Boethius's Consolation of Philosophy

"Fallacious and obscure the lore, By Stoick sages taught of yore: From outward objects they suppose A filmy substance ceaseless flows, Which strikes acute upon the sense, And that all knowledge issues thence. Hence, say they, Mind alone receives Every image it perceives; The paper, thus, a blank before, They add, is trac'd with letters o'er. If nothing to the mind is known By powers inherent of her own, But passive, she th' impressions takes, Which every outward object makes; Reflecting like a mirror fair, All bodies that presented are; Say, whence deriv'd her power to pierce Thro' all th' extended Universe? To roam the world material o'er. And intellectual too explore; Whence does she arrange, compound, And sep'rate her ideal round? Why does she, by progression slow, From truth to truth ascending go? Why now to heav'n her way she wings. Now sinks absorb'd in grov'ling things? Such powers, so various and so strong, Must to the heav'n-born mind belong: They cannot, sure, existence owe To traces which from matter flow. But still, 'twixt matter and the mind We plainly a connexion find: Thus—light when flashing in the eye, Thus—thro' the ear when noises fly. Mind instantaneous running o'er, Of native ideas, her store, Th' according images unites, And blends with those which sense excites For each external form, we find, Its counterpart has in the mind."

"Although there are in objects... qualities which strike... upon the senses, and put... [those] instruments in motion; although the passive impression upon the body precedes the action of the mind; although... the former rouses the latter... and awakens the forms which rest within; yet if the perception of objects flows not from an impression... upon the mind; but... [by] mind... capable... by its powers, of distinguishing this impression... how much more... beings, purely spiritual, discern things by their own light, by... understanding alone, without... necessity of... recourse to impressions made... by external objects."

"For this reason... nature has varied the powers of knowledge... distributed to created beings. Thus, animals that have no motion, as fishes that are nourished in their shells and adhere to rocks, are endowed with sensation only, and have no other knowledge; whilst imagination is given to... brutes... capable of motion, and seem naturally to desire some things, and avoid others: but Reason is the attribute of man alone, as Intelligence is that of God. Hence... God's knowledge exceeds... all other beings; as it not only comprehends... his own nature, but what... is perceived by beings inferior..."

"What would you think, if the Senses and the Imagination should oppose Reason, and endeavour to persuade her that the general ideas... are nothing? for what falls under the cognizance of the senses and imagination, cannot be general. Perhaps you would say, either Reason judges true, that nothing is apprehended by sense; or, since she knows many things are perceived by the sense and by the imagination, she must judge falsely, when she considers as general that which is sensible and particular. But if Reason should answer to this, that in her idea of what is general, she comprehends clearly whatever is sensible and imaginable; but as to the senses and imagination, they cannot possibly attain to the knowledge of what is general, since their perception cannot reach beyond the material figures that strike them; and therefore, in all matters of science, the greatest credit is due to the judgment of that guide, whose powers are the most discerning and perfect. In a controversy of this kind, ought not we, who are possessed of the powers of reason, imagination, and sense, to enlist ourselves on the side of Reason, and to espouse her cause? The case is entirely similar, when human reason thinks the divine understanding cannot behold future events, in any other way than she herself is capable of perceiving them: for your reasoning... is... "That things... cannot be foreseen, unless their events are necessitated; therefore there can be no... prescience; for... every thing would be fixed by... absolute necessity." In answer... I... say, If it were possible for us... endowed only with reason, to become, possessed of the Divine Intelligence, we should then discover... that both sense and imagination should submit to reason... likewise... human reason should submit to an all-knowing Mind. Let us therefore strive to elevate ourselves to the exalted height of the Supreme Intelligence; there shall Reason behold what she cannot discover in herself... how things, which in themselves have no certain event, are... certainly foreseen by a clear and infallible prescience; and... that this is no conjecture or vague opinion, but a simple, supreme, and unlimited knowledge."

"Of varied creatures, mark th' unnumber'd store Wand'ring at will the wide creation o'er: Some drag along their lengths in speckled pride, And trace the dust in furrows as they glide; Some soaring mount the winds with daring wing. And thro' the fields of air exulting sing; Whilst others o'er the fruitful valley rove, Or seek the shadows of the sounding grove. Tho' varied brutal forms are endless found, Their looks dejected ever love the ground; This grov'ling posture stupefies the sense. And all their low propensions issue thence. Imperial man alone rears high his head. And spurns the sordid earth with stately tread: Admonish'd hence, if not by glaring toys Seduc'd, and sunk in Sense's baneful joys; Taught by his form erect, and lifted eye, Let man's aspiring thoughts still range on high; Thus—'twixt his aspect, and his tow'ring mind, We, pleas'd, a strict conformity shall find."

"Since then every thing which is known is not, as I have before proved, perceived by its own inherent properties, but by virtue of powers residing in the person comprehending it; let us now examine, as far as it is possible for us, the disposition of the Divine Nature, that we may thence derive a clearer conception of the knowledge of God."

"It is the sentiment of all reasonable creatures, that God is eternal. Let us then consider what eternity is; because this will discover... the nature of God, and of his knowledge."

"Eternity then is a full and perfect possession of the whole of everlasting life, altogether and at once. Now this will evidently appear, by comparing it with things which endure only for a time: for every temporal existence glides on through the past to the present, and thence to the future; so that there is nothing under the laws of time, which can at once comprehend the whole extent of its duration. As it has lost yesterday, it does not as yet enjoy to-morrow; and as for to-day, it is plain you have no more of life than the present transitory moment. Whatever therefore be subjected to the flight of time, as Aristotle thought of the world, it may be without beginning and without end; and altho' its duration may extend to an infinity of time, it is not of such a nature as to be properly deemed eternal; because it does not comprehend at once the whole extent of its infinite duration, having no knowledge of things future..."

"Whatever comprehends and possesses at the same time, the fulness of an unlimited life; which catches hold of the future, and from which nothing that is past is escaped; that... alone, is truly eternal: for what is eternal must be in nothing defective; must enjoy itself; and must have the infinite succession of time clearly and perfectly under its perception."

"[S]ome Philosophers, who... heard it was the sentiment of Plato, that this world never had a beginning, and should never have an end... falsely concluded, that the created universe was co-eternal with its Creator. But it is one thing to be conducted through a life of infinite duration, which was Plato's opinion... and another... to comprehend at once the whole extent of this duration as present, which is manifest... only... to the mind of the Deity."

"[I]t is not so much by ...measure of time, that God appears ...prior ...and more ancient than his creatures, as by ...his nature ...altogether simple and undivided: for the infinite progression of temporal things aims at a resemblance of that ever-present ...immoveable life, which, as it is not capable ...of copying or equalling, from immobility it degenerates into motion; and, instead of becoming ...immoveable ...and simply present, it falls into an infinite measure of past and future time."

"[S]ince it cannot possess at once the whole... of its duration; yet... never ceases... to exist, it strives... in vain to emulate that, whose perfection it can neither attain or express, by attaching itself to the presence of the fleeting moment, which passes away with rapidity: and because this fleeting presence bears a resemblance to the immoveable presence... it communicates... an appearance of existence: but as it cannot stop or abide, it pursues its course through unlimited time; and hence... by gliding... it continues its duration, the extent and plenitude of which it could not comprehend by resting in a permanent state."

"[W]e must say with Plato, that God is eternal, and the world perpetual."

"Since then every being judges of the things that are the objects of its understanding, according to the faculties of judgment which it possesses; and as God is in a state immoveable, and eternally present to every thing, his knowledge soars above the progression of time, brings together the past and the future, though at infinite intervals, and comprehends, in his capacious intellect, all things, as if they were now transacting."

"If therefore you would properly define this prescience which gives to God the cognisance of every thing, it must not be considered as an anticipated knowledge of the future, but... more justly... esteemed a knowledge of the never-failing now."

"Hence, the word prescience, or foreknowledge, is not so applicable to the Divine Intelligence, as the word providence, or superintendence; for the exalted and sovereign Ruler looks down as it were from the summit of his universe, and beholds every thing moving in obedience to his infinitely wise direction."

"But can you imagine that God imposes a necessity upon events by beholding them, when men, by seeing things, do not make them necessary? for you before acknowledged to me, that your viewing an action happening under your eye, lays no necessity upon it. If we then may be allowed to compare the knowledge of man with that of God, it is plain, that whilst you see only some things in a limited instant, God sees every thing present to him at once, in an unlimited eternity. His Divine foresight does not therefore change the nature and properties of things; but they are present to his view in the very order as they shall in time befal: nor does he judge confusedly of them, but distinguishes with precision the events which will necessarily happen, from those which will take place unconstrained by necessity."

"When you see... a man walking... and the sun rising... although you see both... at once... you plainly perceive... the former is voluntary, whilst... the latter is necessary. Thus the eye of Providence contemplates all things, without altering their nature and properties; for every thing... is present to him; though, with regard to its temporal event, it may be still future. Hence it follows, that when God knows a thing will be, although... he perceives it is under no necessity of being, we must nevertheless allow, that this knowledge is not an uncertain conjecture, but... founded upon truth."

"If you still insist, that what God foresees will befal, must befal; and that things which cannot do otherwise than happen, must necessarily happen (if in this way you force me to admit a necessity, it must be acknowledged, it is unquestionably true that things are under such a constraint; but this is at the same time a truth which can scarce be comprehended by any man, unless he, is acquainted with the Divine counsels)."

"But, in answer to the above objection, that what God foreknows will take place, must come to pass; I would hive you to consider, that every thing which happens, as it bears a relation to the Divine knowledge, is necessary; but when considered in its own nature, it is altogether free and unconstrained: for there are two kinds of necessity; the one simple and absolute, as, men must necessarily die; the other conditional, as, if you know that a man walks, he must certainly do so: for that which is known cannot be otherwise than it is apprehended to be. But this circumstance or condition does by no means infer the other absolute necessity: for the nature of the thing itself does not here constitute the necessity, but the necessity arises from the conjunction of the condition. Thus, no necessity compels a man to walk, who voluntarily steps forward; yet when he steps forward, he must of necessity walk: so every thing which is present to the eye of Providence must assuredly be, although there be nothing in its own nature to constitute this necessity. Since Deity then beholds all future events, proceeding from the freedom of the will, as actually present; these events by that condition become necessary, in relation to the Divine apprehension; although, when considered in their own nature, they be at absolute liberty."

"All things therefore which God by his prescience knows will happen, shall undoubtedly come to pass; but as many of these events proceed from free-will, which, although they do befal, yet their existence changes not their nature, as, before they happened, they had it in their power not to happen."

"৳ But it is a matter of no moment, whether things in their own nature are necessary or not, since, by this circumstance of the Divine knowledge, to which they are all subject, they fall out in every respect as if they were constrained by necessity."

"This... is explained, in the instance... of the sun rising, and a man walking. Now as you see both of these occurrences happen under your view, they assuredly do happen; but nevertheless there is this difference, that the event of the former was necessary before it befel, whereas that of the latter was altogether free. Thus, all things which are present to the view of the Deity unquestionably exist; but some of them proceed from a necessity belonging to their own natures, as in the instance of the rising sun; while others flow from the will and power of the agent, as in the other example. It is then with reason we have asserted, that in respect of the Divine apprehension, things are necessary; but that they are absolutely free from the chains of Fate, when considered in themselves. In the same way, every thing which is an object of sense, is general in regard to its relation with reason, but particular when considered by itself."

"But you may say, If it be in my power to change my purpose, I can deceive Providence, since I may not carry into execution those things which she foresaw I would do. To this I answer. It is indeed in your power to deviate from your purpose; but as Providence sees really and actually what you can do; since she knows whether you will alter your resolutions or not, and upon what resolution you will fix; it is as impossible for you to deceive the prescience of God, as it would be to escape the notice of a present and steady observer of your actions; though, from the freedom of your will, you have it in your power to vary and diversify them ever so much."

"What!—shall the Divine knowledge, will you farther say, be changed according to my dispositions; and when my desires vary and fluctuate, fixing now upon this thing, now upon that, will the apprehension of the Deity vary with them? No, certainly, it will not. For the view of Deity, if I may speak, out-runs every future event, and brings it back into the presence of his own apprehension; which does not vary, as you imagine, to conform itself to your caprices, but remains immoveable, and anticipates and comprehends at once all your variety of changes: which faculty of comprehending and seeing all things as present, God doth not derive from the issue of future events, but from the simplicity of his own nature."

"Here then is a solution of what you objected to me formerly, that it is a preposterous thing to say, that our temporal events are the causes of the Divine prescience: for the quality of the Sovereign Mind is such, that every thing is subordinate to the eternal presence of his knowledge; that he plans and directs all events, without being in the least dependent upon futurity."

"Upon the whole then it must be concluded, the freedom of the human will remains unconstrained and inviolable; and that those laws cannot be considered as unjust, which assign rewards and punishments to men, whose actions are in no respect under the compulsion of necessity. We ought therefore to comfort ourselves with this reflection, that God, who sits on high, perceives every thing, knows perfectly what is to happen; and that the eternal presence of his knowledge, concurring with the future quality of our actions, engages him always to dispense rewards to the good, and punishments to the wicked."

"The confidence which, for this reason, we repose in God, cannot be vain or fruitless; neither will the prayers we address to him be inefficacious, when they proceed from a heart which is pure and upright. Detest, then, and flee every vice; cultivate and pursue every virtue; exalt your mind to God, the only true hope; and offer up your prayers with humility to his throne. If you are ingenuous, you must confess the strict obligation that you are under, to live agreeably to the rules of wisdom and probity, as you know that all your actions are performed under the eye of an all-discerning Judge. FINIS."

"Boethius's eloquent Treatise of The Consolation of Philosophy... has been translated into most of the languages of Europe, and into the Saxon and our own by two of our most illustrious Princes, Alfred and Elizabeth. There is something congenial in great and noble minds, and what appeared interesting to them, cannot be indifferent to you. Length of time, and the mutability of language, have deprived us of the fruits of their leisure. The present version of this beautiful and philosophical Dialogue has cost me much pains and labour."

"Though confined in a doleful prison, and deserted by all the world—though deprived of his library, and stript of all his possessions—our illustrious Philosopher preserved so much vigour and composure of mind, that he wrote, in five books, his excellent treatise of the Consolation of Philosophy. To this treatise our author is more indebted for his fame, than to all his other learned performances."

"Few books have been more popular: it has gone through a multitude of editions; has been commented upon by many eminent men; has been translated into a great variety of languages; and has been universally acknowledged a work replete with erudition and instruction, and executed with much delicacy and good taste. When we consider the distressed situation of our author when he wrote it, we are filled with wonder that he was capable of composing a performance of so much real genius and merit."

"'The Consolation of Philosophy' was throughout the Middle Ages, and... to the beginnings of the modern epoch in the sixteenth century, the 's familiar companion."

"Few books have exercised a wider influence in their time. It has been translated into every European tongue, and into English nearly a dozen times, from King Alfred's paraphrase to the translations of Lord Preston, Causton, [Philip] Ridpath [1785], and [Edmund] Duncan [1779], in the eighteenth century."

"The belief that what once pleased so widely must still have some charm is my excuse for attempting the present translation."

"The great work of Boethius, with its alternate prose and verse, skilfully fitted together like dialogue and chorus in a Greek play, is unique in literature, and has a pathetic interest from the time and circumstances of its composition. It ought not to be forgotten. Those who can go to the original will find their reward. There may be room also for a new translation in English after an interval of close on a hundred years."

"The text used is that of Peiper, Leipsic, 1874."

"[I]n the year 522 A.D... his two sons, young as they were... were created joint Consuls and rode to the senate-house attended by a throng of senators, and the acclamations of the multitude. Boethius... delivered the public speech in the King's honour... Within a year he was a solitary prisoner at Pavia, stripped of honours, wealth, and friends, with death hanging over him, and a terror worse than death, in the fear lest those dearest to him should be involved in the worst results of his downfall. It is in this situation that... 'Consolation of Philosophy' brings Boethius before us... as seated in his prison distraught.., indignant at the injustice of his misfortunes, and seeking relief for his melancholy in writing verses... Suddenly there appears... the Divine figure of Philosophy, in the guise of a woman of superhuman dignity and beauty, who... convinces him of the vanity of regret for the lost... fortune, raises his mind... to the contemplation of the true good, and makes clear... the mystery of the world's moral government."

"Consolation... Peiper's edition (Teubner, 1871)... in the case of the Tegernseensis... are generally accurate and complete. ...I have ...followed ...usually, the opinions of Engelbrecht in his admirable article, Die Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius in the Sitzungsberichte of the Vienna Academy, cxliv. (1902) 1-60. ...The history of the text of the Opuscula Sacra... is intimately connected with that of the Consolatio."

"Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, of the famous Praenestine family of the Anicii, was born about 480 A.D. in Rome. His father was an ex-consul... His public career was splendid and honourable.... But he fell under the displeasure of Theodoric, and was charged with conspiring to deliver Rome from his rule, and with corresponding treasonably to this end with Justin, Emperor of the East. He was thrown into prison at Pavia, where he wrote the Consolation of Philosophy, and he was brutally put to death in 524. His... life was marked by great literary achievement. His learning was vast, his industry untiring, his object unattainable... the transmission... of all the works of Plato and Aristotle, and the reconciliation of their apparently divergent views. Boethius was the last of the Roman philosophers, and the first of the scholastic theologians."

"The Consolation of Philosophy is... as Gibbon called it, "a golden volume, not unworthy of the leisure of Plato or of Tully." To belittle its originality and sincerity, as is sometimes done, with a view to saving the Christianity of the writer, is to misunderstand his mind and his method. The Consolatio is not... a mere patchwork of translations from Aristotle and the Neoplatonists. Rather it is the supreme essay of one who throughout his life had found his highest solace in the dry light of reason. His chief source of refreshment, in the dungeon... was a memory well stocked with the poetry and thought... The development of the argument is anything but Neoplatonic; it is... his own."

"If it is asked why the Consolation of Philosophy contains no conscious or direct reference to the doctrines... in the Tractates... and is, at most, not out of harmony with Christianity, the answer is simple. In the Consolation he is writing philosophy; in the Tractates he is writing theology. He observes what Pascal calls the orders of things. Philosophy belongs to one order, theology to another. They have different objects. The object of philosophy is to understand and explain the nature of the world around us; the object of theology is to understand explain doctrines delivered by divine revelation. The scholastics recognized the distinction, and the corresponding difference in the function of Faith and Reason."