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April 10, 2026
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"1. Ancient attitudes. These are not capable of precise determination. We are told that, at the time of the Persian Empire, abortifacients were known, and that criminal abortions were severely punished. We are also told, however, that abortion was practiced in Greek times as well as in the Roman Era, and that "it was resorted to without scruple." The Ephesian, Soranos, often described as the greatest of the ancient gynecologists, appears to have been generally opposed to Rome's prevailing free-abortion practices. He found it necessary to think first of the life of the mother, and he resorted to abortion when, upon this standard, he felt the procedure advisable. Greek and Roman law afforded little protection to the unborn. If abortion was prosecuted in some places, it seems to have been based on a concept of a violation of the father's right to his offspring. Ancient religion did not bar abortion."
"The usual rule in federal cases is that an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950); Golden v. Zwickler, supra; SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403 (1972). But when, as here, pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied. Our law should not be that rigid. Pregnancy often comes more than once to the same woman, and in the general population, if man is to survive, it will always be with us. Pregnancy provides a classic justification for a conclusion of non-mootness. It truly could be "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814, 816 (1969); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U. S. 175, 178-179 (1968); United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632-633 (1953). We, therefore, agree with the District Court that Jane Roe had standing to undertake this litigation, that she presented a justiciable controversy, and that the termination of her 1970 pregnancy has not rendered her case moot."
"This Texas federal appeal and its Georgia companion, Doe v. Bolton, post, p. 179, present constitutional challenges to state criminal abortion legislation. The Texas statutes under attack here are typical of those that have been in effect in many States for approximately a century. The Georgia statutes, in contrast, have a modern cast, and are a legislative product that, to an extent at least, obviously reflects the influences of recent attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and techniques, and of new thinking about an old issue. We forthwith acknowledge our awareness of the sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy, of the vigorous opposing views, even among physicians, and of the deep and seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion. In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem. Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of emotion and of predilection."
"This right of privacy... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy....[T]he word 'person', as used in the 14th Amendment, does not include the unborn."
"When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of manâs knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answerâ"
"In closing, I emphasize what the Court does not do by these decisions. The Court does not today hold that the Constitution compels abortion on demand. It does not today pronounce that a pregnant woman has an absolute right to an abortion. It does, for the first trimester of pregnancy, cast the abortion decision and the responsibility for it upon the attending physician, whose judgment is to be exercised, as always, upon long established medical standards. For the period following the first trimester, the decisions permit the state, if it chooses, to impose reasonable regulations for the protection of maternal health. And, after viability, they give the state full right to proscribe all abortions except those that may be necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."
"We thus strike a balance between the interests of the pregnant woman and the interests of the state in health and in potential life. Fortunately, these decisions come at a time when a majority of the legislatures of the states are in session. Presumably where these decisions cast doubt as to the constitutional validity of a stateâs abortion statute, the legislature of that state may immediately review its statute and amend it to bring it into line with the constitutional requirements we have endeavored to spell out today. If this is done, there is no need whatsoever for any prolonged period of unregulated abortion practice."
"We conclude: 1. For that portion of the pregnancy stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the womanâs privacy right dominates the interests of the state. It follows that, during this period, the abortion decision must be left to the medical judgment of the womanâs attending physician. 2. From that point on, however, the state, in promoting its interest in health, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are appropriately related to maternal health. Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility where the procedure is to be performed; and as to the licensing of the facility. 3. From and after viability, which, we judicially notice, is usually the end of approximately the 26th or 27th week, and which is the point at which the fetus has a reasonable chance of independent life if it were then born or removed from the mother, the stateâs interest in protecting the potentiality of human life dominates the womanâs right to privacy. It follows that the state may, if it chooses, regulate and even prohibit abortion, except where it is necessary in appropriate medical judgment for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. 4. The state may define the term physician to mean only a licensed physician, and it may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician We feel that this holding is consistent with the relative weights of the respective interests involved, with the lessons and examples of medical and legal history, with the attitude of the common law toward abortion, and with the demands of the profound problems of the present day. The states are thus left free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens so long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests. The decision, we also feel, vindicates the right of the physician and is consistent with the fact that abortion is essentially a medical decision until, of course, those points in pregnancy are reached when the state interests become dominant. Viewed under this analysis, the Texas statute must fall, and we, therefore, affirm, with one procedural exception, the judgment of the federal court of the Northern District of Texas. In the Georgia case we hold that the procedural requirements for J.C.A.H. accreditation for the hospital, for the hospital abortion committee, and for the additional two-doctor concurrence are unduly restrictive of the patientâs rights and of the attending physicianâs rights. Similarly, we do not uphold the provision that the patient be a resident of Georgia. The remainder of the Georgia statute does not conflict with federal constitutional standards."
"There are, we feel, two important interests that a state possesses and that if it so desires, it may seek to protect by legislation. The first is the stateâs interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman. The second is the stateâs interest in protecting the potentiality of human life, irrespective of the moment when life actually begins. These interests are separate and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term, and at some point during pregnancy each becomes âcompelling.â"
"The abortion issue, of course, is a most sensitive, emotional and controversial one, perhaps one of the most emotional that has reached the Court for some time. The issue is one of great public interest not confined to lawyers and their lawsuits. Convictions are firmly rooted and firmly held. At the same time, attitudes by no means are uniform. We are aware of this, and we are fully aware that, however the Court decides these cases, the controversy will continue. Our task, however, is to decide the cases on constitutional principles as we perceive those principles to be. In the Texas case we have filed a lengthy opinion that attempts to review the history of attitudes toward abortion, popular, legal, civic, and moral, from ancient times down to the present. We cannot escape noting, too, the change in attitudesâin recent yearsâof professional bodies such as the American Medical Association, the American Public Health Association, and the American Bar Association, and, indeed, the changing attitudes among the courts of this country, both state and federal. This historical approach has revealed a number of interesting things. One is the fact, already alluded to, that nearly all the strict state abortion statutes were enacted about a hundred years ago. Another is the conclusion that it is very doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a common law crime, even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus. A third is that there is little consensus, even among religious or medical groups, as to when life begins. Some would fix it at the moment of conception. Others would focus on quickening. Still others would regard live birth as the significant point. We have concluded again, as the Court has done before, that there is a right of personal privacy under, and implicit in, the Constitution. It is not spelled out in so many words, but the Court has recognized this right before in varying contexts. We feel that it is founded in the Fourteenth Amendmentâs concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action. We further conclude that this right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but, as we say that, we emphasize that the right is not unqualified and that it must be considered against important state interests in regulation abortion."
"The Texas statue is representative of those presently in effect in a majority of our states and that, for the most past, were enacted during the last half of the nineteenth century. The Texas statue prohibits any abortion, or any attempt at an abortion, except where is it procured by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the woman. It makes no reference to health, as does the District of Columbia statute considered in United States v. Vuitch decided here in the 1970 Term. The Georgia statute, on the other hand, was enacted only in 1968. It is a modern statute patterned after the American Law Instituteâs Model Penal Code. It is representative of recent legislation enacted in approximately one-quarter of our states. It makes an abortion a criminal act with certain exceptions. These exceptions are where the abortion is performed by a licensed physician and, âbased upon his best clinical judgment,â the abortion is necessary because the pregnancy if continued would endanger the life or health of the woman, or the fetus would very likely be born with a grave and permanent mental or physical defect, or the pregnancy resulted from forcible or statutory rape. The Georgia statute also imposes certain procedural conditions for the obtaining of the abortion. These are several in number, but among them are (1) Georgia residence, (2) concurrence in the abortion decision by two licensed physicians in addition to the attending [physician], (3) performance of the procedure in a hospital both licensed by the state and accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, and (4) approval by a hospital abortion committee of 3 physicians. So much for the statutes. The Texas federal court held that a woman had a right, protected by the Ninth and Fourteen[th] Amendments, to choose whether to have children and that the Texas statute was therefore void on its face. The Georgia federal court invalidated certain parts of the Georgia statute including the portion specifying the particular circumstances in which an abor-tion may be sought, but upheld most of the remainder of that stateâs statute."
"QUESTION: But any doctor, I suppose, you would say, may refuse her? MRS. WEDDINGTON: Certainly, Your Honor. He may refuse any kind of medical procedure whatsoever. QUESTION: But the State may not; yes. MRS. WEDDINGTON: Here itâs the question of whether or not the State, by the statute, will force the woman to continue. The woman should be given that freedom, just as the doctor has the freedom to decide what procedures he will carry out and what he will refuse to his patients. QUESTION: To be sure that I get your argument in focus, I take it from recent remarks that you are urging upon us abortion on demand of the woman alone, not in conjunction with her physician? MRS. WEDDINGTON: I am urging that in this particular context this statute is unconstitutional. That in the Baird vs. Eisenstadt case this Court said, âIf the right of privacy is to mean anything, it is the right of the individual, whether married or single, to make determinations for themselves.â It seems to me that you cannot say this is a woman of this particular doctor, and this particular woman. It is, it seems to me, -- QUESTION: Well, doesnât it follow from that, then, that a woman can come into a doctorâs office and say, âI want an abortionâ. MRS. WEDDINGTON: And he can say âIâm sorry, I donât perform them.â QUESTION: And then what does she do? MRS. WEDDINGTON: She goes elsewhere, if she so chooses. If she stays with that â you know, thatâs an impossible question. Certainly, I donât think the State could say the first doctor a woman goes to shall make that determination and she cannot go elsewhere."
"MRS. WEDDINGTON: We are not here to advocate abortion. We do not ask this Court to rule that abortion is good or desirable in any particular situation. We are here to advocate that the decision as to whether or not a particular woman will continue to carry or will terminate a pregnancy is a decision that should be made by that individual, that in fact she has a constitutional right to make that decision for herself, and that the State has shown no interest in interfering with that decision. Our supplemental brief, on page 14, points out that the brief of the opposition canât quite decide when life does begin. At one point they suggest itâs when thereâs implantation. A few pages later they suggest itâs with conception."
"MRS. WEDDINGTON: In this case, this Court is faced with a situation where there have been fourteen three-judge courts that have ruled on the constitutionality of abortion statues. Nine courts have favored the woman, five have gone against her. Twenty-five judges have favored the woman, seventeen have gone against her. Nine Circuit Judges have favored the woman, five have gone against her. Sixteen District Court judges have favored the woman, ten have gone against her. No one is more keenly aware of the gravity of the issues or the moral implications of this case, that it is a case that must be decided on the Constitution. We do not disagree that there is a progression of fetal development. It is the conclusion to be drawn from that upon which we disagree."
"MRS. WEDDINGTON: As to mutilation, there, it seems to me, that the purpose of those statutes was to prevent the citizen from becoming a dependent or ward of the State, and also to insure that its citizens would be available for service in the military. In this particular instance, the rationale works just the opposite. Here a woman, because of her pregnancy, is often not a productive member of society. She cannot work, she cannot hold a job, sheâs not eligible for welfare, she cannot get unemployment compensation. And furthermore, in fact, the pregnancy may produce a child who will become a ward of the State."
"The way itâs written, a Texan who objects to SB 8 may have no one they can sue to stop it from taking effect. For one, abortion rights plaintiffs canât sue their state directly. The ordinary rule is that when someone sues a state in order to block a state law, they cannot sue the state directly. States benefit from a doctrine known as âsovereign immunity,â which typically prevents lawsuits against the state itself. But they also canât really follow the same path that most citizens who want to stop laws do. That path relies on Ex parte Young (1908), a decision in which the Supreme Court established that someone raising a constitutional challenge to a state law may sue the state officer charged with enforcing that law â and obtain a court order preventing that officer from enforcing it. So, for example, if Texas passed a law requiring the state medical board to strip all abortion providers of their medical licenses, a plaintiff could sue the medical board. If a state passed a law requiring state police to blockade abortion clinics, a plaintiff might sue the chief of the stateâs police force. Part of what makes SB 8 such a bizarre law is that it does not permit any state official to enforce it. Rather, the statute provides that it âshall be enforced exclusively through . . . private civil actions.â Under the law, âany person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local governmental entity in this state,â may bring a private lawsuit against anyone who performs an abortion after the sixth week of pregnancy, or against anyone who âknowingly engages in conduct that aids or abets the performance or inducement of an abortion.â Plaintiffs who prevail in such suits shall receive at least $10,000 from the defendant. SB 8, in other words, attempts to make an end run around Young by preventing state officials from directly enforcing the law. Again, Young established that a plaintiff may sue a state official charged with enforcing a state law in order to block enforcement of that law. But if no state official is charged with enforcing the law, thereâs no one to sue in order to block the law. Checkmate, libs. Itâs worth noting that this tactic cannot prevent anyone from ever challenging SB 8. Now that the law has taken effect, abortion providers (plus anyone who âaids or abetsâ an abortion, a vague term that is not defined in the statute) will undoubtedly be bombarded with lawsuits seeking the $10,000 bounty authorized by the new state law. These defendants will then be able to argue in court that they should not be required to pay this bounty because it is unconstitutional. But they will do so under the threat of having to pay such a bounty to anyone who brings a lawsuit against them. Even if abortion providers prevail in all of these suits, moreover, they will still have to pay for lawyers to defend themselves in court. And the suits seeking a bounty under SB 8 will likely be numerous and endless, because literally âany personâ who is not a Texas state officer can file such a suit. If SB 8 remains in effect, any abortion providers who do remain operational are likely to be crushed by a wave of lawsuits that they cannot afford to litigate."
"Texas Right to Life has heard stories like this one and says itâs all a big âmisunderstanding.â The group says doctors have been misinformed, and that while the Texas anti-abortion law, known as SB 8, doesnât define the word âabortion,â another Texas statute says âan act is not an abortion if the act is done with the intent to remove a dead, unborn child whose death was caused byâ a miscarriage. Doctors say they do understand the law - but that itâs not enough to protect them."
"Stell had her miscarriage in Texas in September, just a few weeks after a strict anti-abortion law went into effect. Since then, in the wake of last monthâs US Supreme Court decision to overturn Roe v. Wade, more than a dozen other states have sought to enforce abortion bans or very restrictive policies, according to the Guttmacher Institute, an abortion rights advocacy research group. Those laws will have âan enormous chilling effectâ on doctors performing miscarriage surgeries even when doctors âare confident that what theyâre doing is within the letter of the law,â said Steve Vladeck, a professor at the University of Texas School of Law and a CNN contributor."
"The vast majority of Americans donât want government intruding on a womanâs fundamental constitutional right to her own reproductive health care choices. Thatâs why the dark-money forces behind S.B.8 engineered an anti-abortion majority on the Supreme Court â to do things the American people wonât abide from elected branches of government."
"If a claimant in an S.B.8 case prevails, they are entitled to ... at least $10,000 per abortion, with no apparent maximum amount."
"If Texasâs scheme is permissible, no constitutional right is safe from state-sanctioned sabotage of this kind."
"The whole case [Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. (1982)] arose because of this arbitrary power that was given to a private entity... the Supreme Court said you cannot give governmental power over peoples` lives or liberty to private bodies, that have no public accountability."
"Ocasio-Cortez also took issue with Abbott's comments on rape, noting that the majority of people who are raped or sexually assaulted are assaulted by someone whom they know. The anti-sexual violence nonprofit RAINN says 8 out of 10 rapes are committed by someone known to the victim. "These aren't just predators that are walking around the streets at night. They are people's uncles, they are teachers, they are family friends, and when something like that happens, it takes a very long time, first of all, for any victim to come forward," Ocasio-Cortez added. "And second of all,"
"Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, D-N.Y., slammed Abbott in an interview with CNN's Anderson Cooper on Tuesday, saying he lacks basic knowledge of biology. "I'm sorry we have to break down Biology 101 on national television, but in case no one has informed him before in his life, six weeks pregnant means two weeks late for your period," Ocasio-Cortez said. "And two weeks late on your period ... can happen if you're stressed, if your diet changes or for really no reason at all. So you don't have six weeks.""
"Texas Gov. Greg Abbott is again under fire for his state's restrictive new abortion law, after falsely claiming it does not force victims of rape or incest to give birth even though it prohibits abortions after about six weeks â which is before many people even know they're pregnant... Abbott was asked about forcing a rape or incest victim to carry their pregnancy to term. He misleadingly replied that the law does not require that. "...it provides at least six weeks for a person to be able to get an abortion, and so, for one, it doesn't provide that," Abbott said... In fact, the countdown for those six weeks starts from the first day of a person's last period (not the "expected" period that was missed), leaving many with only about one or two weeks to end the pregnancy, if that, under the new law."
"Drucilla Tigner, policy and advocacy strategist of the American Civil Liberties Union of Texas, said the âgovernorâs swipe of a pen canât change the Constitution.â While the law amounts to the most extreme abortion ban in the country, âabortion is both legal in Texas and supported by the majority of Texans,â Tigner said."
"No matter what the Supreme Court does with Roe, the court already let SB 8 take effect, which means that for Texans the right to abortion currently exists largely in name only. The inability to access abortion beyond the earliest weeks of pregnancy has been and will continue to be devastating for pregnant people in Texas and their families. Sadly, that is precisely the intent of SB 8âs architects and supporters, and whether through copycat bills, 15-week bans, or total abortion bans, courts and legislatures appear prepared to release this devastation on countless more people. But we wonât give up the fight â we will do everything we can to protect the right to abortion, rebuild the right if the Supreme Court dismantles it, and ensure that people can get the care they need."
"On the ground, SB 8 is wreaking havoc. Although the law has prohibited access to most abortions in the state, Texans continue to need and seek abortion care. Those with the resources to do so have been forced to flee the state. Individuals with the means to take time off work, find childcare, and pay for transportation have made long journeys to clinics in other states in order to access abortion. Providers thousands of miles away now report seeing Texas patients, and neighboring states â such as Louisiana, Arkansas, and Oklahoma â are overwhelmed with Texas patients. The influx of patients has caused weeks-long wait times in appointments for both traveling Texans and local patients alike. Even for those who are able to access care, SB 8âs delays from travel and wait times are pushing them later into pregnancy. Although abortion is very safe, and much safer than childbirth, each week of unnecessary delay increases the risks of the procedure. For pregnant Texans beyond six weeksâ gestation who cannot overcome the difficult and costly barriers to leaving the state, SB 8 forecloses access to legal abortion and forces them to continue their pregnancies. The devastating impacts of forced pregnancy will be felt most by already marginalized communities, including people of color and low-income families. For example, undocumented immigrants in South Texas may fear interstate travel due to internal immigration checkpoints, and young people may be unable to take time away from school to get medical care far from home. And it is Black women who will suffer the brunt of the sometimes-deadly effects of forced pregnancy: Texas has a severe maternal mortality crisis, and Black women are three times more likely than white women to die during pregnancy or as a result of childbirth. Abortion bans hurt pregnant people and their families."
"Abbott's response is misleading, at best. The law's stipulation banning abortions after six weeks does not necessarily mean six weeks from the incident, in the case of rape or incest victims. Doctors date pregnancies from the first day of the individual's last menstrual cycle not from ovulation or "conception." As a result, under the new Texas law, those seeking abortions have less than six weeks to do so. Abbott attempted to caveat his comments Tuesday by highlighting that "rape is a crime," though the bill has no exception for it. Under SB8, the only possible exemption is for "medical emergency." Otherwise, abortion is prohibited when a fetal heartbeat is detected, though the flickering identified as a fetal heartbeat on an ultrasound at that time is really just electrical activity and the sound is made by the ultrasound machine itself. Even at six weeks, doctors say an ultrasound is not detecting a functional heart. And it's worth noting that the fetal heartbeat used as the abortion cutoff in this bill often occurs before people know they are pregnant. Jennifer Kerns, associate professor at University of California San Francisco and an OB-GYN, told CNN, "Saying that someone has six weeks to access abortion is completely misleading. When we say six weeks pregnant what that actually means is six weeks from the last menstrual period... So it doesn't actually mean the person has been pregnant for six weeks."
"But I just want to him to knowâI respect the man. Any man who will stand on his hind legs, knowing good and well that the whole purpose of the thing is to bankrupt any doctor who tries it, and does what he thinks is the right thing to do, I have a high degree of respect for him"
"The majority of people who are raped, and who are sexually assaulted, are assaulted by someone they know. These arenât just predators who are walking around the streets at night. They are people's uncles, they are teachers, they are family friends, and when something like that happens, it takes a very long time, first of all, for any victim to come forward. And second of all, when a victim comes forward, they don't necessarily want to bring their case into the carceral system. They don't want to re-traumatize themselves by going to court. They don't necessarily all want to report a family friend to a police precinct, let alone in the immediate aftermath of the trauma of a sexual assault."
"Six weeks pregnant means two weeks late for your period... And two weeks late on your period for any person -- any person with a menstrual cycle -- can happen if you're stressed, if your diet changes or for really no reason at all. So you don't have six weeks."
"For your listeners in Texas, if you are in this position, do call your local clinics... they are open, because there is this small period in which you can get an abortion, and they do want to help their patients. So, of course, before you do anything, call your local clinic. And secondly, you can leave the state. They canât criminalize you leaving the state to have an abortion. But, of course, for so many people, they donât have the means to do that. Right? You have to not only have the financial means to leave the state. You have to be able to take time off from work. You have to potentially have child care. Most women in Texas who have abortions do have children. And thereâs a whole set of circumstances that are going to make that very difficult."
"Itâs the most extreme thatâs ever gone into effect. And as you pointed out, this morning, unfortunately, in Texas, the clinics canât be open to provide abortions any later than six weeks. And 85% of people seeking abortions in Texas do so after six weeks, since many people donât even know theyâre pregnant yet at six weeks. So, this is the most extreme law to go into effect. We have gone to the Supreme Court. We filed papers right up to 8:00 last night. We are waiting for the court to act. And it really should step in. I mean, what Texas has done his just blanket unconstitutional. It is not for the state of Texas to overturn Roe v. Wade... Roe v. Wade is the law of the land. It has been for 50 years. There is no question that a ban on abortion at six weeks violates the Constitution"
"If you are confused by this morass of procedural aggression, countermeasures to procedural aggression, dueling appeals, and court orders forbidding other court orders, you should be. This is not how the judiciary is supposed to function. Litigants who face an imminent risk of harm unless a state law is blocked should be given an opportunity to challenge that law before they violate it and risk legal consequences. Appeals courts should wait for lower courts to decide a case before they reach a different conclusion than the lower court might reach. Doctors who provide medical care that, at least for the time being, is still protected by decisions like Roe and Casey should not risk an unending wave of harassing lawsuits brought by people seeking to collect a bounty. And yet, the justices effectively rewrote the nationâs abortion jurisprudence without receiving full briefing, hearing oral argument, or taking more than a couple of days to even consider the case. Just as significantly, blessed a tactic that could be used to undermine virtually any constitutional right. Imagine, for example, that New York passed an SB 8-style law allowing private individuals to bring lawsuits seeking a $10,000 bounty against anyone who owns a gun. Or, for that matter, imagine if Texas passed a law permitting similar suits against anyone who criticizes the governor of Texas."
"I fully understood that there could be legal consequences â but I wanted to make sure that Texas didnât get away with its bid to prevent this blatantly unconstitutional law from being tested," Braid said."
"âItâs a very unique law and itâs a very clever law,â said Josh Blackman, a constitutional law professor at South Texas College of Law Houston. âPlanned Parenthood canât go to court and sue Attorney General [Ken] Paxton like they usually would because he has no role in enforcing the statute. They have to basically sit and wait to be sued.â"
"Today, Texas law SB8 went into effect. This extreme Texas law blatantly violates the constitutional right established under Roe v. Wade and upheld as precedent for nearly half a century."
"I never learned to shoot while I was in the Army. Itâs not like Iâm going to get a gun now."
"I cannot believe that people who were born after â73 are going back to the Middle Ages. Sometimes I think it is more of a taboo now than it was then."
"The Fundamental Rights to Marital and Personal Privacy Are Acknowledged in Decisions of This Court as Protected by the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments."
"Abortion is an accepted medical procedure for terminating pregnancy. Amici medical organizations recognize the acceptability of abortion, as their policy statements indicate; they draw no distinction between abortion and other medical procedures. The Texas abortion law effectively denies Appellants Roe and Doe access to health care. Jane Roe was forced to bear a pregnancy to term though an abortion would have involved considerably less risk to her health. Physicians who would otherwise be willing to perform an abortion in clinical surroundings are deterred by the fear of prosecution. Since Appellant Roe could not afford to travel elsewhere to secure a safe abortion, to avoid continuation of pregnancy she would have been forced to resort to an unskilled layman and accept all the health hazards attendant to such a procedure. Even had she been able to travel out of state, the time required to make financial and travel arrangements would have entailed greater health risks inherent in later abortions."
"Although this Court has not expressly delineated a right to seek health care, the importance of such care has been recognized and the existence of such a right suggested. In United States v. Vuitch (1971), this Court reaffirmed societyâs expectation that patients receive âsuch treatment as is necessary to preserve their health.â In this Courtâs invalidation of Connecticutâs proscription against contraception, Justice White noted that statuteâs intrusion upon âaccess to medical assistance...in respect to proper methods of birth control.â Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) (White, J., concurring)."
"The Right to Seek and Receive Medical Care for the Protection of Health and Well-Being Is a Fundamental Personal Liberty Recognized by Decisions of This Court and by International and National Understanding."
"Appellants contend that fundamental rights entitled to constitutional protection are involved in the instant case, namely the right of individuals to seek and receive health care unhindered by arbitrary state restraint; the right of married couples and of women to privacy and autonomy in the control of reproduction; and the right of physicians to practice medicine according to the highest professional standards. These asserted rights meet constitutional standards arising from several sources and expressed in decisions of this Court. The Texas abortion law infringes these rights, and since the law is not supported by a compelling justification, it is therefore unconstitutional."
"The Constitution does not specifically enumerate a âright to seek abortion,â or a âright of privacy.â That such a right is not enumerated in the Constitution is no impediment to the existence of the right. Other rights not specifically enumerated have been recognized as fundamental rights entitled to constitutional protection including the right to marry, the right to have offspring, the right to use contraceptives to avoid having offspring, the right to direct the upbringing and education of oneâs children, as well as the right to travel."
"The Provisions in the Texas Penal Code, Articles 1191â1194 and 1196, Which Prohibit the Medical Procedure of Induced Abortion Unless âprocured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother,â Abridge Fundamental Personal Rights of Appellants Secured by the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and Do Not Advance a Narrowly Drawn, Compelling State Interest."
"Evidence of American standards of medical practice respecting induced abortion is found in the policy statements of professional organizations. Both the American Medical Association and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have set standards of professional practice in recent years. ACOG policy sanctions therapeutic and elective abortion âto safeguard the patientâs health or improve her family life situation.â ACOG recognizes that âabortion may be performed at the patientâs request....â A very similar position was taken by the American Medical Association. The AMA at one time had followed the A.L.I. model, listing four or five vaguely defined situations for sanctioned abortion. This proved unworkable, and the policy was changed in order not to limit the physiciansâ traditional responsibility for evaluating âthe merits of each individual case....â"
"Today, only abortions performed in non-medical environments present significant risks of morbidity and mortality; with proper medical supervision, abortions are safe and simple procedures. In keeping with modern medical practice, this Court would reinforce the purpose of early abortion legislation if it invalidated the statute. This would permit abortions to be done by licensed physicians in adequate medical facilities and discourage abortions by unskilled practitioners. Moreover, it would preserve the 117-year-old purpose of the law, and the common law."
"On another level as well, abortion is a safe procedure: it is without clinically significant psychiatric sequelae. A number of recent studies confirm that abortion does not produce serious psychological side-effects damaging to the mental wellbeing of the patient."