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April 10, 2026
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"Several kinds of evidence for the PIE locus have been presented here. Ancient loanwords point to a locus along the desert trajectory, not particularly close to Mesopotamia and probably far out in the eastern hinterlands. The structure of the family tree, the accumulation of genetic diversity at the western periphery of the range, the location of Tocharian and its implications for early dialect geography, the early attestation of Anatolian in Asia Minor, and the geography of the centum-satem split all point in the same direction: a locus in western central Asia. Evidence presented in Volume II supports the same conclusion: the long-standing westward trajectories of languages point to an eastward locus, and the spread of IE along all three trajectories points to a locus well to the east of the Caspian Sea. The satem shift also spread from a locus to the south-east of the Caspian, with satem languages showing up as later entrants along all three trajectory terminals. (The satem shift is a post-PIE but very early IE development.) The locus of the IE spread was therefore somewhere in the vicinity of ancient Bactria-Sogdiana. This locus resembles those of the three known post-IE spreads: those of Indo-Iranian (from a locus close to that of PIE), Turkic (from a locus near north-western Mongolia), and Mongolian (from north-eastern Mongolia)... Thus in regard to its locus, as in other respects, the PIE spread was no singularity but was absolutely ordinary for its geography and its time-frame. ... The reason that dialect divisions arising in the locus show up along more than one trajectory is that the Caspian Sea divides westward spreads into steppe versus desert trajectories quite close to the locus and hence quite early in the spread. In contrast, developments that occurred farther west, as the split of Slavic from Baltic in the middle Volga may have, continue to spread along only one trajectory. This is why the Pontic steppe is an unlikely locus for the PIE spread. ...Thus the structure of the IE family tree, the distribution of IE genetic diversity over the map, and what can be inferred of the geographical distribution of dialectal diversity in early IE all point to a locus in western central Asia"
"She holds that the dispersal of the Indo-European languages commenced from a region somewhere in the vicinity of ancient Bactria-Sogdiana, thus bringing the scenario closer to the Indian subcontinent, but not quite there."
"And academics have come up with theories of their own. For example, Johanna Nichols, a professor of linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley, put forward the so-called Sogdiana hypothesis, which places the Proto-Indo-European speakers to the east of the Caspian Sea, in the area of ancient Bactria-Sogdiana in the fourth or fifth millennium BCE (Nichols 1997, 1999)."
"The OIT party can be harsh on its opponents too, but in a different sense: they highlight alleged polemical malpractice. At the ICHR 2018 conference, Danino’s paper was titled: “Fabricating Evidence in Support of the AIT”. Sh. Talageri regularly lambasts “the joke that is Western Indology”, not sparing even the biggest names in detailed critiques. Thus, he makes fun of the “radical damage control measures” and “weird about-turns” by the AIT party, such as the “Stalin-era-like” retraction by Johanna Nichols of her plea for an Asian origin of linguistic features in West-Asian languages, attributed to “peer pressure”. She had, in her own words, first contributed “a beautiful theory that accounts elegantly for a great deal of the dynamic and linguistic geography of the IE spread” which “still stands”; but now she disowns the logical conclusion of her own still-standing research, allegedly because it adds evidence for an eastern homeland."
"All admirals are supposed to be "crusty," and this characteristic is expected to continue into retirement. Leahy often seemed to be crusty, formal, and distant. He had a mean eye when he faced incompetence, stupidity, or neglect of duty. But there was kindness, tenderness, and compassion. He just didn't let those qualities show so much."
"On the day that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur stood on the deck of the battleship Missouri and sternly ordered the Japanese representatives to sign the articles of surrender, Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy was far from the scenes of power, delivering a routine speech for the president. Addressing the Midwest Farmer Observance, he spoke of responsibility and of duty, especially of the civilian's duty to make "our own system of government and our own way of life... work better in our land than other systems work in foreign lands. Let us not fear the competition of other systems." With the greatest war in history a thing of the past, it was time to rebuild the nation and the world. It was time to plan so that war would never again bring its destruction to man. In Leahy's mind the United States had a sacred duty of preserving the peace in spite of the dawning of the atomic age. His last years of service were dedicated to accomplishing that goal. There were those who believed, now that the war was over, there was no longer a need for a military chief of staff to the commander in chief. Despite the fact that the military men of the United States have never failed to yield to civilian direction and have never failed to lay down their offices when their terms have expired, there remains a paranoid lack of trust among many liberal newspapermen and politicians that the generals and admirals they have relied on to save them from the enemy somehow become the enemy when the guns have fallen silent."
"[FDR] acknowledged needing a primary adviser to coordinate the army, navy and air force operations. In July, he appointed Fleet Admiral William Leahy as chief of staff to the commander in chief, US Army and Navy. Unlike modern presidential chiefs of staff, Leahy's job was related primarily to the military. The sixty-seven-year-old former chief of naval operations had also served as governor of Puerto Rico and ambassador to France after the Nazi takeover- a thankless job if there ever was one. FDR thought Leahy's experience and seasoning would make him an ideal power broker to the big egos of the military command. And he was comfortable with Leahy. Their relationship dated back to FDR's years as assistant secretary of the navy, when Leahy had commanded the secretary's dispatch boat and they'd become friends. "He said [at a press conference] that I would be a sort of 'leg man' who would help him digest, analyze, and summarize a mass of material with which he had been trying to cope singlehandedly," Leahy recalled."
"It's important to get a mental picture of FDR at the time of his early sails with Bill Leahy. Roosevelt was an energetic and athletic thirty-three year old, easily motoring around on his own two legs. About the only similarity between this man who strode purposefully aboard the Dolphin and almost demanded his turn at the helm and the wheelchair-bound leader of the Allies three decades later was the pince-nez eyeglasses that perched on the bridge of his nose. The fact that Roosevelt was seven year Leahy's junior didn't stop him from calling the lieutenant commander "Bill." Naval etiquette, as well as Leahy's firm separation of familiarity from duty, demanded that Leahy call FDR either "Mr. Secretary" or "Mr. Roosevelt." But the two hit it off."
"Always dependable, loyal, shrewd, and intelligent, Bill Leahy was next beside the president in the turbulent years of World War II and in the first few years of rebuilding, offering counsel and advice. Only Harry Hopkins was closer to Roosevelt, and no one on the military side was closer to Truman. George Marshall undertook more jobs for Harry Truman, but Bill Leahy was the one who was in the White House every day until his health demanded that he step down. To most laymen and to many naval officers, he is a forgotten name from the past, one of those shadowy figures whose name is given to buildings and ships, whose picture appearing in books of history is passed over as eyes fall upon the face of the man he is with. The reason for his lack of prominence is simple. He did his greatest work in the shadow of two dynamic presidents. He led no fleets during World War II, only one battle in his entire career, the Battle of Santiago in the Spanish-American War, from a gun turret aboard the battleship Oregon, after her famous cruise around South America."
"In the Pacific we gave our enemies a costly lesson in amphibious warfare, just as in Europe we, with our allies, demonstrated successful coalition warfare. The performance of all branches of the services in Europe under General Eisenhower, in the central and southern Pacific under Admiral Nimitz, and in the southwestern Pacific under General MacArthur brought glory to themselves and to their country."
"Perhaps there is some hope that its capacity for death and terror among the defenseless may restrain nations from using the atom bomb against each other, just as in the last war such fears made them avoid employment of the new and deadlier poison gases developed since World War I. However, I am forced to a reluctant conclusion that for the security of my own country which has been the guiding principle in my approach to all problems faced during my career, there is but one course open to us: Until the United Nations, or some world organization, can guarantee- and have the power to enforce that guarantee- that the world will be spared the terrors of atomic warfare, the United States must have more and better atomic bombs than any potential enemy."
"The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children. We were the first to have this weapon in our possession, and the first to use it. There is a practical reality that potential enemies will have it in the future and that atomic bombs will sometime be used against us. That is why, as a professional military man with a half-century of service to his government, I come to the end of my war story with an apprehension about the future. These new concepts of "total war" are basically distasteful to the soldier and sailor of my generation. Employment of the atomic bomb in war will take us back in cruelty toward non-combatants to the days of Genghis Khan. It will be a war of pillage and rape of a society, done impersonally by one state against another, whereas in the Dark Ages it was a result of individual greed and terrorism. Thee new and terrible instruments of uncivilized warfare represent a modern type of barbarism not worthy of Christian man. One of the professors associated with the Manhattan Project told me that he had hoped the bomb wouldn't work. I wish that he had been right."
"Once it had been tested, President Truman faced the decision as to whether to use it. He did not like the idea, but was persuaded that it would shorten the war against Japan and save American lives. It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nakasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons. It was my reaction that the scientists and others wanted to make this test because of the vast sums that had been spent on the project. Truman knew that, and so did the other people involved. However, the Chief Executive made a decision to use the bomb on two cities in Japan. We had produced only two bombs at that time. We did not know which cities would be the targets, but the President specified that the bombs should be used against military facilities. I realized that my original error in discounting the effectiveness of the atomic bomb was based on long experience with explosives in the Navy. I had specialized in gunnery and at one time headed the Navy Department's Bureau of Ordnance. "Bomb" is the wrong word to use for this new weapon. It is not a bomb. It is a poisonous thing that kills people by its deadly radioactive action, more than by the explosive force it develops."
"Far less known than other leaders of World War II, Leahy was content to perform his services for his country and for the two presidents he served so closely, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman. In his final job, the one he held longer than any other in his career, chief of staff to the commander in chief, he was the president's man. He spoke for the president, he represented the president, he advised the president, and he disagreed with the president when he believed he was wrong. But he did not make waves outside. He seldom gave interviews. When he made his occasional speeches, he talked on mundane subjects such as patriotism or what a proper naval education and naval career entailed. He kept silent- in public- on politics, on international affairs, on controversial issues. He made his opinions known where they mattered... Strictly a black-shoe sailor, Leahy did learn to value naval air and later the importance of air power. As he matured, he learned how the services complemented each other, and he was able to make balanced judgments which he recommended to the president. In the opinion of George Elsey, one-time assistant naval aide to President Truman, Leahy's greatest contribution was keeping the Joint Chiefs of Staff in line."
"I was there."
"Throughout the war, the four of us- Marshall, King, Arnold, and myself- worked in the closest possible harmony. In the postwar period, General Marshall and I disagreed sharply on some aspects of our foreign political policy. However, as a soldier, he was in my opinion one of the best, and his drive, courage, and imagination transformed America's citizen army into the most magnificent fighting force ever assembled. In number of men and logistical requirements, his army operations were by far the largest. This meant that more time of the Joint Chiefs were spent on his problems than on any others- and he invariably presented them with skill and clarity. King had an equally difficult task. His fleets had to hold Japan at bay while convoying millions of tons of supplies for the second front. He was an exceptionally able sea commander. He was also explosive and there were times when it was just as well that the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs were a well-kept secret. The President had a high opinion of King's ability but he was a very undiplomatic person, especially when the Admiral's low boiling point would be reached in some altercation with the British. King would have preferred to put more power into the Asiatic war earlier. He supported loyally the general strategy of beating Germany first, but this often required concessions of ships which he did not like to make. He could not spare much, since, until the last months of the war, he was working with a deficit of ships. America was fighting a two-ocean war for the first time in its history."
"The President tried to avoid face-to-face showdowns with King. If he had something to say that would rile King, he would use Leahy, Knox or his naval aides as reluctant surrogates. After the Savo Island debacle, Roosevelt suggested to Knox that carrier task groups employ fewer cruisers and more destroyers. (FDR presumably felt that cruisers could be more profitably used in defending beachheads.) As Knox was the least qualified official in the Navy Department to discuss tactics, King presumably drafted the reply for Knox's signature: the Navy knew best (it said) and would keep the status quo. Roosevelt was smart enough not to overrule King's professional judgment, but he still wanted the last word. Thus Leahy found himself dragged into the discussion when he received word from Roosevelt that the Navy Department memorandum should "receive further study." It did not, of course. Leahy had another unpleasant chore when he entered King's office in mid-1944. King was surprised because Leahy rarely came to see him. Leahy explained that Roosevelt, obviously jealous of his own "commander in chief" title, wanted King, Nimitz, and Ingersoll to change their titles as fleet "commanders in chief." "Is that an order?" asked King. "No," said Leahy, "but he'd like to have it done." "When I get the orders," said King, "I will do exactly that. Otherwise not. The subject was dropped."
"Alberta as an independent country doesn’t solve a huge number of problems. If it left Canada, its currency goes through the roof because all it has is oil exports, and that would drive agriculture out of business. It would be a one-horse economy in a very short time. Seceding to the U.S. becomes the only political and economic option. If you do that, the inflation issue goes away, the tax problem goes away, the security problem goes away. Alberta gets everything it says it wants out of Canada within the first year of joining the U.S. Seceding to the U.S. becomes the only political and economic option."
"Canada’s demographic situation is similar to the rest of the developed world — a large population moving toward retirement and hardly any young people in the replacement generation coming up. However, Alberta does not fit that mould. It is the youngest province, and is becoming younger, better paid and more highly skilled as the rest of Canada becomes older and less skilled, and a ward of the state financially."
"Canada's demographic situation is similar to the rest of the developed world — a large population moving toward retirement and hardly any young people in the replacement generation coming up."
"Canadians are just too damn polite."
"Everybody may have peace if they are willing to pay any price for it. Part of this any price is slavery, dishonor of your women, destruction of your homes, denial of your God. I have seen all of these abominations in other parts of the world paid as the price of not resisting invasion, and I have no thought that the inhabitants of this state of my birth have any desire for peace at that price, or that they lack the fortitude that is necessary to discourage aggression by the barbarians who are now about to be driven back to their kennels, or by any other savages who may arise at some later date against our civilized Christian world."
"[MacArthur's "Old Soldiers Never Die" speech was of] such a superlative quality of excellence... that there is no other individual... capable of preparing and delivering a comparable address... The public enthusiasm for General MacArthur in San Francisco and in Washington was a triumph beyond anything that I have ever seen anywhere for anybody, which seems strange in view of his recent summary detachment by President Truman. If the general's popularity persists for a considerable time, it should actively effect a change in the country's domestic political policy, and it might have a radical effect on the complexion of domestic political development. From a purely military point of view it appears that General MacArthur's attitude will be fully accepted by all qualified military authorities."
"Independence doesn't solve anything, the only way that this turns out well for Alberta economically, in the long run, is union with the United States, and that's a very different political decision than simply secession."
"Fleet Admiral William Daniel Leahy's death was announced by the US Navy. On July 22 at noon, his casket was moved into the Bethlehem Chapel of the Episcopal Cathedral in Washington, DC, and for the next twenty-four hours his body lay surrounded by a naval honor guard before being brought into the nave for the funeral. His eleven honorary pallbearers consisted of his old friend Bill Hassett and ten naval officers who included his few remaining living friends from the Annapolis class of 1897. After the service, a motor procession brought the admiral to his final resting place in Arlington Cemetery. A nineteen-gun salute was fired, and then Leahy was laid beside his wife, Louise, where she had awaited him for seventeen years. Neither Dwight Eisenhower, Harry Truman, nor George Marshall were in attendance. Newspapers marked his passing, but the articles were perfunctory and often mistaken. The New York Times noted how he had all but disappeared from the public mind, having lived as a "recluse" for the past for years. The Washington Post missed his importance entirely, writing, "Yet despite his inner position, his contribution to evolving defense concepts probably was not profound." When George Marshall died three months later, the reaction could not have been more different. President Eisenhower issued a public proclamation announcing Marshall's passing and extolling his greatness. He ordered that the national flag be flown at half-mast on all US government buildings, military facilities, and warships, both at home and abroad, and to be kept that way until after the funeral. both Truman and Eisenhower attended the funeral, and Truman described Marshall as "the greatest general since Robert E. Lee... the greatest administrator since Thomas Jefferson. He was the man of honor, the man of truth, the man of greatest ability. He was the greatest of the great in our time." The general's death was soon followed by a hagiographic biography, the foundation of Marshall scholarships, a Marshall library, Marshall public schools, Marshall awards- a whole industry to perpetuate his memory. To this day, historians claim, with scant evidence, that he determined US strategy in World War II."
"Admiral Leahy has largely disappeared from the national mind. Despite the enormous power he wielded during World War II, a war the United States fought to his strategic ideas more than any other and a conflict that still shapes America's identity, there are today no William D. Leahy foundations, public schools, statues, or libraries. As his greatest service was in the White House, the US Navy has remembered him more shoddily than they should. In 1962, a new guided missile cruiser, the USS Leahy (DLG-16), was named for him. It was the best ship of its class, and would serve with distinction into the 1990s, but it was hardly a vessel worthy of the highest-ranking sailor in American history. A simple marker, in a small park in Ashland, Wisconsin, sandwiched between Lake Superior and a highway, serves as one of America's few tributes to a man who, more than any other, helped America triumph in World War II. Leahy would have preferred it that way."
"On the evening of August 14, the White House press corps was invited into the Oval Office. President Truman was seated behind his desk, with his cabinet secretaries, military chiefs, and aides standing behind him. Their beaming faces told the tale. The president came directly to the point. The Japanese government had accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and therefore, the Second World War was over. The reporters rushed back to the press room, and moments later the news was on the wires. Soon a boisterous crowd gathered outside the White House gates. Admiral Leahy noted in his diary: "A noisy celebration is going on in the city with all motor cars sounding their horns, and great crowds of shouting people milling in the streets and bringing traffic to a standstill. The radio is bearing for the news of the celebration in cities from Los Angeles to Boston, in all of which the populace seems to be celebrating the war's end with noise in crowded streets. Leahy did not approve. He felt that the occasion called for calm, thoughtful, dignified reflection, "but the proletariat considers noise appropriate and the greatest number of people in democracies must have their way.""
"King, in addition to heading the Navy, served as a member of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, which also included General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, General Henry H. ("Hap") Arnold, Chief of Staff of the Army Air Forces, and, later, Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Imperial Chiefs of Staff, when meeting together, comprised the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the senior executive body controlling Allied military operations. The CCS delegated most of the control of Pacific theater operations to the JCS, who for this function relied heavily on the advice of Admiral King."
"To King, Leahy, Nimitz, and naval officers in general, it had always seemed that the defeat of Japan could be accomplished by sea and air power alone, without the necessity of actual invasion of the Japanese home islands by ground troops. In 1942, 1943, and 1944, while the attention of most of the Allied political and military leaders was concentrated on Europe, and while the war against Japan was left largely to King to manage with what forces he could muster, the Pacific war had proceeded largely upon this assumption. With the approaching victory in Europe a larger amount of attention was concentrated on the Pacific by people who had not previously been too greatly concerned with the problems of that war, and an increasing amount of high-priced thought was devoted to it, some of which seemed to King not strictly pertinent. From the time of the Teheran Conference there had been the political consideration of Soviet intervention in the war against Japan, and the Army had been convinced that the use of ground troops would be necessary. Upon Marshall's insistence, which also reflected MacArthur's views, the Joint Chiefs had prepared plans for landings in Kyushu and eventually in the Tokyo plain. King and Leahy did not like the idea, but as unanimous decisions were necessary in the Joint Chiefs meetings, they reluctantly acquiesced, feeling that in the end sea power would accomplish the defeat of Japan, as proved to be the case."
"Historians have concluded that Truman grew into the role of commander in chief, and eventually proved more than equal to the job. But in the spring and summer of 1945, the growing pains were evident- and the decisions he must confront during those early weeks were among the most important of his presidency. In his diary, Bill Leahy expressed concern about the "staggering burdens of war and peace that [Truman] must carry." Privately, according to Leahy's son, the admiral regarded his new boss as a "bush-leaguer." He had been accustomed to speaking his mind to Roosevelt, knowing that the late president was "captain of the team" and might accept or reject his advice according to his own judgment. But Truman did not yet possess the confidence or independence to buck his advisers. Truman was in their hands, Leahy told another aide, which meant everyone who advised the president bore heavy responsibility, and must be absolutely sure they were right. In his diary and his subsequent memoir, Leahy betrayed no sense of responsibility or culpability for the new president's relative ignorance. One is struck by this lack of self-awareness in a Washington statesman otherwise respected for his wisdom and good judgment. Whatever he knew or did not know about the state of FDR's declining health, Leahy had been at the late president's elbow for most of the last year of his life. He certainly knew enough to anticipate that Truman might be thrust into the role of commander in chief at any moment. Leahy was the White House chief of staff and the chairman of the JCS. What steps did he take to ensure that the vice president was properly briefed? Who else had that duty, if not himself? No adequate explanation has ever been provided for this breakdown in the basic procedures of sound constitutional government."
"Admiral: You do not seem to approve!"
"Above all these sailors was the Commander in Chief, Franklin D. Roosevelt- a remarkable leader indeed. Unlike Winston Churchill, Roosevelt never imagined himself to be a strategist. In general he followed the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which included King, Marshall, and his own chief of staff, wise old Admiral Leahy. Thrice at least he went over their heads- refusing to redeploy American forces into the Pacific in 1942, insisting that Guadalcanal must be reinforced and held at all costs, and inviting a British fleet to participate in the Okinawa campaign. He also threw his influence in favor of MacArthur's desire to liberate Leyte and Luzon against the Navy's wish to bypass them. He was a tower of strength to Marshall, King and Eisenhower against insistent British pressure to postpone OVERLORD and shift DRAGOON from Marseilles to Trieste. The Navy was his favorite service- I heard him once, in his true regal style refer to it as "my Navy"- and he did his utmost to build it up and improve its efficiency both before and during the war."
"I did not see Julius Caesar's return to Rome, but I am sure that in comparison it looked like a deuce of spades."
"To direct the actions of each supreme commander and to coordinate British and American military policy, ARCADIA established the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), a joint British-American undertaking composed of the three British chiefs- General Sir Alan Brooke (CIGS); Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord; and Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal- and their American counterparts, Marshall, King, and Arnold. At Roosevelt's insistence the Combined Chiefs was headquartered in Washington, where its work was directed by Field Marshal Sir John Dill, who became the ranking British chief and Churchill's personal representative. Dill was joined in July 1942 by Admiral William D. Leahy, whom Roosevelt brought back from Vichy to become chief of staff to the commandeer in chief and, in effect, chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff. In retrospect, the establishment of the command structure to fight the war was an unprecedented achievement that reflected the extraordinary ability of Churchill and Roosevelt to saw off minor differences and find common ground. Roosevelt, unlike Lincoln, was also well served by his long familiarity with the Army and Navy and his ability to pick effective military subordinates. Leahy, Marshall, King, and Arnold were exactly the right men for the job, and they served in their posts throughout the war. In their own way they were ruthless taskmasters, loyal to the president, and, when pushed by FDR, worked effectively with their British counterparts."
"Admiral Leahy had served with Roosevelt since FDR had been assistant secretary of the Navy and enjoyed the president's complete confidence. Marshall, Roosevelt's personal choice for chief of staff, brought a single-minded, take-no-prisoners dedication to his task- combined with a remarkable sensitivity to political nuance at the highest level. Arnold, underneath his affable exterior, had a genius for organization urgently required to create an air force virtually from scratch. King, to some extent, was odd man out: fiercely Anglophobic, incredibly stubborn, not as gifted intellectually as his colleagues, but a powerful command presence that the Navy needed after Pearl Harbor. FDR said King shaved with a blowtorch, and it was that fierceness that propelled the Navy, even when King was wrong (as he was in early 1942, when he refused to convoy ships in American waters)."
"The redistribution system that Canada has with the transfer payments, anywhere else would have social instability. But to be blunt, Canadians are just too damn polite."
"Dear Admiral: I am writing this on the train going 90 mi. an hour. I hope you will be able to read it. I received your letter enclosing an article by Constantine Brown. I wish I could get my hands on him and on the fellow who gave him the false information in the first place. I want you in the White House. I have the utmost confidence in you. You tell me what you think. While you and I don't see eye to eye on some things, we are always frank with each other. Don't you pay any attention to any lying stories the gossipers write. It's part of the political farce as it's played in this country. The opposition try to hurt me by hurting my friends. Please don't let it bother you. When I have anything to say to you, I'll say it to you. You are my friend and I am yours come hell or high water. Sincerely, Harry S. Truman"
"During the closing days of 1944 King received the final promotion of his naval career. On 11 December the Congress passed a bill authorizing the appointment of four Fleet Admirals and four Generals of the Army. The President immediately named Leahy, King and Nimitz to the naval five-star rank (Halsey later became the fourth.), and Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower and Arnold to the corresponding grade in the Army. The Senate confirmed these appointments on 15 December 1944, and on 20 December- the third anniversary of his designation as Commander in Chief, United States Fleet- King took the oath of office as a Fleet Admiral in the United States Navy."
"Leahy had been personally close to FDR, he told Truman, and was "distressed" by his death. He was inclined to retire from the navy and from his position as White House chief of staff. But Truman needed him for the sake of continuity, if nothing else, and asked him to stay on the job to help him "pick up the strands of the business of war." After Truman gave assurances that he would adhere to the same decision-making procedures used by FDR, Leahy agreed to remain on the job for at least a few more months. It turned out that he served another four years, to the end of Truman's first term in office."
"A few weeks previously Leahy had come to King's office one day and said that the President would like to have King cease using the customary term Commander in Chief, both in respect to the United States Fleet and the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets, and to alter these designations to Commander, United States Fleet, Pacific Fleet, or Atlantic Fleet, as the case might be. Thus there would be but one Commander in Chief, and that the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. King asked Leahy if that were an order or a request, and was told that it was not an order or a request, but the Leahy knew that the President would like to have it done. King therupon told Leahy that if Mr. Roosevelt issued an order, or a request, he would of course have to comply with it, but Leahy said that the President said that the President did not wish to issue a definite order, but simply would like to have it done. That was the last that King heard of that particular matter, but it came to mind when he heard of the President's forthcoming visit to Hawaii."
"A friend unexpectedly died yesterday. He was young. I searched my email because I remembered he recently sent a kind note. I had a response in my drafts that I never finished. I feel awful. A sad reminder life is short."
"And it would be a short war my friend. The government has nukes. Too many of them. But they’re legit. I’m sure if we talked we could find common ground to protect our families and communities."
"We hear a great deal of talk about idealism, the idealism of America, the idealism of men. There are two conceptions of idealism. If by idealism is meant that a man is so exalted in his purposes that he disregards his own interests from any selfish standpoint and endeavors to benefit other people without trying to benefit himself, that kind of idealism is admirable in an individual. But if by idealism is meant that a man follows visions and dreams, that he does things that are impractical, that will not work out, then that kind of idealism is closely associated with insanity."
"They tell us that our race is the best type of Christian civilization. Very well; I want to preserve that civilization until Christ does come to earth, and I do not want any individual to assume that he can transform himself into a second Christ by talking about idealism. Every once in a while, you know, there is a gentleman who imagines that he is Napoleon, or Caesar, or Hannibal, or Mahomet, or the Saviour. The trouble is, they are idealists; they are not practical men. Suppose we sit down here and say to ourselves, "Some day, somewhere, in some remote century of time, people are going to be so good that they will not kill us, and therefore we will throw away our weapons and give them several thousand years in which to butcher us"; and suppose that in the meantime this race of men to which we belong, and which is all that represents real civilization in the world, is destroyed. There will not be anybody to recognize the millennium when it does come. There will not be anybody with enough idealism to know what it is when he sees it."
"Every person has a first name, a middle name, and a last name. That person has a history. He has a family. He has a mother and a father, maybe a wife and a child. He has friends. Each time an American soldier dies, there is a long and powerful aftershock, rippling across continents, felt intimately by someone- maybe by many people- half a world away."
"All these freedoms and pleasures we enjoy as Americans were bestowed upon us, but they came at a great cost."
"Like most people, I can vividly recall exactly where I was when I heard the news. It was chemistry class, second period. I was a sixteen-year-old junior, wandering aimlessly through another school day, working halfheartedly on a lab assignment, trying to figure out the density of different liquids, when word filtered down to our classroom. Something about a terrible accident in New York City: a plane crashing into one of the Twin Towers. Suddenly every television set in the school was lit up, and every classroom had suspended normal teaching activities to focus on this tragedy half a continent away. At that point that morning, no one knew what had happened yet. The news commentators- like everyone else- were working under the assumption that the jet had gone wildly off course and experienced some sort of catastrophic failure, resulting in a collision with one of the towers. It wasn't until the second plane ht that the unfathomable became real: This wasn't an accident- it was a terrorist attack, intentional, willful, coordinated, and almost incomprehensibly lethal. To those of us watching, it was our first view of evil."
"When you hold a buddy in your arms and watch his skin turn gray, when you can feel his life slipping away, it's almost impossible not to walk around afterward in something of a stupor, asking yourself repeatedly: How did this happen? Why wasn't it me? But you have to let it go."
"There is luck in being an American, but there is responsibility as well. Being an American means you have the right to freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom t gather and assemble, freedom to criticize the government without fear of retribution. There are many countries in the world where acting on those impulses will get you tossed into jail or killed. So exercise those rights, but keep in mind the very simple fact that you have them only because hundreds of thousands of men and women have laid down their lives for you, stretching across parts of three centuries, from the Revolutionary War, through two world wars, and through less popular conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. And Iraq. And Afghanistan. As a kid growing up in Iowa, I didn't really get any of that. I mean, I sort of got it. I understood the connection between Independence Day and the sacrifices that went into securing that independence. Mostly, though, I was like everyone else. I liked watching fireworks and eating hot dogs off a backyard grill. Still do, in fact, preferably washed down with a few cold ones. But it means much more to me now, and I have two deployments in Afghanistan to thank for that."
"When I was sixteen years old, I thought my dad was the stupidest man I'd ever met in my entire life. I couldn't see why I had to listen to him or take his advice or follow his rules. What did we fight about? You might better ask what we didn't fight about. Every interaction was cause for antagonism and verbal jousting. Simply put, I was an idiot: drinking, hanging out with the boys, chasing girls, ignoring my schoolwork.. getting fat and lazy. My father had been a hard and diligent worker his whole life, so he naturally and understandably found my lack of initiative and my self-destructive tendencies somewhat disturbing. I didn't want to hear it, though. I figured as long as I wasn't being brought home by the cops, I wasn't doing anything wrong. And that wasn't true, of course. It's not the right way to look at life. But at that point in time, that's the way I saw things: through a very narrow and selfish prism."