Composers From England

"The core of common culture is religion. Tribes survive and flourish because they have gods, who fuse many wills into a single will, and demand and reward the sacrifices on which social life depends."

"Liberty is not the same thing as equality, and that those who call themselves liberals are far more interested in equalizing than in liberating their fellows."

"A free society is a community of free beings, bound by the laws of sympathy and by the obligations of family love. It is not a society of people released from all moral constraint–for that is precisely the opposite of a society. Without moral constraint there can be no cooperation, no family commitment, no long-term prospects, no hope of economic, let alone social, order."

"Faith exalts the human heart, by removing it from the market-place, making it sacred and unexchangeable. Under the jurisdiction of religion our deeper feelings are sacralized, so as to become raw material for the ethical life: the life lived in judgement."

"All of us need an identity which unites us with our neighbours, our countrymen, those people who are subject to the same rules and the same laws as us, those people with whom we might one day have to fight side by side to protect our inheritance, those people with whom we will suffer when attacked, those people whose destinies are in some way tied up with our own."

"I don't think you can be a conservative in the end without being some kind of nationalist. You are always going to have in the back of your mind a conception of the community whose structure you are trying to retain."

"Hayek sees that the zero-sum vision is fired by an implacable negative energy. It is not the concrete vision of some real alternative that animates the socialist critic of the capitalist order. It is hostility toward the actual, and in particular toward those who enjoy advantages within it. Hence the belief in equality remains vague and undefined, except negatively. For it is essentially a weapon against the existing order – a way of undermining its claims to legitimacy, by discovering a victim for every form of success. The striving for equality is, in other words, based in ressentiment in Nietzsche’s sense, the state of mind that Max Scheler identified as the principal motive behind the socialist orthodoxy of his day. It is one of the major problems of modern politics, which no classical liberal could possibly solve, how to govern a society in which resentment has acquired the kind of privileged social, intellectual, and political position that we witness today."

"The ethical life... is maintained in being by a common culture, which also upholds the togetherness of society... Unlike the modern youth culture, a common culture sanctifies the adult state, to which it offers rites of passage."

"Hayek fails to account either for the passion among intellectuals for equality, or for the resulting success of socialists and their egalitarian successors in driving the liberal idea from the stage of politics. This passion for equality is not a new thing, and indeed pre-dates socialism by many centuries, finding its most influential expression in the writings of Rousseau. There is no consensus as to how equality might be achieved, what it would consist in if achieved, or why it is so desirable in the first place. But no argument against the cogency or viability of the idea has the faintest chance of being listened to or discussed by those who have fallen under its spell."

"Conservatives have, on the whole, accepted nationality as a sphere of local duties and loyalties, defining an inheritance and a community that has a right to pass on its values from generation to generation. The nation may indeed be the best that we now have, by way of a society linking the dead to the unborn, in the manner extolled by Burke. And for this very reason it arouses the hostility of liberals, who are constantly searching for a place outside loyalty and obedience, from which all human claims can be judged. Hence, in the conflicts of our times, while conservatives leap to the defense of the nation and its interests, wishing to maintain its integrity and to enforce its law, liberals advocate transnational initiatives, international courts, and doctrines of universal rights, all of which, they believe, should stand in judgment over the nation and hold it to account."

"[Burke] emphasized that the new forms of politics, which hope to organize society around the rational pursuit of liberty, equality, fraternity, or their modernist equivalents, are actually forms of militant irrationality."

"The strange superstition has arisen in the Western world that we can start all over again, remaking human nature, human society, and the possibilities of happiness; as though the knowledge and experience of our ancestors were now entirely irrelevant."

"In 1970s Britain, conservative philosophy was the preoccupation of a few half-mad recluses."

"From its beginnings the Conservative Party has been characterized by a relatively firm and enterprising fiscal policy, being responsible, not only for constant restrictions on free trade, but also for the introduction of regular income tax, and for legislation which governed the sale and conditions of labour. In the light of history, its post-war conversion to Keynesian economic theory might be seen as a natural intellectual development, a further move away from the view...that economic affairs are self-regulating...towards the more plausible view that the posture of the state is all-important, and that, without the state's surveillance, destitution and unemployment could result at any time. And it is perhaps no accident that, when the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher abandoned this conception of the state's economic role, and took up the banner of liberal economics, it was, in time, deserted by the electorate, so that the old alliance of interests which it had for a century represented suddenly fell apart. The odd thing, however, is that the policy which caused the Conservative Party's collapse – free market economics, under the aegis of global corporations – is the policy most fervently adopted by the New Labour Party of Tony Blair, and will no doubt be the downfall of that Party too."

"There is no doubt in my mind that, from the third-person point of view, monarchy is the most reasonable form of government. By embodying the state in a fragile human person, it captures the arbitrariness and the givenness of political allegiance, and so transforms allegiance into affection."

"When truth cannot make itself known in words, it will make itself known in deeds."

"Many Britons...feel strongly about something which was once called "the alien wedge". And surely it cannot be doubted, even by those who profess allegiance to the "multicultural society", that our society, unlike America, is not of that kind, and therefore that immigration cannot be an object of merely passive contemplation on the part of the present citizenship. There is perhaps no greater sign of the strength of liberalism (a strength which issues, not from popular consensus, but from the political power of the liberal elite) than that it has made it impossible for any but the circumlocutory to argue that the English, the Scots and the Welsh have a prior claim to the benefits of the civilization that their ancestors created, which entitles them to reserve its benefits for themselves."

"Hayek’s theory of evolutionary rationality shows how traditions and customs (those surrounding sexual relations, for example) might be reasonable solutions to complex social problems, even when, and especially when, no clear rational grounds can be provided to the individual for obeying them. These customs have been selected by the ‘‘invisible hand’’ of social reproduction, and societies that reject them will soon enter the condition of ‘‘maladaptation,’’ which is the normal prelude to extinction."

"Conservatism is itself a modernism, and in this lies the secret of its success."

"[W]hile it is a long-standing principle of British law that the fomentation of hatred (and hence of racial hatred) is a serious criminal offence, it is not clear that illiberal sentiments have to be forms of hatred, nor that they should be treated in the high-handed way that is calculated to make them become so. On the contrary, they are sentiments which seem to arise inevitably from social consciousness: they involve natural prejudice, common culture, and a desire for the company of one's kind. That is hardly sufficient ground to condemn them as "racist" – an accusation which has no definition in law, and against which there is now no defence. To be accused of racism is to be guilty of it: this is the great achievement of liberal thinking about nationality. One of the most important conservative causes in our time must surely be the attempt to undo the apparatus of censorship and intimidation, which has effectively silenced the appeal to national identity."

"Take any aspect of the Western inheritance of which our ancestors were proud, and you will find university courses devoted to deconstructing it. Take any positive feature of our political and cultural inheritance, and you will find concerted efforts in both the media and the academy to place it in quotation marks, and make it look like an imposture or a deceit. (p. 40)"

"The modern world gives proof at every point that it is far easier to destroy institutions than to create them. Nevertheless, few people seem to understand this truth."

"For we are social beings, who can exist and behave as autonomous agents only because we are supported in our ventures by that feeling of primal safety that the bond of society brings. We can envisage no project and no satisfaction on which the eyes of others do not shine. We are joined to those others, and even when they are strangers to us, they are also part of us. It is the indispensable need for membership that brings the national idea to our minds; and there is no rational argument that will expel it, once it is there. Without it, we are homeless; and even if our attitude to home is one of sour disaffection, home is no less necessary to our sense of who we are."

"Yes, I am in favor of censorship, but it has to be conducted by people like me. And that's the difficulty (laughs). I'm in favor of encouraging every possible form of self-restraint and parental control. And I certainly don't think that pornography should be protected under the American Constitution."

"Schopenhauer argues that the empirical world exists only as a representation: ‘every object, whatever its origin, is, as object, already conditioned by the subject, and thus is essentially only the subject’s representation.’ A representation is a subjective state that has been ordered according to space, time and causality – the primary forms of sensibility and understanding. So long as we turn our thoughts towards the natural world, and search for the thing-in-itself behind the representation is futile. Every argument and every experience leads only to the same end: the system of representations, standing like a veil between the subject and the thing-in-itself. No scientific investigation can penetrate the veil; and yet it is only a veil, Schopenhauer affirms, a tissue of illusions which we can, if we choose, penetrate by other means. The way to penetrate the veil was stumbled upon by Kant."

"Schopenhauer was not the only one of Hegel’s opponents to rest his faith in the unsayable. Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), in his attack on the prevailing Hegelian rationalism, sought to undermine the claim that ‘the real is the rational and the rational the real’, and so to reaffirm the value of that which, while real, lies beyond the reach of reason. But, lacking Schopenhauer’s gift of argument, and being indeed more literary than philosophical in his inclination, he did not set up any elaborate system of ideas whereby to postpone the recognition of his ultimate refuge. His principal interest was the vindication of the Christian faith, and he wrote directly or indirectly towards this end, inventing in the process the name, if not the philosophy of ‘existentialism’, for which achievement he is now chiefly known. His philosophy is a clear example of a reaction against idealism which is not also a form either of empiricism or skepticism. In the course of this reaction, it is once again the subject that is reaffirmed, as the ground of all philosophical thought."

"Those critics of the nation who have seen in it the root of xenophobia and racism, have often disparaged the imperial powers of Europe for their indecent contempt toward the "natives" of their territories. A picture has developed—by no means wholly wrong—of European despots, smugly convinced of their ancestral right of sovereignty, cruelly trampling on people whom they regarded as their genetic inferiors. But these very same critics are frequently enthusiastic supporters of the "national liberation struggles," whereby colonial peoples attempt to affirm themselves as nations, and to achieve independence in precisely that guise. Of course, the new nations are not the same kind of thing as the old ones, as I have argued. But they answer to the same need: the need for a bond of membership that will conform to the geographical and administrative realities, that will permit the dead and the unborn to stand beside us, and that will define our territory as home. Now you can't have it both ways. If nationhood is a boon to the peoples of New Guinea and Peru, it must also be a boon to those who formerly oppressed them."

"Race is at best an influence on behaviour, not the moral source of it. It is the individual alone who acts, and he alone who should bear the benefits and the burdens of moral judgment. In all questions of right and duty, it is both wicked and nonsensical to refer to a person's race – whether the purpose be to accuse him, or to exonerate him. To do so is to place the crucial attribute of responsibility where it does not belong – with the abstract totality, rather than with the concrete individual. The racist ignores every genuine right and obligation in pursuit of a merely abstract reckoning: he seeks to reward or punish the individual in respect of qualities which are not of his own choosing and for which he can in truth be neither praised nor blamed. It is surely obvious that racism is an evil. Even if it were not obvious from its intrinsic nature, it is obvious from its effects. Millions have died precisely because, in the eyes of the racist, they were already dead, being of "inferior" race, without rights, condemned by their very existence."

"Of course, there are those — Sandel, Walzer and Dworkin, for example — who propose "communitarian" ways of thinking, as a further move in the direction which a sophisticated liberalism requires. But none of them is prepared to accept the real price of community: which is sanctity, intolerance, exclusion, and a sense that life's meaning depends upon obedience, and also on vigilance against the enemy."

"A developed legal system, with elaborate common law rights, and supported by a system of natural justice, was the most precious legacy of our empire. If it were still permissible to defend colonization, I should justify it in terms of this bequest, and at the same time contrast the colonization of Africa with the Soviet "colonization" of eastern Europe, which has advanced not by the generation but by the destruction of law."

"A writer who says that there are no truths, or that all truth is 'merely relative,' is asking you not to believe him. So don't."

"It goes without saying that apartheid is offensive. It was adopted, however, as the lesser of two evils. The Afrikaners believe that black majority rule has, in almost every case, led to the collapse of the constitutional government which they brought to South Africa, and upon which their freedoms and privileges – and perhaps even their lives – depend. And it did not seem so very bad to deny to blacks a vote which they would, when in power, promptly deny to themselves."

"An international socialism is the stated ideal of most socialists; an international liberalism is the unstated tendency of the liberal. To neither system is it thinkable that men live, not by universal aspirations but by local attachments; not by a “solidarity” that stretches across the globe from end to end, but by obligations that are understood in terms which separate men from most of their fellows—in terms such as national history, religion, language, and the customs that provide the basis of legitimacy."

"Attitudes to death go hand in hand with attitudes to sex. And it is in the sphere of sex that some of the greatest of medical confusions have arisen. I refer in particular to the "sex change" – again, an operation which has exhilarated the public, with its implication that sexuality is an elaborate accident, which can be tailored to the individual need. A person's sexuality is no longer regarded as part of his essence. It has become an attribute, which he might change as he changes his clothes. The possibility of thinking in such a way shows a deep change in perception. The obligation to accept one's sex has dwindled, in the same way as the obligation to accept one's death. Consequently people call upon doctors to help them, demanding painful, expensive and dangerous operations, whose moral effects cannot really be envisaged in advance, and whose premise is a kind of delusion which, however it might arouse our compassion, ought not to inspire our connivance. No doubt the time is not far distant when sex-change operations will be obtainable on the National Health, granted on the advice of "experts" able to discern the "real" gender identity of the soul sheathed within each human envelope."

"Kant's position is extremely subtle — so subtle, indeed, that no commentator seems to agree with any other as to what it is."

"In argument about moral problems, relativism is the first refuge of the scoundrel."

"This is an important book and one of the best to appear in a long while."

"Scruton does not disappoint. To be sure, niggling doubts about his purely musical analysis surface now and then. While he obviously believes his own insistence that Tristan is thoroughly tonal, it also allows him the convenience of sidestepping a number of complex musico-dramatic issues. He also resorts on occasion, for example on page 98, to the kind of descriptive jargon in which dear old Imogen Holst indulged in her hagiographical writing on Ben Britten. But there are here many quite wonderful turns of phrase that say much, beautifully, in little space. Thus, for example: "Wagner was an intemperate thinker, whose theories were thrown out from his prodigious sensibility like spray from a ship in full sail". I wish I'd written that. Scruton's almost frightening erudition is paired with an ability to explain in lucid, comprehensible prose what are in fact complex philological and philosophical issues. Whether he is elucidating the Upanishads, Schopenhauer, Kant or mediaeval epics, he never browbeats the reader, but draws him in to arguments that seem to possess a remarkable inevitability. Scruton offers a succinct tour of Wagner's sources for Tristan that is the most lucid that the present writer has yet encountered"

"Philosophers seldom devote a book to a single art; hardly ever to architecture. Dr. Scruton's book is thus most welcome. It combines wide knowledge of architecture and architectural theories, copious examples and interesting views on aesthetics... Neither architects nor philosophers can ignore this book. Though I find parts of it questionable or arbitrarily stipulative, its richness, suggestiveness and scope make it absorbing reading."

"One of the most important contributions to its subject matter since Ruskin."

"In many ways the topics covered by the book are new territory for Scruton. As a longstanding admirer of his writing and, though with rather more qualifications, of his thinking, I have read a good deal of his published output over the last few years, and find new themes in this book I do not recall before. The prospect of Scruton, the defender of hunting and elegist of rural England, defending the Enlightenment came as something of a surprise, though admittedly it is a somewhat Hegelianized and communized Enlightenment. His treatment of Islamic thought and ideas, while hardly uncontentious, is clearly fed by deep thought and much reading, and, as always, he writes like a dream."

"Roger Scruton has given us a fetching book on the nature and value of architecture, one which is almost as enlightening as it is infuriating (and that's saying a lot). There is a solid structure of argument at the heart of the book, but present too are all the occasions for pleasure usual with Scruton, such as a biting polemic and a nice style."

"This book is a remarkable addition to the philosophical corpus in analytic musical aesthetics. Scruton may be unmatched in his numerous use of musical examples in a philosophical text. Unfortunately, it is almost too dense and too complicated to be of much use to anyone wanting to learn about musical aesthetics. A reader would be at a loss to understand much of what Scruton advances without not only a full understanding of the history of musical aesthetics in the philosophical realm, but also a good working knowledge of music theory and music history. Also, without a familiarity of the theories of Lerdahl and Jackendoff as well as a full comprehension of Schenkerian Analysis the reader may be at a loss about many of Scruton's explanations. Thus it is not a good tool for those interested in learning musical aesthetics, but it could be invaluable to those who want to deepen their understanding of the analytic end of the field."

"Scruton is one of the best philosophers currently writing on aesthetics and few can match his deep and catholic understanding of the arts."

"Scruton begins his book with an expert account of the origins of the Tristan story and Wagner's treatment of it. Scruton has absolute command of this material, and he eloquently organizes it around a few central points. As a concise account of the evolution of the Tristan myth, the first two chapters of Scruton's book are unsurpassed... Scruton's deep love of Tristan seems to render him blind toward the inconsistencies of the Wagnerian enterprise and the ruptures in the fabric of the Gesamtkunstwerk. Unfortunately, this blindness undermines Scruton's arguments in the final chapters of the book. In these pages, Scruton uses Tristan to pronounce jeremiads against contemporary culture, attacking (among other things) popular music and pornography. Scruton has important things to say here, and we would take him more seriously if he did not grip so tightly onto the meaning of Wagner's work. Scruton's eloquent and persuasive prose alerts us to ways in which Wagner's music cuts across the grain of contemporary notions about love and sexuality. But the ability of Wagner's work to "speak against" or to "speak across" depends at least in part to ways in which it resists decoding and presents irreconcilable paradoxes. Scruton seems unable or unwilling to acknowledge these qualities, and his work suffers as a result."

"Despite my reservations about certain aspects of Sexual Desire, it is a book which deserves and repays serious and careful consideration; it is at once a highly sensitive and refined exploration of a central but philosophically neglected part of our Lebenswelt, and a bold attempt to relate the Lebenswelt in general and the area of human sexuality in particular to its physical basis. Throughout the book Scruton manifests a deep commitment to philosophy as a humane discipline, a commitment seen all too rarely in contemporary philosophy. The upshot is to give one confidence that philosophy can still, on occasion, respond to the hopes that were once placed on it, of being at once rigorous and responsive to the resonance of the human world."

"Roger Scruton's book [Aesthetics of Music] is the first account of music's nature and purpose — or at least the first to come my way — which attempts to explain what music is and what it is for. One reason for this is the far-ranging, wide-eyed, open-eared quality of his mind; another, more humbly practical, reason is that this may well be the only book about the philosophy and aesthetics of music that is copiously equipped with examples in handsomely printed music type... Roger Scruton's book speaks proudly on behalf of wholeness, haleness, and holiness; a beacon to our bleakness, its 'value' should endure."

"How, then, if music seems so self-contained and cut off from the everyday world in a way that literature painting can never be, can we engage with it so fully? And how can it be important to us? In his outstandingly good book, The Aesthetics of Music, Roger Scruton demonstrates, with all the erudition, eloquence and profound insight has become a hallmark of his writing, how an answer to the first question provides an answer to the second."

"As a critic, Scruton is perceptive and persuasive... Roger Scruton seems characteristically British, however—an heir not only of the elite, eighteenth-century Dilettanti but of popularizing nineteenth-century propagandists such as Ruskin and Morris. Indeed, there is a moralistic fervor to his evangelism, and occasionally Scruton strikes one as a new Pugin, arguing the opposite side: favoring classicism rather than denigrating it. Unlike those ardent idealists of the last century, however, Scruton peppers his opinions with articulate British wit, irony, and sarcasm."

"Scruton is at his best not when he is trying to import a 'scientifically'-orientated metaphysic into a phenomenological description, or when he seems to be doing so, but when he articulates so elegantly the humanity that lies in music. "Our music is the music of upright, earth-bound, active, love-hungry beings" (p.172). This book is full of such humane insight and is for that reason, and for many other reasons, compulsive reading. Roger Scruton is passionate and knowledgeable about music. He is also something which it is now unfashionable to be—a passionate and inspiring philosopher writing about what really matters."