"There was every indication that the Spanish war might grow into a general European fight. As soon as the French learned that the Italians were helping Franco, they wanted to help the other side. The Russians, learning that the Germans were going to Franco's assistance, rushed to reinforce the Loyalist forces. The British, as usual, were caught in the middle. Their public was badly divided on the merits of the struggle in Spain but was united on the proposition that no general war was wanted. Out of this dilemma was born the "non-intervention" programme which eventually won the war for General Franco. All of the big nations agreed to keep hands off and to let the Spaniards settle their own differences among themselves. Hull was persuaded by the British that the United States, in the interest of world peace, must go along with this plan, especially in the matter of refusing to sell arms to either side. He fell in with it, actuated partly by a mistaken belief in the sincerity of the "non-interveners" and partly by the knowledge that Congress would amend the Neutrality Act to cover civil wars as soon as they reconvened in January. In addition, the imminence of the presidential election made it politically wise to not offend the powerful Catholic elements of the country by opposing Franco too strongly. Like most of the other British appeasement plans, the non-intervention scheme worked badly for Britain- and for the world at large."