"King's greatest political-strategic victory of the war came over the British and U.S. armies in 1943 when he won formal recognition from Roosevelt and Churchill that the war with Japan could be won only by an American naval campaign across the Central Pacific, a campaign directed by him and his principal field subordinate, Chester W. Nimitz. The first phase of the debate occurred before, during, and after two Roosevelt-Churchill conferences in early 1943: "Trident" in Washington, D.C., and "Quadrant" in Quebec. Aided by his best strategist, Admiral Cooke, King fought for his version of JCS 287, an American-drafted "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan." In its earliest drafts, this plan simply reflected the current reality that there were campaigns under way in Burma, China, and the South Pacific. Although army planners, dedicated to a second front in Europe, showed little interest in the war with Japan, the army still endorsed MacArthur's "I Shall Return" campaign. King insisted that any campaign should focus on the destruction of Japan's overseas resources, which meant an offensive direct only toward the Western Pacific sea lanes. He played on FDR's declining confidence that the British and Chinese would ever contribute much to a war of economic strangulation against Japan. When the British chiefs finally admitted that they would not release force from the Mediterranean for Asia, King pressed for the endorsement of CCS 242/6, "Agreed Essentials in the Conduct of the War, which basically made the war with Japan an American responsibility. Roosevelt and Churchill approved this document on 25 May 1943."