected, the Mediterranean. Relations between the two military staffs were poorer than ever. Brooke became uncharacteristically intemperate; Admiral King, commander of the American navy, came close on one occasion to striking him. But on issues to do with Overlord and the Mediterranean the Americans remained silent, leaving the floor to their ally. When pressed they replied that the issues would be discussed when they met Stalin."

"[King was] perhaps the most disliked Allied leader of World War II. Only British Field Marshal Montgomery may have had more enemies... King also loved parties and often drank to excess. Apparently, he reserved his charm for the wives of fellow naval officers. On the job, he "seemed always to be angry or annoyed"."

"For all his human weaknesses, however, King was a magnificent sailor who excelled in all branches of seamanship. He had commanded a flotilla of destroyers in World War I with great skill and distinction. He was the hero of a between-wars catastrophe when a U.S. submarine- the S51- went down with all hands, and he and a team of divers had successfully raised it to the surface against all expert prognostications, though too late to save the crew. He was the pioneer of that new branch of the post-World War I Navy, the Air Division Command, had learned to fly a plane and land it on the deck of one of the first American aircraft carriers, which he had successfully commanded. He shared one other quality with Marshall: patience. Like the Army Chief of Staff, he had waited years for promotion, and though his elbow-bending propensities hadn't helped him, he had held in there, enduring and waiting. As he said later, when the top job finally arrived, "If one can only hold on for a little time longer, things will be eased up and in due time the trouble will iron out. That has been my own belief, not to say creed, but it works out for me.""

"From the beginning of his service as chief of naval operations and fleet commander- a fusion of responsibilities unknown in the navy's history- King proved he would fight the war his way, which meant an institutional focus on the Pacific war, a focus so intense that King himself botched the war on the German U-boats in 1942. He simply ignored this failure and pushed for more offensive action in the Pacific. He disagreed with cautious colleagues or superiors more often than not. He said no with routine abruptness to FDR, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, George C. Marshall, Douglas MacArthur, and the British representatives on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He had an overriding strategic goal: to destroy the Japanese military might and to detach the U.S. Navy from the thrall of the British and MacArthur. Unlike MacArthur, King had no roots in Congress, the media, or any political party. Instead, he depended entirely o his absolute sense of purpose and strategic correctness to insist that the Allies could not defeat the Japanese along the Malay barrier at an acceptable cost in time and lives."

"King's greatest political-strategic victory of the war came over the British and U.S. armies in 1943 when he won formal recognition from Roosevelt and Churchill that the war with Japan could be won only by an American naval campaign across the Central Pacific, a campaign directed by him and his principal field subordinate, Chester W. Nimitz. The first phase of the debate occurred before, during, and after two Roosevelt-Churchill conferences in early 1943: "Trident" in Washington, D.C., and "Quadrant" in Quebec. Aided by his best strategist, Admiral Cooke, King fought for his version of JCS 287, an American-drafted "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan." In its earliest drafts, this plan simply reflected the current reality that there were campaigns under way in Burma, China, and the South Pacific. Although army planners, dedicated to a second front in Europe, showed little interest in the war with Japan, the army still endorsed MacArthur's "I Shall Return" campaign. King insisted that any campaign should focus on the destruction of Japan's overseas resources, which meant an offensive direct only toward the Western Pacific sea lanes. He played on FDR's declining confidence that the British and Chinese would ever contribute much to a war of economic strangulation against Japan. When the British chiefs finally admitted that they would not release force from the Mediterranean for Asia, King pressed for the endorsement of CCS 242/6, "Agreed Essentials in the Conduct of the War, which basically made the war with Japan an American responsibility. Roosevelt and Churchill approved this document on 25 May 1943."

"In character, Ernie King was the direct antithesis of General George Marshall. It is true that they had in common a liking for attractive women, but while Marshall's mood lightened at the sight of a pretty face, King reached out at the approach of a seductive female rump. He was an inveterate bottom pincher, and the benchmarks of many a bright young officer's promotion in the Navy were the bruises on his wife's shapely posterior. King was very much married, with a family of six daughters and a son. His wife, Mattie, was one of those spouses who used to be referred to as "long-suffering." She had known the time when her husband had been not only a dogged chaser of naval wives but a hard drinker, too, passed over for promotion on one crucial occasion for suspected alcoholism; but, typical of his strength of mind, he had taken the pledge to eschew hard liquor for the duration of the war and now sipped only an occasional sherry. He had taken no similar pledge to eschew the opposite sex, and Mattie King had learned to live with that, though she did occasionally retaliate by finding out which naval wife King happened to be visiting. She would then telephone and, refusing to speak to her husband, would simply leave the message: "Tell him his wife called.""

"He was a seadog who, despite his age (he was sixty-three, two years older than Marshall) had teeth and knew how to use them. Ashamed of the Navy's errors in Hawaii, he stormed into his new office under full sail, having been appointed by the President not only as Navy Chief of Staff but also as Commander in Chief of U.S. Navy Operations. The acronym for that had previously been CINCUS, but it is indicative of King's frame of mind that he thought it sounded too much like "Sink Us" with its Pearl Harbor connotations, and therefore had it changed to COMINCH. By presidential decree, he became the most powerful sailor in the history of the U.S. Navy, able to make operational and policy decisions over the head of the Secretary of the Navy himself, Colonel Frank Knox."

"Whatever his failings in interpersonal relations, King was a superb administrator and a determined foe of bureaucratization. His Fleet Staff was kept purposefully small and officers were constantly rotated in from sea duty, then rotated out again in a year or so- before they could acquire what King balefully referred to as "the Washington mentality.""

"The news was a stunning blow, and it quickly rippled all the way back to Pearl Harbor and to Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, in Washington, D.C. Both King and Admiral Nimitz, in particular, were concerned about the impact of the tragedy on the impending plans to bomb Japan. They feared a controversy in the midst of what could be the war's- and the Navy's- finest hour."

"By the end of 1943, King had largely succeeded in not only making the United States the principal arbiter of Pacific strategy but in making American strategy synonymous with navy strategy."

"Historically ... it is traditional and habitual for us to be inadequately prepared. This is the combined result of a number factors, the character of which is only indicated: democracy, which tends to make everyone believe that he knows it all; the preponderance (inherent in democracy) of people whose real interest is in their own welfare as individuals; the glorification of our own victories in war and the corresponding ignorance of our defeats (and disgraces) and of their basic causes; the inability of the average individual (the man in the street) to understand the cause and effect not only in foreign but domestic affairs, as well as his lack of interest in such matters. Added to these elements is the manner in which our representative (republican) form of government has developed as to put a premium on mediocrity and to emphasise the defects of the electorate already mentioned."

"King was a brilliant naval officer and exceptionally capable seaman. But he had a willful, mean, and brittle side to his nature that limited his effectiveness as a leader charged with bringing new people and new ideas to bear on problems of developing untraditional and unanticipated ways of waging warfare."

"The war has been variously termed a war of production and a war of machines. Whatever else it is, so far as the United States is concerned, it is a war of logistics."

"Roosevelt, who had been assistant secretary of the navy during World War I and maintained a proprietary interest in the service, had a hand in the choice of the sixty-three-year-old King as CINCLANT. Tough, brilliant, and short-tempered- Roosevelt said "he shaved with a blow torch"- King was an aviator, a submariner, and a staff officer, and the president's idea of a fighting sailor. Only a short time before, the admiral had been passed over for a top command and was headed for retirement, because, it was said, he drank too much, chased other men's wives, and had too many enemies. "When they get into trouble they send for the sons-of-bitches," was his explanation for this reversal of fortune."

"King was a sailor's sailor. He believed what was good for the Navy was good for the United States, and indeed the world. In that sense and that alone he was narrow. But he had a firm grasp of naval strategy and tactics, an encyclopedic knowledge of naval detail, an immense capacity for work, and complete integrity. Endowed with a superior intellect himself, he had no tolerance for fools or weaklings. He hated publicity, did not lend himself to popular buildup, and was the despair of interviewers. Unlike Admiral Stark's decisions, King's were made quickly and without much consultation; when anyone tried to argue with him beyond a certain point, a characteristic bleak look came over his countenance as a signal that his mind was made up and further discussion was useless. Although he had nothing of the courtier in his makeup, King acquired and retained the confidence and esteem of President Roosevelt. The two men were in a sense complimentary. Each had what the other lacked, and in concert with General Marshall, who shared the qualities of both, they formed a perfect winning team. The Republic has never had more efficient, intelligent and upright servants than these three men."

"The day after Pearl Harbor our Navy's position in the Pacific was extremely grave. The bulk of our major ships had been put out of commission for a year; only our small Asiatic Fleet under Admiral Hart in the Philippines and portions of the Pacific Fleet that had been absent from Pearl Harbor on the day of the attack were in fighting condition in the Pacific. Even Hawaii might be attacked and overrun at any moment. And in the Atlantic the Axis submarines were destroying a tremendous tonnage of our shipping within sight of our very shores. Then, even at the lowest of the war tide, the decision was made, and correctly: first fight for time, especially in the Pacific- and then assemble the might to conquer first Italy and then Germany, and then inevitably Japan must succumb."

"Nor is the Navy content to rest on its present laurels. Long a leader in invention and research, our Navy is already studying new weapons, new methods- the atomic bomb and guided missiles, for instance. Whatever new weapons, or defenses against new weapons, science can develop, the U.S. Navy intends to incorporate them into itself to make sure that the Navy shall always be strong enough to perform its historic function of defense of our own country and of offense against enemy countries. It is to be hoped that every American will exert his effort and influence to see that goal is achieved- that the U.S. Navy will always remain, as it is today, the world's greatest sea power."

"Calculating risks does not mean taking a gamble. It is more than figuring the odds. It is not reducible to a formula. It is the analysis of all factors which collectively indicate whether or not the consequences to ourselves will be more than compensated for by the damage to the enemy or interference with his plans. Correct calculation of risks, by orderly reasoning, is the responsibility of every naval officer who participates in combat, and many who do not."

"SUSPEND ALL OFFENSIVE ACTION. REMAIN ALERT."

"Well, it's all over. I wonder what I'm going to do tomorrow."

"I can best stress the importance of the U.S. Navy to the American people when I state that without sea power on our side the United States would never have become a nation, would not have continued to exist as a nation, and even more specifically would not have won the great World War just so successfully concluded."

"Admiral Ernest J. King was the Navy's principal architect of victory. A stern sailor of commanding presence, vast sea-knowledge, and keen strategic sense, he was so insistent on maintaining the independence of the Navy, not only from our great Ally but from the Army, that he seemed at times to be anti-British and anti-Army. Neither was true; but King's one mistaken idea was his steady opposition to "mixed groups" from different Navies in the same task force; an idea strengthened by the unfortunate experience of the ABDA command... We may, however, concede to Admiral King a few prejudices, for he was undoubtedly the best naval strategist and organizer in our history. His insistence on limited offensives to keep the Japanese off balance, his successful efforts to provide more and more escorts for convoys, his promotion of the escort carrier antisubmarine groups, his constant backing of General Marshall to produce a firm date for Operation OVERLORD from the reluctant British; his insistence on the dual approach to Japan, are but a few of the many decisions that prove his genius. King's strategy for the defeat of Japan- the Formosa and China Coast approach, rather than the Luzon-Okinawa route- was overruled; but may well, in the long run, have been better than MacArthur's, which was adopted. King was also defeated in his many attempts to interest the Royal Navy in a Southeast Asia comeback; and in this he was right. The liberation of Malaya before the war's end would have spared the British Empire a long battle with local Communists and would have provided at least a more orderly transfer of sovereignty in the Netherlands East Indies."

"The trial would begin in five days, on December 3, 1945. Admiral Nimitz and Admiral Spruance had disagreed with the inquiry's initial recommendation and suggested a letter of reprimand. However, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King a stern and "by-the-book" Navy man, pressed for the trial, and Secretary Forrestal agreed... McVay had less than a week to prepare his defense. King, eager to hurry the proceedings, had refused McVay his first choice of counsel when his preferred lawyer proved not immediately available. McVay wound up with an inexperienced lawyer."

"The part of the U.S. Navy alone in this war was stupendous. And I wish here to acknowledge our debt not only to the men and women of the United States Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and their several Women's Reserves, but also to those innumerable civilians who aided the Navy's war effort."

"[King was] opinionated, short-tempered, highly irascible, and rude."

"On the evening of December 8, therefore, after the Japanese had bombed the airfields and destroyed many of General MacArthur's planes, our submarines and motor torpedo boats, which were still in Philippine water, were left with the task of impeding the enemy's advance."

"I have a philosophy that when you have a commander in the field, let him know what you want done and then let him alone. I have two other philosophies. One is: Do the best you can with what you have. The other is: Do not worry about water over the dam."

"We knew what Nimitz was doing. He did the right thing, and we let him alone."

"It's going to be a long war. We will really hit our stride in about a year's time... Our two-ocean Navy is not yet in service. The smaller ships for it will begin to come into service around Thanksgiving or Christmas. The plain fact is we haven't got the tools. Some of our critics would have us do everything everywhere all at once. It can't be done with what we have to work with."

"We hear a great deal of clamor from time to time for unity of command. That's a loose term and has come to be widely used by people who don't have the full facts. Actually, many good officers are not qualified or competent to exercise unified command, but we keep on hearing amateurs suggest that some one man be called in to exercise sweeping control over all things military."

"In the last analysis, Russia will do nine-tenths of the job of defeating Germany."

"I'd say they started something at Pearl Harbor that they are not going to finish. We are going to win this war."

"Our days of victory are in the making."

"The seeming helplessness of our cousins strikes me as amusing when it is not annoying. I am sure what they wish in their hearts is that we would haul down the Stars and Stripes and hoist the White Ensign in all our ships. What particularly irks me is their strong liking for mixed forces, which as you know approached anathema to me. I am willing to take over additional tasks- and we have done so- but I cannot be expected to agree to help them cling to tasks that they themselves say they are unable to do unless we lend them our ships and other forces. I think we have done enough for them in their Home Fleet."