"In the years immediately after World War II, Marshall (1947), Shils and Janowitz (1948), and Stouffer et al. (1949) argued that social cohesion within the soldier’s primary group is essential to military effectiveness. Shils and Janowitz offered the following (1948, p. 281): It appears that a soldier’s ability to resist is a function of the capacity of his immediate primary group (his squad or section) to avoid social disintegration. When the individual’s immediate group, and its supporting formations, met his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from both officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power and adequately regulated his relations with authority, the element of self-concern in battle, which would lead to disruption of the effective functioning of his primary group, was minimized. Nevertheless, it is not clear that social cohesion was the driving force behind combat motivation, even during World War II. Stouffer et al. (1949) reported that when soldiers were asked, “What was most important to you in making you want to keep going and do as well as you could?” only 14 percent cited “solidarity with the group”; the most popular response (cited by 39 percent) was “ending the task.”"