Military Leaders Of World War Ii

"It seems to me, Mr. President, that in this particular time that all of history points to the harsh fact that until we are much nearer this goal of a peaceful world to which you inspiringly lead, that we must maintain this Army in which you have such an abiding faith as a strong clement in the defense of this Nation. As I turn over my duties to the splendid officer who succeeds me, I have absolute confidence, Mr. President, that if ever our security or our liberty are threatened, that this magnificent Army of ours will valiantly play its ultimately decisive role in those defenses."

"Remember there are many others on your team, and be inwardly humble. Every man’s life is equally precious, although all are at the disposal of our country, and the contribution each makes in battle is of equal potential value."

"Well, as you look back with the hindsight of thirty years, I think that a farsighted statesman could have seen that this little sliver of land, the Korean peninsula, off the great Asian land mass, was of great strategic importance. It had been fought over already by Russia, China, Japan, and the Korean forces. And given the known conduct of the leadership of the Soviet Union, it was clear that an attempt might be made to regain control. The Russian forces had been in there up to 1904 and 1905 when the Russo-Japanese War took place. It's a very strategic little area there. It would become a threat to Japan by whichever great power controlled it. So I would say again that I would think that farsighted statesmen should have seen this thing coming and had they seen it then they would have been inclined to reverse the policy of only lightly arming the South Korean forces, but they didn't."

"When a soldier rising, sword in hand, reaches to protect an idea -- freedom, liberty, human kindness -- the world is, for a moment, hushed. Greatness is often born in quiet, in stillness. And so it was that night in June of 1944 when General Matthew B. Ridgway prayed the words God spoke to Joshua: "I will not fail thee, nor forsake thee." D-day saved a continent, and so, a world. And Ridgway helped save D-day. Heroes come when they're needed; great men step forward when courage seems in short supply. World War II was such a time. And there was Ridgway. General, thank you, and God bless you."

"Throughout my two years as Chief of Staff, I felt I was being called upon to tear down, rather than build up, the ultimately decisive element in a properly proportioned fighting force on which the world could rest its hope for maintaining the peace or, if the catastrophe of war came, for enforcing its will upon those who broke that peace."

"The occasion for the relief of commanders may regrettably arise. If it does, there are three points to consider: If your decision is based on personal knowledge and observation, or on secondhand information? What will the effect be on the command concerned? Are you relieving a commander whose men think highly of him-even with affection-regardless of professional competence? And, finally, have you a better man available? Every man is entitled to go into battle with the best chance of survival your forethought as a leader can provide. What best helps you discharge this responsibility? Sharing things with your men; to be always in the toughest spots; always where the crisis is, or seems most likely to develop; always thinking of what help you can give your commanders who are executing your orders; doing your utmost to see that the best in rations, shelter, first aid, and evacuation facilities are available; being generous with praise, swift and fair with punishment when you have the facts, intolerant of demonstrated failure in leadership on which lives depend, yet making full allowances for human weaknesses and the stresses and strains of battle on individuals."

"Some people thought I wore the grenades as a gesture of showmanship. This was not correct. They were purely utilitarian. Many a time, in Europe and Korea, men in tight spots blasted their way out with grenades."

"I publicly protested the adoption of the volunteer Army, now a demonstrated failure and perhaps a disaster. I publicly deplored the dismantling of Selective Service and the admission of women into our service academies. Every one of those actions is now looming as potentially detrimental to the esprit and effectiveness of our armed forces -- a blow at discipline, without which no military unit is worth its keep."

"No other means will provide the commander with what his personal perceptions can provide, if he is present at the critical time and place, He can personally intervene, if he thinks that necessary, but only to the extent that such intervention will be helpful and not interfere with his subordinates. He is in a position to make instant decisions, to defend, withdraw, attack, exploit, or pursue."

"Character is the bedrock on which the whole edifice of leadership rests. It is the prime element for which every profession, every corporation, every industry searches in evaluating a member of its organization. With it, the full worth of an individual can be developed. Without it--particularly in the military profession-failure in peace, disaster in war, or, at best, mediocrity in both will result."

"The qualities of a leader are not limited to commanders. The requirement for leadership are just as essential in the staff officer, and in some respects more exacting, since he does not have that ultimate authority which can be used when necessary and must rely even more than his commander on his own strength of character, his tact and persuasion in carrying out his duties. Between the commander and his chief of staff in a division or larger unit there should be thorough mutual respect, understanding, and confidence with no official secrets between them. Together they form a single dual personality, and the instructions issuing from the chief of staff must have the same weight and authority as those of the commander himself"

"I've seen some pretty damned bloody engagements myself. You don't pile bodies up in a wall at all. It reminds me of one marine who said to the sergeant, "Sergeant, you used the word 'hordes,' attacking in 'hordes.' How many platoons does it take to make a horde?" In other words, while the Chinese, and the North Koreans to an even greater extent, attacked with a fanaticism which was hard for us to understand attacks in the face of our superior firepower which no American commander would have countenanced for a moment the bodies still would be scattered according to their approach. You don't build a wall of bodies. Maybe you did in a medieval city when you were trying to breach a wall or something."

"While recognizing that there are many principles, or truths. Pertaining to the exercise of leadership, and while firmly believing that powers of leadership can be greatly increased in any individual through knowledge of these principles and practice in their application, I still think the variables of human nature combined with those of combat, and to a lesser degree with those in peacetime training, make the exercise of leadership far more of an art than science."

"Well, we want to do everything with welfare and everything else ahead of the primary responsibility of government which is to govern and to protect the people. It's a long, long step ahead there, but once you've lost that national independence, you never regain it. We never have come very close to it but we almost did in our revolutionary period in gaining our independence. Our leadership for many years was willing to take a chance on not spending the money and making the effort to rebuild our military forces, in favor of diverting the funds to other purposes. You couldn't get the money out of the Congress, and I don't think the presidents of the United States after Truman made any great effort to do it. They went along with the general feeling to which the Congress was completely responsive."

"There is another element in battlefield leadership which I want to mention and illustrate. It is a cardinal responsibility of a commander to foresee insofar as possible where and when crises affecting his command are likely to occur. It starts with his initial estimate of the situation—a continuing mental process from the moment of entering the combat zone until hie unit is pulled out of the line. Ask yourself these questions. What are the enemy capabilities? What shall I do, or what could I do, if he should exercise that one of his capabilities which would be most dangerous to me, or most likely to interfere with the accomplishment of my mission?"

"Well, we like to sign a check and say that the bill is paid, you see; then we realize that the payment's going to come later and be more painful still. We like to think that when we sign an agreement, the other party is going to keep it. We keep our part but the Russians have no intention of keeping it, none whatever. Duplicity, secrecy, and every form of deceit is in- grained in their working methods and their handling of peoples. They've always been that way when I say always, I mean about two or three hundred years at least."

"As commander of a division or smaller unit, there will rarely be more than one crisis, one really critical situation facing you at any one time. The commander belongs right at that spot, not at some rear command post. He should be there before the crisis erupts, if possible. If it is not possible, then he should get there aa soon as he can after it develops. Once there, then by personal observation of terrain, enemy fire, reactions, and attitudes of his own commanders on the spot—by his eyes, ears, brain, nose, and his sixth sense gets the best possible picture of what is happening and can best exercise hie troop leadership and the full authority of his command. He can start help of every kind to his hard-pressed subordinates. He can urge higher commander to provide additional fire support, artillery, air, other infantry weapons, and, in the future, perhaps, nuclear strikes."

"If, at this time, he is at some rear command post, he will have to rely on reports from others, and time will be lost, perhaps just those precious moments which spell the difference between success and failure. Notwithstanding the console capabilities of future television in combat, I still believe what I have said is true. In any event, keep tide time factor ever in mind. It is the one irretrievable, irretrievable, priceless element in war."

"The quality of British strategic decision-making was also vital. As is his due, Churchill is still remembered on both sides of the Atlantic as the saviour of his nation and the architect of the Allied victory. But if Churchill had enjoyed the same untrammelled power as Hitler, he might well have lost the war, so erratic were his strategic judgements. It was the limitation of Churchill's power that was Britain's greatest strength - the fact that the other members of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, notably Brooke, were able not merely to disagree with 'the old man', but frequently to dissuade him."

"Britain waged war by committee. No individual's will was supreme. The armed services were forced to hammer out their differences and subscribe to a coherent strategy. The result was no doubt sometimes ponderous, but the chances of a catastrophic error were thereby much reduced. The same could also be said of the unwieldy but nevertheless vital Anglo- American Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings. Indeed, it may be that it was Brooke's caution and tenacity in argument that restrained the Americans from a premature attempt to open a Second Front in Western Europe, in the face of intense pressure from Stalin as well as from sections of the British public. Hitler, by contrast, could and did sack any commander whose obedience he so much as doubted. There was nothing to prevent him from issuing counter-productive orders that merely wasted German lives - nothing to prevent him descending eventually into the realm of fantasy, moving non-existent divisions into what were in any case untenable positions."

"King on the other hand is a shrewd and somewhat swollen headed individual. His vision is mainly limited to the Pacific, and any operation calculated to distract from the force available in the Pacific does not meet with his support or approval. He does not approach the problems from a worldwide war point of view, but instead with one biased entirely in favour of the Pacific. Although he pays lip service to the fundamental policy that we must defeat Germany and then turn on Japan, he fails to apply it in any problems connected with the war."

"Professional Luftwaffe officers, realizing that German bombers were not armored or otherwise equipped for defense against enemy fighters, were opposed to the Battle of Britain. But Hitler, supported of course by Hermann Goering, overruled his professional airmen and insisted upon carrying through."

"The Germans did not succeeded in gaining undisputed control of the air, a prerequisite for a successful land invasion. As later revealed, German production hadn't concentrated on building sufficient air strength, either in type or numbers. Moreover, Goering continually interfered with operations during the critical period of the Battle of Britain, ordering costly daylight bombing attacks that resulted in a tremendous attrition of Nazi planes. There seemed to be a total lack of firm objectives- "too many targets", as General Kreipe has said. Although Goering was a disciple of the doctrines of General Douhet, he was often guilty of dissipation of means."

"The gravest charge against Admiral Kimmel and General Short is that they virtually ignored the "war warning" dispatch of 17 November from Washington. Admiral Kimmel, as we have seen, did send air reinforcement promptly to Wake and Midway Islands. He had already (with Admiral Bloch's cooperation) set up the surface and air patrol off the mouth of Pearl Harbor which encountered the midget submarines. Thus, the charge whittles down to this: that he did not repeat this warning and beef-up air patrol after 17 November. He thought that he had done everything that could reasonably be expected, in view of the intelligence received. Nevertheless, an "unwarranted feeling of immunity from attack" prevailed in Oahu at the crucial moment, as Admiral King observed; and it is not unfair to hold Kimmel and Short responsible."

"There is an old saying, "Give every dog two bites"; but Kimmel and Short were not even allowed one; they were relieved from active duty forthwith. Admiral Turner, however, was conceded two bites- Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Savo Island, after which he became a highly successful practitioner of amphibious warfare. General Marshall functioned brilliantly as Chief of Staff; and Admiral Stark, as Commander United States Naval Forces Europe in London, acquitted himself very well. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were so shaken by the attack that they had to be relieved anyway; but they might, with justice, have been given honorable commands elsewhere."

"Even then, I think everyone present knew that the disaster would be formally investigated, but I'll take my oath that not one of us would have guessed that the blame would fall on Kimmel, because not one of us thought he deserved it- any part of it. I want to emphasize my next statement. In all my experience, I have never known a Commander in Chief of any United States Fleet who worked harder, and under more adverse circumstances, to increase its efficiency and to prepare it for war; further, I know of no officer who might have been in command at the time who could have done more than Kimmel did. I also want to repeat and reemphasize the answer I made when the Roberts Commission asked me how I happened to be ready for the Japanese attack. I told them, "Because of one man: Admiral Kimmel." Who, then, is to blame? Look at it logically: the attack succeeded because Admiral Kimmel and General Short could not give Pearl Harbor adequate protection. They could not give it because they did not have it to give. They did not have it because Congress would not authorize it. Congress is elected by the American people. And the blame for Pearl Harbor rests squarely on the American people and nowhere else. Instead of trying to dodge our responsibility by smirching two splendid officers, we should be big enough to acknowledge our mistakes- and wise enough to profit by him."

"The Pacific Fleet was inferior to the Japanese Fleet in every category of fighting ship... Japan, at the outbreak of hostilities, had nine aircraft carriers in commission. We had three carriers in the Pacific and those did not have their full quota of planes. Although the battleships of the fleet were all approximately the same age as the heavy ships of the Japanese Navy, our ships were particularly deficient in short-range anti-aircraft weapons..."

"All this was long ago. Nearly two-thirds of my classmates are dead, and not one of us is left on active duty. But there might be one if a close friend of mine received his justice. I refer, and will refer again, to Husband E. Kimmel."

"I was in such a hurry to see Kimmel that I commandeered the first boat I found. Machine-gunners were firing at everything that moved, and bullets whizzed around us all the way to CINCPAC's landing, but the black-out saved us from damage. In peacetime Pearl, the officers wore whites on Sundays. Kimmel and his staff were still wearing their Sunday uniforms, crumpled, and spotted with mud. Their faces were haggard and unshaven, but their chins were up. Kimmel himself was a marvel of cool efficiency, although the hysteria that surged around him mounted by the minute: eight Japanese transports had been seen rounding Barbers Point; Jap gliders and paratroopers- their uniforms were described- had just landed at Kanoehe. I broke out laughing. Kimmel wheeled on me. "What the hell is there to laugh about?" I said, I've heard a lot of wild reports in my life, but that's the wildest I ever heard! The Japs can't possibly tow gliders here from their nearest base, and certainly they're not going to waste their precious carrier decks on any such nonsense. My God!""

"Goddamnit, use your common sense!"

"From: CINCPAC To: All ships present AIR RAID PEARL HARBOR X THIS IS NO DRILL"

"I felt lower than a frog’s posterior. This was my first combat mission. I planned it from the beginning and led it. I was sure it was my last. As far as I was concerned, it was a failure, and I felt there was no future for me in uniform now. Even if we successfully accomplished the first half of our mission, the second half had been to deliver the B-25s to our units in the China-Burma-India theater of operations."

"That was perhaps the greatest tragedy of our mission. All of that horror was retribution against the Chinese for helping us…. They also exacted their revenge against our captured men, which I learned of later… The loss of those men has always stayed with me. When people ask about the atomic bombs and their justification, they come to mind."

"When the wreckage was cleared, Mr. Todd [the instructor] looked at me carefully and said we should get on with our business. I was shaken up by what I had seen but nodded in agreement, and we went up for the first lesson. If there is such a thing as love at first sight, my love for flying began on that day during that hour."

"Well, I have always been highly competitive, and that is useful no matter what sport you go into. And in those days flying was to a considerable degree a sport, yes. But what really helped me in aviation was to have fast reactions and a good sense of balance. I think I got those from my tumbling, not my boxing."

"It had three real purposes. One purpose was to give the folks at home the first good news that we'd had in World War II. It caused the Japanese to question their warlords. And from a tactical point of view, it caused the retention of aircraft in Japan for the defense of the home islands when we had no intention of hitting them again, seriously in the near future. Those airplanes would have been much more effective in the South Pacific where the war was going on."

"[T]here has never been a time, when I’ve been completely satisfied with myself. . . . I’ve very much appreciated the respect that my peers have given me throughout a fairly long life. Nowadays I try to spend at least half my time continuing to be useful, still making a contribution, while getting whatever rest, recreation, and diversification I believe is essential if one is to go on living a happy and useful life."

"From the time I was a very young fellow, I knew I wanted to do two things. I wanted to build things, and I wanted to see the world. It seemed to me that the best way to build things was to be an engineer, and the best way to see the world was to be the kind of engineer that went to different parts of the world. In those days that meant either a civil or a mining engineer. I decided to become a mining engineer."

"I will not be able to do anything until the air fields are captured and supplied with fuel, oil, ammunition, bombs, spare parts, and all the necessary ground personnel."

"You look for a chap who has good eyesight, who has fast reactions, who has a good sense of balance, but most important, you look for someone who really loves to fly. It would be very difficult to make a good pilot out of a chap who hated it. We always incline to do best those things that we enjoy doing. Another thing you look for is a pilot who can learn his limitations. A poor pilot is not necessarily a dangerous pilot as long as he remains within his limitations. And you find your limits in the air, by getting closer and closer and closer and sometimes going beyond them and still getting out of it. If you go beyond and don’t get out of it, you haven’t learned your limitations, because you are dead."

"It was a dangerous area, for certain. There were saloons, prostitutes, everything. The real Wild West. There was no law to speak of; everyone carried weapons, and they used them. Gambling was rampant, and crime increased with the growing population."

"I will say that in those days the pilot was very important, and his skill in manipulating the airplanes, which were not as reliable as they are today, was very important indeed. The airplanes today are mechanized to such a degree that the pilot no longer depends on the seat of his pants to the extent that he did in the early days. What has happened to aviation has happened to almost everything else. The day of the rugged individualist, the day of the inventor, is almost over. The Ben Franklins and Henry Fords are pretty much a thing of the past. It has just become too complicated. Everything now is a team operation, and if a truly new concept is developed, it means that there will be a large number of people knowledgeable in various scientific disciplines involved. And this requires a different philosophical outlook. I cannot see, for instance, how we could ever have another Lindbergh. Things have changed too much for that sort of competence to be rewarded the way it justifiably was. Still, I think that aviation will continue to develop, and each era will be interesting. But interesting in different ways."

"One of the things that we considered was being apprehended before we got to Japan. And the plan was that if we were within range of Japan, we would go ahead and bomb our targets, fly out to sea and hope, rather futilely, to be picked up by one of the two submarines that were in the area. If we were within range of the Hawaiian Islands—say, Midway—we would immediately clear their decks and proceed to Midway so they could utilize the task force properly."

"World War II gave King the opportunity of putting in practice another conviction. His earliest studies of the Napoleonic campaigns had indicated to him that the great weakness of the French military system of the period was that it required the detailed supervision of Napoleon. His belief that one must do the opposite, and train subordinates for independent action, had been confirmed and strengthened through his years of association with Admiral Mayo. During World War II King would jokingly maintain that he managed to keep well by "doing nothing that I can get anybody to do for me," but in all seriousness he could not have survived the four years of war without having made full use of the decentralization of authority into the hands of subordinate commanders, who were considered competent unless they proved themselves otherwise, and who were expected to think, decide, and act for themselves. Upon Nimitz in the Pacific, Edwards, Cooke and Horne in Washington, Ingersoll in the Atlantic, Stark in London, Halsey, Spruance, Kinkaid, Hewitt, Ingram and many other flag officers at sea, King relied with confidence and was not disappointed."

"Spruance received his written orders in the evening of 27 May, the night before he got underway. They comprised ten succinct pages. All operation orders in the early stages of the war were terse, reflecting the command philosophy of King, Nimitz, and the better admirals. That philosophy was to tell the subordinate commander what you wanted done, give him the necessary resources, provide as much information as you could about the enemy, and then let him alone so he could accomplish his mission. King would upbraid any commander for the sin of oversupervising his subordinates with complex, overly detailed directives. The intent was to encourage the on-scene commander to use his initiative and not to inhibit his freedom of action. Spruance's personal belief was that the commander responsible for accomplishing the mission should develop the necessary plans; the proper role of the next highest command echelon was to establish the objective and to suggest how the objective might be achieved."

"Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, victor of Midway13 and subsequently Admiral Nimitz's chief of staff, became Commander Fifth Fleet on 5 August 1943 and so also of the Gilbert Islands expeditonary force. 13 Admiral Spruance, in commenting on the first draft of this volume, requested that I delete "victor of" and substitute "who commanded a carrier task force at"; but, for reasons which readers of Vol. IV will appreciate, I have let it stand."

"On the forenoon of June 19th began the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The Japanese carriers launched their attacks from outside the range of our planes, with the apparent intention of having them land on their airfields on Guam and Rota, in the vicinity of Saipan. This day, June 19th, will be remembered by Navy men everywhere as the "Marianas' Turkey Shoot." The result of the day's action was 408 enemy planes destroyed out of 545 sighted, as against 32 American planes lost and negligible damage to 4 ships. There was nothing else like it in the whole of World War II."

"The Congress during World War II created a limited number of five-star ranks for the Army and the Navy, designated General of the Army and Fleet Admiral. The Navy by law was authorized four Fleet Admirals. Three were easily chosen: Ernest J. King, Chester W. Nimitz, and William S. Leahy, chief of staff to President Roosevelt. The choice for the fourth was between Halsey and Spruance. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal told King that he would have to decide between the two. It was a difficult task, because Halsey and Spruance both had influential supporters in Washington. The most powerful was Representative Carl Vinson, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who had publicly endorsed Halsey. The Navy did not like to oppose Vinson on anything. King put off the decision for several months, then sent a memorandum to Forrestal summarizing the pros and cons of each candidate. There were many things in Halsey's favor. He was the senior admiral, he had been at sea since 1938, his performance in the South Pacific in the dark days of 1942-1943 had been brilliant, and his raids against the Japanese empire in late 1944 had been spectacular and devastating. Against him, wrote King, were his errors in judgment in not evading two typhoons that severely damaged his fleet in the latter part of the war. King said very little about Halsey's questionable decisions at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. King then turned to Spruance, whom he would have endorsed for CNO had it not been for Spruance's mandatory retirement age. "As to brains," wrote King, "the best man in every way." His record in the Pacific was self-evient. The only argument against Spruance was that he had held relatively subordinate commands during the early part of the war."

"Halsey eventually received the five-star rank. The Congress, in an effort to compensate Spruance and to acknowledge his wartime achievements, authorized full pay for life as a four-star admiral, whereas all other naval officers received reduced pay upon retirement. A controversy has continued ever since, the gist being that Halsey's publicity had own his fifth star, and that Spruance had been at a disadvantage because he had avoided publicity. Many efforts were subsequently made to promote Spruance to Fleet Admiral, all reportedly thwarted by Vinson. After Vinson retired, still more attempts were made, but the Navy has been unwilling to reopen the case. The Navy's reasoning is that Spruance was the only World War II naval officer who retired on full pay by a special act of Congress, and thereby he had been appropriately recognized and honored by the people of America. Spruance expressed his personal feelings on the matter in a 1965 letter to Professor E.B. Potter of the United States Naval Academy. "So far as getting my five star rank is concerned," wrote Spruance, "if I could have had it along with Bill Halsey, that would have been fine; but, if I had received it instead of Bill Halsey, I would have been very unhappy over it. The present situation is that World War II will have been over twenty years next August, which is a long time. Also, the central and western parts of the Pacific Ocean are a long way from Washington.""

"Decades later, when Spruance's military and diplomatic career had become history, Spruance was generally regarded as a man endowed with extraordinary intelligence and proven wisdom. Whether he was an intellectual is debatable. Intellectuals are commonly associated with the pursuit of the liberal arts and the physical sciences, with advanced academic degrees, and with learned writing and speaking. As a distinguished author recently observed, "In common parlance an intellectual is a man soaked in the advanced critical ideas of the liberal-academic establishment; and even an opponent of these ideas... has them all at his fingertips." Using these standards alone, Spruance would not be regarded as an intellectual. His formal education ended at the Naval Academy, and he read few, if any, of the classic works in science, literature, and philosophy. He disliked writing, and what little he wrote was not for publication. He also disliked public speaking, and what few speeches he did make were soon forgotten. Nevertheless, Spruance was an intellectual in the purest sense of the word. He was a person with superior mental power. He was deeply interested in fields of knowledge outside the technicalities of the naval profession. He once told some university students, "I think it is most desirable for you to retain and to stimulate your intellectual curiosity in other fields where you may have a natural interest." He explained that those with a liberal education in art, literature, and music had an advantage over people- such as himself- with only a technical education. "A knowledge and appreciation of these subjects enriches their lives," he said, "and makes them more interesting individuals to their friends and acquaintances." Finally, Spruance was a classic intellectual in the sense that he was extremely rational and relied upon his intellect rather than his emotions or feelings. He later regarded the war against Japan as an intellectual exercise that posed a complex yet interesting series of problems that challenged and stimulated his mind. These problems had to be solved using logic and reason that was unaffected by the violent passions of war."