"Drucilla Cornell addresses the question of bodily integrity, personhood, and the legal protection of both in a related way, arguing that, the right to abortion should not be understood as the right to choose an abortion but as the right to realize the legitimacy of the individual woman's projection of her own bodily integrity, consistent with her imagination of herself at the time that she chooses to terminate her pregnancy. Here, in other words, personhood and bodily integrity are not about physical wholeness but about psychological or existential wholeness-the relationship between an intact body and a sense of self. A woman's identity (political and otherwise) is based on the projection of her physical and psychological self, and a legal system must protect a woman citizen's ability (and “right”) to maintain this identity. As Taub notes, although “far more sophisticated” than many other approaches, Cornell's analysis is also based both implicitly and explicitly upon a Lacanian interpretation of the mirroring process. Taub further argues that if we do not accept Lacanian analysis, Cornell's argument becomes problematic. I would respond, however, that psychological projections of the self based on bodily integrity are not any more constructed (or “false”) than physical projections of the same, and that Cornell's approach is therefore useful regardless of whether or not we accept the details of Lacanian analysis. Indeed, both the more “basic” approach and the more “sophisticated” approach appear to get at the same issue-the linkage of personhood or the self to the ideal of wholeness, and the need for legal structures or rights rhetoric to protect this connection."