Directors Of The Central Intelligence Agency

"As to the issues on which we part ways with the Committee, I have already stated that our reviews indicate that the detention and interrogation program produced useful intelligence that helped the United States thwart attack plans, capture terrorists, and save lives. But let me be clear. We have not concluded that it was the use of EITs (Enhanced interrogation techniques) within that program that allowed us to obtain useful information from detainees subjected to them. The cause and effect relationship between the use of EITs and useful information subsequently provided by the detainee is, in my view, unknowable."

"We kill people based on metadata."

"American intelligence professionals, through a process of self-selection and acculturation, much like their diplomatic counterparts, trend overwhelmingly internationalist. They view American involvement abroad as the natural order of things, and their life experience tells them that American disengagement rarely makes things better anywhere."

"Beyond the lack of truth telling, there was the question of inclusion, with the campaign's emphasis on the politically convenient but somewhat amorphous "other"- immigrants, illegals, Mexicans, Muslims, and so on- as the root of our problems. The campaign broadcast a palpable sense of America less as a welcoming Madisonian "we the people" than a nation defined by blood and soil and shared history. If the campaign hadn't been conducted in English, we would have routinely heard words that evoked blood and soil like the German Volk or the Slavic narod. Lacking a good English equivalent, the campaign settled on "hardworking Americans" as an adequate dog-whistle equivalent. The label preferred by some in the alt-right was "awakened whites.""

"Trumpism was a long time coming."

"The travel ban was stopped by the courts, the amicus comments from security professionals being cited as one of the reasons for its rejection, before a modified version was allowed to proceed. But the effects of even attempting to impose such a ban will not pass quickly. Insults rarely just fade away. Honor patiently awaits to be satisfied. In the meantime CIA will be left with more of the weak and the merely avaricious, agents who will cut a deal just for the money, the worst kind of sources- and ISIS and al-Qaeda will (with more justification than they once had) claim that America and Islam are inevitable enemies. And all of this, I firmly believe, is based on a false, post-truth premise."

"One didn't need to read the fine print to see the unwavering intelligence community consensus that the Russians interfered in the 2016 election and planned to do the same in 2018. In his opening remarks, Coats predicted that Russian operations "will continue against the United States and our European allies, using elections as opportunities to undermine democracy, sow discord, and undermine our values," and then added, "There should be no doubt that Russia perceived its past efforts as successful, and views the 2018 U.S. midterm elections as a potential target for Russian influence operations.""

"That's a pretty clear warning. And a pretty good sign that American intelligence remains steadfast on this issue and, one hopes, more broadly in its commitment to objective truth. It's also a pretty good sign that phase four in the relationship between the IC and the president will be lengthy, contentious, divisive, and unpredictable. Stand by."

"In the absence of orders, figure out what they should have been and execute aggressively."

"Syria has allowed its soil to be transited by foreign fighters who have come from a variety of source countries in the Gulf area and in the — in North African countries. There are some signs that that may have been reduced somewhat in the last couple of months. We need to watch that a bit and see if that is the case."

"Iran, as we have already discussed, has carried out very, very harmful activities inside Iraq. Funding, trainings, arming and, in some cases, even directing the activities of the special groups associated with the Jaish al-Mahdi and the Sadr Militia."

"Political progress will only take place if sufficient security exists."

"Another practitioner of the counterinsurgency war was General David Petraeus. I first met him at Fort Campbell in 2004. He had a reputation as one of the smartest and most dynamic young generals in the Army. He had graduated near the top of his class at West Point and earned a Ph.D. from Princeton. In 1991, he was accidentally shot in the chest during a training exercise. He endured a sixty-mile helicopter flight to Vanderbilt University Medical Center, where his life was saved by Dr. Bill Frist, later the Republican leader of the Senate. Early in the war, General Petraeus had commanded the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul. He sent his troops to live alongside the Iraqi residents and patrol the streets on foot. Their presence reassured residents that we were there to protect them. Petraeus then held local elections to form a provincial council, spent reconstruction funds to revive economic activity, and reopened the border with Syria to facilitate trade. His approach was textbook counterinsurgency. To defeat the enemy, he was trying to win over the people. It worked. While violence in much of Iraq increased, Mosul remained relatively calm. But When we reduced troops in Mosul, violence returned. The same would happen in Tal Afar."

"Even General Petraeus believes that leaking secret information is terrible-when others do it. In 2010 he said on Meet the Press about Chelsea Manning's revelations: "This is beyond unfortunate. I mean, this is a betrayal of trust... that is very reprehensible.""

"By the end of the Vietnam War, the American military had learned a good deal about how to fight a counterinsurgency war against a nationalist movement that used both conventional and guerrilla forces. The only problem was that few people wanted to remember either Vietnam or its lessons. There was, said T.X. Hammes, a Marine colonel who maintained an interest in counter-insurgency, “a pretty visceral reaction that we would not do this again.” American military training focused on conventional war; counter-insurgency was not even mentioned in the army’s core strategic planning in the 1970s. Hammes nevertheless studied the small wars in places such as Central America, Africa, and Afghanistan, and wrote a book on how to combat guerrilla warfare. A publisher turned it down: “Interesting book, well written, but a subject nobody’s interested in because it’s not going to happen.” The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century finally came out in 2004 as the Americans were painfully learning in Iraq the lessons they had chosen to forget. In 2005, General Petraeus, one of the few American generals to devise successful tactics in Iraq, set up a counter-insurgency academy there. Back in the United States, he made the study of counter-insurgency compulsory at the army’s advanced training colleges. Two books, T.E. Lawrence’s Seven Pillars of Wisdom, about the Arab revolt against the Turks during World War I, and Counterinsurgency Warfare by the French officer David Galula, became unexpected bestsellers in bookstores near army bases."

"Teamed up with General Dave Petraeus (Commander Central Command and responsible for the entire region), America now has two generals who understand how to fight on the battlefield, as well as in Washington for resources. Stan McChrystal made an assessment of the situation he inherited and immediately saw the mission/resource mismatch. His request for thirty-thousand additional troops, while not a political best-seller in Washington, came at a critical time to reverse the trend he found in Afghanistan- a growing insurgency, a reemerging Taliban, and a loss of confidence by the Afghan people, which undermines the confidence the international community has in Karazai. Today, it appears that Generals Petraeus and McChrystal (Commander U.S. Forces Afghanistan) are starting to turn things around. Only time will tell if the U.S. effort, as a part of NATO, will be able to leave behind a stable Afghanistan with a more sophisticated infrastructure and systems resembling today's more modern nations. For sure, it won't be easy or fast. But if we remember the conditions that led to 9/11 and take into consideration the possible outcome of an al-Qaeda-controlled Afghanistan that already has a toehold in Afghanistan's next-door, nuclear-armed neighbor, Pakistan, we just might conclude that the effort will be well worth it."

"There are no easy choices. The way ahead will be very hard. Progress will require determination and difficult U.S. and Iraqi actions, especially the latter, as ultimately the outcome will be determined by the Iraqis. But hard is not hopeless, and if confirmed, I pledge to do my utmost to lead our wonderful men and women in uniform and those of our coalition partners in Iraq as we endeavor to help the Iraqis make the most of the opportunity our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines have given to them."