"Perhaps nobody should be particularly surprised by this, as, after all, the laws of nature physicists acknowledge also seem to be timelessly true independently of whether anyone takes them to be true. Where do they come from? Since there are somewhat mundane interpretations of what laws of nature are – including the possibility that they are accidental generalities valid in this particular universe and/or within a certain time-span – the case posed by mathematical constructs seems to be even more clear and powerful. Math, like diamonds, truly seems to be forever. If one ‘goes Platonic’ with math, one has to face several important philosophical consequences, perhaps the major one being that the notion of physicalism goes out the window. Physicalism is the position that the only things that exist are those that have physical extension [ie, take up space] – and last time I checked, the idea of circle, or Fermat’s theorem, did not have physical extension. It is true that physicalism is now a sophisticated doctrine that includes not just material objects and energy, but also, for instance, physical forces and information. But it isn’t immediately obvious to me that mathematical objects neatly fall into even an extended physicalist ontology. And that definitely gives me pause to ponder."