"Rape is a crime not because there is an absence of consent, but because sex is an assault on politically defined biological boundaries. The role of “proving” consent is thus, again, simply to mitigate the original crime. Far more so than early twentieth century fascist and “quasi”-fascist legislature, contemporary international law has thus mobilized the “right” implied by integrity/autonomy to turn sex into something in need of constant regulation And indeed, to the extent that both integrity and autonomy play interchangeable roles in the contemporary legislation, the passive, spatial nature of women's bodies is highlighted. In Kirsten Campbell's description of the ICTY's approach to rape law, for instance, we learn that, the Tribunal's conception of the crime of rape rests upon notions of integrity of the body and of the self of the survivor of sexual violence .. [T]his model of rape as a crime against humanity thus rests upon a conception of the material integrity of the body, and of the crime as a trauma to it … [I]n “Kunarac” the crime consists not only of a breach of bodily integrity but also of sexual autonomy ... [T]his model of rape reflects the more liberal model of rape, which “now understands the crime as a violation of autonomy, as a failure to recognize the victim's civil rights of self determination” and assumes that “personhood is intricately tied to self-determination and autonomy.” In a very different context, Alan Hyde has argued that, bodies may indeed be experienced as autonomous, but, when this is so, this is because of their social, discursive construction as autonomous. Body autonomy is really social, public, and conventional ... [I]t follows that the body is not the best but the worst standpoint for defining legal subjects, particularly subjects' autonomy against public intrusion (the aim of those who would replace the right of privacy with a right to bodily integrity or autonomy). Hyde's analysis is more critically informed than Campbell's is-working from the notion that the autonomous body is a political construct rather than some pre-existent, natural reality. But each in a different way accepts unquestionably the slippage between the “autonomy” associated with the liberal right to do with one's body as one wishes, and the “integrity” associated with the authoritarian insistence the body is inviolable and deserving of respect. In Campbell's discussion, we have firs ta conflation of the “self” and bodily integrity, followed by a characterization of rape as a simultaneous assault on bodily integrity and sexual autonomy. The passage concludes with a conflation this time of “personhood,” “self-determination,” and “autonomy.” Hyde's discussion is almost a mirror image. We start with bodily “autonomy”, and then move to the strange assertion that autonomy *rather than integrity) serves as a barrier “against public intrusion.” We then conclude with integrity “or” autonomy replacing the notion of privacy. If integrity and autonomy-and the right to both-were the same thing, then these discussions would be entirely reasonable. Without question, however, they are not."