Keyu Jin

"Reforming the system... would allow the flow of talent across regions... improve... allocation of labor... [and] reduce regional disparities."

"China has made the... quantum leap... from US$380 to US$10,000... over... four decades. The second... is to go from US$10,000 to US$30,000... [M]uch... speed of China’s achievement can be ascribed to catching up. But unqualified success... will be... when... 1.4 billion... reach... high-income status, particularly... in a political environment... antithetical to... Western conventional wisdom. ...[H]alf of the most prosperous people in the world... living under Communist rule—not... predicted... when the Berlin Wall fell."

"[[Innovation|[I]nnovation]] has... become... one of the highest forms of... glory. And it is [China's] only... hope of becoming the foremost economic power of the twenty-first century."

"[B]ooms and busts is a natural feature of market economies. In the last 40 years China has really never had a bust. ...[B]ust cycles also oust less productive firms and provides exit mechanisms, and that creative destruction... is one of the bright spots... of the situation."

"China's suffering from a severe deficit in demand because of low wage growth, scarring effects of the pandemic and... the real estate. But... because of China's size today, growing at 3% to 4% even, is not a bad thing. If India grows 4 percentage points faster than China from now until 2030, China's still going to contribute $130 trillion dollars of additional GDP more than India... to the world."

"I totally agree with Mr. Zhu's assessment of transitioning to a productivity, innovation driven economy. That's the only way that's going to sustain growth in the long run. So that's a good thing. But... renewables or digitization in the short term... can't possibly displace real estate as a provider for growth and employment in the way that it had in the last 10 years or so. Second, services right now... only accounts for half of GDP and only 48% of employment. That number is 80% in advanced economies, so you can imagine a whole amount of room for also absorbing the youth who are underemployed, highly educated. They account for a more educated skill force than manufacturing. And you also have almost a billion people who haven't really reached middle income by international standards, living under $300 per month. ...So I could go on and on, when even Japan and Korea leveled off their growth, their productivity as a share of... the US was already 80% and China is still very low... a lot of room for convergence. ...[W]e want to separate the cyclical problems of demand from some of the longer term challenges."

"Confidence has to come from somewhere... There are underlying factors that alter confidence and consumption, and... we've seen the scarring effects of the pandemic. Don't forget that Chinese households did not get the support that European and American households got during the pandemic... [M]ore importantly, could be declining, and we don't really know for sure, but it's not climbing, so without that you can't possibly get consumption to be really... enthusiastic. Of course, there's real estate and the stock market. ...Retail investors account for the majority of turnover for Chinese A shares and... that has also been performing problematically. And... youth unemployment is a challenge, but is it coming from a cyclical feature which is a demand deficit, in which case policies could potentially work, but... As we'll hear from Mr. Zhu, there are also constraints... There's a on s... the key implementers of economic drivers of growth, but now they are suffering from mountainous debt burdens. So these are some of the... short-term challenges."

"Coming back to the trade challenges... We're seeing in the data that trade is simply being re-routed... from countries like Vietnam and Mexico, but... the ultimate demand and suppliers for that is... still the U.S. and China. It's... taking a longer route... that's going to increase trade cost, and... some Chinese companies... have also set up factories in Mexico and... Vietnam to... circumvent some of these... trade barriers, but it still has to come ultimately from countries like the U.S. and China."

"In so many ways China is in transition, and... requires a bit of patience, whether it's real estate, or debt, or ..."

"At the core... the U.S. China competition is about the China... development model, Chinese aspirations and most of all, Chinese technology, or technological competition. ...[I]t's as bad as it is because of a lack of mutual trust and very different world vision, values and culture, which I think we underappreciate."

"President Xi recently said, We hope that America would be prosperous, and hope that the U.S. would wish China to be more prosperous as well. I think that does send a message, but I do think that the two countries are recalibrating the relationship, learning from what has happened. I don't... think there's a set, specific idea of how it's going to look..."

"[R]ecalibration comes from two important things... First... is that internal challenges for both countries, China for sure on the economic... political... military... A lot of the focus is now inward. Chinese don't think about Americans all day long. ...Second, there's a huge unintended consequence of these technological restrictions... We've seen it in history... that whenever there are restrictions or... walls, it accelerates technological development. So what we have seen in China recently is a national mobilization. Unlikely partners from the big techs, working together. Universities, industries, governments, all trying to tackle the hard and impossible... [T]hat's... accelerated some of the endeavors to leap frog... [W]e're going to see much more of that, because of these restrictions, not despite them."

"Before, they were comfortably importing chips. ...Of course Chinese companies would love to import chips. Now they have to turn to domestic substitution, and that's accelerating... making domestic chip companies much more profitable... in many, many different areas."

"[I]t's leaky. You cannot really restrict technology flows... [Y]ou're basically enriching the intermediaries. ...There are a lot of third [party] countries where we're seeing a huge surge in imports of chips. I wonder what happened there."

"Collaborative competition is the way we should define the relationship. ...U.S. and Japan had similar... economic... technology competition, and... everybody was better off because Japan pushed the U.S. to do much more. Lots of these... important innovation pushes were because of Japanese competition."

"The two biggest themes this year, AI and sustainability: one represents competition between the two; the second represents collaboration. There's no way we're going to get to green transition without the collaboration... So my advice would be first... start from small victories to build trust... and recalibrate and readjust to real time circumstances."

"After reading Jake Sullivan's reviving national American economy, it sounds... like the China model with industrial policies, subsidies and a huge national boost... The China model is about having a unique coordination between government and markets... individualism and communalism..."

"[T]here's one fundamental misunderstanding about the Chinese from the American side... that China's sole goal is to try to overtake the U.S. That is not the Chinese aspiration. The Chinese people, with a billion people still trying to have a better life... It's overwhelmingly pragmatic. Chinese people... still think about getting an apartment in the cities and sending their kids to school... [T]hat is the ultimate source of legitimacy, also, for the party. When we talk about war and all that, it's about peace and stability, which is the best conditions to make that happen."

"[C]oming back to the recalibration, look at trade. Yes, U.S. and China's structural trade is declining, but... it's just being rerouted from Vietnam and Mexico, but ultimate sources of demand and supply are still coming from the two largest economies. It's just taking a much longer route and adding to the trade costs. And it's going to add to the cost of innovation... to the cost of inflation... [C]oming back to the American voters... ultimately defining this year's election is still going to be overwhelmingly pragmatic about the everyday livelihoods of these people."

"Keep borders open, student flows, academics, knowledge flows, and leaders should talk more often."

"Jin Keyu is professor of economics at the LSE. She is also a Young Global Leader at the , and I'm hoping she can give us some helpful input as to the Chinese position on where global finance is headed."

"Jin avoids ideology and instead frames basic economic agents in the same manner as any other country. As a result, English-language readers will come away with a more informed and empathetic picture of this still-developing country. ...[S]he addresses the ...reality that the poses no threat to the dollar... a global currency so long as the CCP’s desire for stability demands rigid capital controls. ...Jin’s skill as a communicator pays dividends as she explains the enormous consequences of seemingly arcane regulations."

"Jin... is the Harvard-educated daughter of a former deputy minister of finance who... heads up China’s .... ...She is ...less well placed ...or eager ...to deal with politically contentious questions. ...[S]he displays a ...tendency to omit unwelcome information. Jin’s book... feels... peppered with concealed rabbit holes... Jin refers to a drop in grain production between 1959 and 1961, without mentioning... harvests collapsed because of government policy, and... 30 and 50 million citizens starved... The author... praises China’s Covid policies... [as] embraced... by the population, despite evidence of protests... and... deaths ...being scrubbed from the record. ...Jin is an optimist ...she believes Beijing has a unique ...evolving model ...to grow through ...difficulties. ...Whether she is right ...remains contested. Those who disagree point to endemic corruption... repression and stalled... productivity..."

"Jin... doesn't adequately address the underlying ideological and political issues that have in many cases an outsize impact on China’s economic policies, performance and behaviour. ...Jin notes that Xi Jinping has “himself taken over the job of overseeing China’s technology advancement..." ...But she doesn’t ask whether having Xi — a non-technologist — in charge is the best bet ...[T]he avoidance of politically sensitive topics and analysis compromises the value of The New China Playbook."

"Jin Keyu... professor of economics at the , author of The New China Playbook: Beyond Capitalism and Socialism, and advising lots of companies as well... as the World Bank and IMF on how to decrypt where things are going."