Ernest King

"I'll never forgive the Army for not taking at least part of the blame for Pearl Harbor. That was why I didn't like Stimson."

"I didn't like the atom bomb or any part of it."

"To the Class of 1901, United States Naval Academy."

"During the war I kept neither a diary nor notes. I had then neither the time nor the inclination, and like most sailors, who through necessity "travel light," I have not accumulated any substantial body of personal papers. Since my relief as Chief of Naval Operations on 15 December 1945, I have spent many hours in recalling the events of World War II and of my earlier life in the Navy. My source has been my memory, verified and supplemented by references to official records and by the recollections of officers who assisted me in my wartime duties. The reader must therefore take this book on faith, for its statements are not bolstered by citations of numerous documents. I must ask him to believe, however, that I have made a sincere and conscientious effort to avoid the inspiration of hindsight and to record matters as they seemed at the time."

"War has changed little in principle from the beginning of recorded history. The mechanized warfare of today is only an evolution of the time when men fought with clubs and stones, and its machines are as nothing without the men who invent them, man them and give them life. War is force- force to the utmost- force to make the enemy yield to our own will- to yield because they see their comrades killed and wounded- to yield because their own will to fight is broken. War is men against men. Mechanized war is still men against men, for machines are masses of inert metal without the men who control them- or destroy them."

"Any man facing a major decision acts, consciously or otherwise, upon the training and beliefs of a lifetime. This is no less true of a military commander than of a surgeon who, while operating, suddenly encounters an unsuspected complication. In both instances, the men must act immediately, with little time for reflection, and if they are successful in dealing with the unexpected it is upon the basis of past experience and training. As any decisions that I made during World War II sprang from the forty-four years' service that were behind me in 1941, I wish to acquaint the reader with the background of my professional life so that he may better understand their origins."

"The United States has never had the tradition of a military class. The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Services, and the officers and enlisted men of the Army, Navy, and Air Force are drawn from all classes of American life and must be trained from scratch."

"First, all hands gave their best and their utmost, day and night, in good weather and bad, in order that the work might progress with all practicable dispatch. Second, the divers encountered the hazards of their work with unfailing readiness, with the greatest skill and frequently the greatest intrepidity and daring; it is trite to say that the job could not have been done without them; it is true to say that none could have done more than they did. Third, the commanding officer of the Falcon, Lieutenant Henry Hartley, whose seamanship was of the highest order, whose advice in all matters was invaluable, whose judgement was eminently sound, displayed a devotion to duty which was unceasing and a constant example to all hands."

"Fourth, Lieutenant Commander Edward Ellsberg, Construction Corps, the salvage officer, was in direct personal charge of the actual salvage work and diving operations; his technical knowledge and resourcefulness were adequate for all of the innumerable setbacks and difficulties; he developed an improved underwater cutting torch, worked out the technique of handling the pontoons, learned to dive during the months the actual operations were suspended and actually went down on the wreck some three times during the spring operations; he was the embodiment of perseverance and determination."

"Historically ... it is traditional and habitual for us to be inadequately prepared. This is the combined result of a number factors, the character of which is only indicated: democracy, which tends to make everyone believe that he knows it all; the preponderance (inherent in democracy) of people whose real interest is in their own welfare as individuals; the glorification of our own victories in war and the corresponding ignorance of our defeats (and disgraces) and of their basic causes; the inability of the average individual (the man in the street) to understand the cause and effect not only in foreign but domestic affairs, as well as his lack of interest in such matters. Added to these elements is the manner in which our representative (republican) form of government has developed as to put a premium on mediocrity and to emphasise the defects of the electorate already mentioned."

"On the afternoon of 28 February 1939 King and Halsey went together on board Houston where some twenty or more flag officers of the United States Fleet had been summoned to pay their respects to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. President Roosevelt was in high spirits, for he loved the Navy and always visibly expanded when at sea. As the admirals greeted him, he would have some pleasant, half-teasing personal message for each. King, when his turn came, shook hands and said that he hoped the President liked the manner in which naval aviation was improving month by month, if not day by day. Mr. Roosevelt seemed pleased by this, and, after a brief chat, admonished King, in his bantering way, to watch out for the Japanese and the Germans. King made no attempt to hold further conversation with the President, even though Admiral Bloch urged him to do so. He had never "greased" anyone during his forty-two years of service and did not propose to begin, particularly at a moment when many of the admirals were trying so hard to please Mr. Roosevelt that it was obvious. He had paid his respects civilly; he was in plain sight, and felt that the President could easily summon him if there were anything more to say. He believed that his record would speak for itself, and that it was not likely to be improved by anything that he might say at this moment. It seemed that the die was already cast, although the President's decision would not be made known for some weeks."

"King, when told that he could have eggs or pancakes and toast and coffee, asked with the severity of expression that has often disconcerted those who do not know his fondness for teasing, why he could not have both. The waiter gasped, but shortly returned with a monumental plate of eggs and pancakes that caused Marshall to wonder how King got that huge breakfast. The answer was simple: "I asked for it!" Although in some doubt as to whether he could eat his way through what he had brought on himself, the food tasted so good after a week in wartime London that King eventually disposed of it. He then in Navy fashion thanked the mess officer, asked to look over the galley, and congratulated and shook hands with the cooks."

"a. Would it further threaten or cut Japanese lines of communications? b. Would it contribute to the attainment of positions of readiness from which a full-scale offensive could be launched against Japan?"

"Do the best you can with what you have. Do not worry about water that has gone over the dam. Difficulties exist to be overcome."

"Dear Harriet: I have your letter of January 6th- and am interested to learn that you have to do my biography as part of your English work. As to your questions: I drink a little wine, now and then. I smoke about one pack of cigarettes a day. I think I like Spencer Tracy as well as any of the movie stars. My hobby is cross-word puzzles- when they are difficult. My favorite sport is golf- when I can get to play it- otherwise, I am fond of walking. Hoping that all will go well with your English work, I am, Very truly yours, E.J. KING Admiral, U.S. Navy"

"When they get in trouble they send for the sons-of-bitches."

""Admiral, asked McCrea, "is this story true that I hear about?" "Well, John, I don't know," replied King, deadpan. "Which story is it?" "They tell me," McCrea went on, "you were heard to say recently, 'Yes, damn it, when they get in trouble they send for the sons of bitches.'" King couldn't help but smile. "No, John, I didn't say it. But I will say this: If I had thought of it, I would have said it.""

"He is the most even-tempered person in the United States Navy. He is always in a rage."

"FLEET ADMIRAL ERNEST JOSEPH KING, USN. Born Ohio 1878. Annapolis Class of 1901. As Lt. Comdr., assigned first command, DD Terry, 1914. Awarded Navy Cross, 1916, for service as Assistant Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet. Promoted to Comdr., 1917, Capt., 1922. Commanded Submarine Base, New London, 1923-1926,; USS Lexington, 1930-2. Served as Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics, 1933-6. Promoted Rear Admiral, 1939. In Feb. 1941, became Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet. Appointed Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, Dec. 1941, and Chief of Naval Operations, 1942. On Dec. 20, 1944, achieved newly established highest rank, Fleet Admiral. Awarded 3 DSM's, numerous other decorations, American and foreign."

"In the wake of the Pearl Harbor disaster, President Roosevelt made sweeping changes in the navy high command. When word of these changes reached the submarine force, there were cheers. The key people, it seemed, were all submariners. First, and most important, Roosevelt named Admiral Ernest Joseph King, Jr., to the post of Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, replacing Admiral Stark. King had commanded the Submarine Base at New London and a division of S-boats and had played a key role in salvaging two sunken submarines in the 1920s, the S-51 and the S-4. Although King had never commanded a submarine, he wore the dolphin insignia plus his aviator's wings. Second, King appointed former submariner Chester Nimitz to replace Kimmel (and Pye) as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. After his submarine service before and during World War I, Nimitz had established the Submarine Base at Pearl Harbor and then commanded a division of early fleet boats, including Barracuda, Bass, and Bonita. King's staff in Washington was laced with submariners. For his deputy chief of staff he named Richard Edwards, then commanding Submarines Atlantic. Edwards, who would eventually become King's right arm, had commanded a squadron of fleet boats, and the Submarine Base at New London and had helped Lockwood fight for the Tambor class before the General Board in 1938. For his operations officer, King picked Francis Stuart ("Frog") Low, another submariner. Later, King appointed one-time submariner Charles Maynard ("Savvy") Cooke to be Assistant Chief of Staff for War Plans."

"Diplomacy, tact, and forbearance were not words to be associated with Ernest King, even at a young age. When his mother once scolded him for expressing his dislike in front of the hostess, seven-year-old Ernest held his ground. "It's true," he insisted, "I don't like it." Absolute candor, no matter how rude or insulting, became his trademark. "If I didn't agree," King later reminisced, "I said so.""

"Whereas Leahy was stern, reserved, and even dour, King was nothing short of bombastic. Throughout his career, King's personality was routinely commented upon- and frequently feared- by his contemporaries and junior officers alike. His seniors usually found it merely annoying, although many- Forrestal was clearly an exception- tended to overlook his grating manner because there was no question that this demanding and strong-willed individual was also highly intelligent and capable of delivering results. King simply had no tolerance for subordinates who failed to carry out his orders to his satisfaction. Considering King's satisfaction was a very high bar, many failed to clear it. "On the job" wrote historian Robert Love in his history of the chiefs of naval operations, "[King] seemed always to be angry or annoyed." But some of that anger or annoyance may well have been a mask that was best breached when one stood up to him or took the initiative in doing what King likely would have done had he been in the other's shoes."

"Ironically, during four years of war, MacArthur may have owed the most to the very people he was certain were out to discredit and disparage him. While never among his fans, Franklin Roosevelt and George Marshall nonetheless consistently supported MacArthur within the framework of their global priorities, from the first efforts to resupply the Philippines to MacArthur's appointment as Allied supreme commander. Even then, where would MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area have been had not Ernie King urged the Joint Chiefs to pour resources into the Pacific and wage a two-front war?"

"In a caravan of recon cars we serpentined through traffic that churned the Normandy roads into a trail of choking white dust. It parched our throats, watered our eyes, and chalked King's neat blues. From Omaha we turned toward Isigny, past the dry, malodorous tidal basin at Grandcamp-les-Bains where the enemy had destroyed a dozen fishing craft and damaged the tidal gates. From offshore a salvo echoed across the beach as the battleship Texas lobbed its broadsides into the Carentan flats where the enemy had withdrawn behind that city. After having so persistently badgered the Navy for capital ships in the bombardment, I was anxious that King see the effects of his big guns in the streets of Isigny. Hansen had parked two armored cars in the village square to cover our party with their guns. With General Marshall, King, Arnold, and Eisenhower bunched together in three open cars, an enemy sniper could have won immortality as a hero of the Reich."

"King on the other hand is a shrewd and somewhat swollen headed individual. His vision is mainly limited to the Pacific, and any operation calculated to distract from the force available in the Pacific does not meet with his support or approval. He does not approach the problems from a worldwide war point of view, but instead with one biased entirely in favour of the Pacific. Although he pays lip service to the fundamental policy that we must defeat Germany and then turn on Japan, he fails to apply it in any problems connected with the war."

"Betty Stark, known to the more junior officers of the Joint Staff Mission as "Tugboat Annie," was an easy man to get on with. Ernie King on the other hand was a difficult man to like. He had recently become Commander-in-Chief US Fleet and was effectively in charge of the day to day running of the US Navy, leaving the grand strategy to stark. This arrangement did not really work, and in March Stark moved to London as Commander-in-Chief US Naval Forces Europe, while King became both C-in-CUS and CNO. Nobody ever found King an easy man. He appeared prejudiced against all things British, but was probably better described as a ferocious Americanophile. He considered that any deployment of American forces in Europe, or, worse, North Africa was wasted as it detracted from the main theatre of the US Navy, the Pacific. His biggest dislikes were mixing US and Royal Navy ships in a combined force, or allowing US Navy ships to serve under foreign, especially British, command."

"In a period of one month- March 1942- King had inspired and advocated the plans and strategy that would govern the entire course of the war in the Pacific."

"King's attitude was a paradox. He griped about too many people getting decorations, but he refused to establish a policy that would end the confusion. Nimitz was his voice of conscience, besieging King to approve the Purple Heart or to define different grades for the Legion of Merit. But it was futile. King did nothing. Nimitz tried to force the issue at their January 1944 meeting in San Francisco by demanding a formal board to standardize the awarding of decorations. All the services had different rules, argued Nimitz, and the Army Air Force was notably generous. If the services could not agree on a common policy, then the President should act. King stalled with a promise to study the problem. King's thinking began to change in June 1944. Just before King had left to watch the Normandy landings, Abby Dunlap had warned him that when the war was over the Army Air Force would get all the credit and the Navy would be forgotten. King thought she was too pessimistic. But when he next saw Abby and Betsy Matter following the invasion, he told Abby she had been right."

"King's bluntness went to extremes, because of his sense of self-righteousness and an undisciplined temper. Tact and discretion too often lost out to emotional excesses, especially in his early career. Together with his intellectual arrogance and lack of humility, King simply considered that he had more brains than anyone else in the Navy and acted accordingly."

"Paradoxically, King resented anyone who treated him the way he treated others, yet there is little evidence that he tried very hard to be more considerate or patient with other people. Throughout his life King would be a harsh and often intolerant judge of character, but his memoirs are mute on his own self-appraisal- other than when as an ensign he vowed to shed his softness and become a tough naval officer."

"King's role in the war was indispensable. He not only oversaw the expansion of the Navy, but he was also involved in plotting military strategy, directing the antisubmarine effort (he created the Tenth Fleet, a paper organization with himself at its head, to coordinate the antisubmarine war in the Atlantic), and helping coordinate American strategy and operations with those of the Allies. King retired in late 1945, shortly after promotion to five-star rank. For several years thereafter he served as an adviser to the Secretary of the Navy and to the President."

"The major problem facing the Allies in 1942 was to agree on what they would do, and when and where they would do it. No plan had yet been drawn up by Eisenhower's directorate for the employment of assault landing craft for the coming conflicts in Europe and Japan. Although he would later be overruled, a stubborn Ernie King pursued a Pacific-first strategy that favored the navy."

"Eisenhower did not participate in the final discussions leading to the demise of Sledgehammer. At their conclusion Marshall summoned Eisenhower to his suite in Claridge's. When Eisenhower arrived, the chief of staff was occupied in the bathroom, and their brief discussion took place through the door. In characteristic fashion Marshall announced that Eisenhower was being given the new title of deputy Allied commander in charge of planning for Torch, and that both he and Admiral King were backing his appointment to command the entire operation. Temporarily in limbo as the commander of American forces, pending the president's approval, Eisenhower reflected on Napoleon's remarks that a general must not permit himself to be impatient or distracted in any manner that would weaken or interfere with the execution of a major plan. When the Combined Chiefs of Staff met on July 25 and the subject of a commander for Torch was raised, the blunt-spoken Ernie King declared that the choice seemed obvious: "Well, you've got him right here," he pointed out. "Why not put it under Eisenhower?" As he would later ascertain, Eisenhower once again had reason to regret his earlier criticism of King, who had become one of his strongest supporters."

"[It was Admiral King's] custom to encourage free and uninhibited debate until he had absorbed all points of view. He would then come forward with a clear-cut scheme, usually so obviously applicable as to cause all concerned to wonder why they had not thought of it themselves."

"I also went to see Admiral King. He was a naval officer of the frightening type, abrupt, decisive, and frequently blunt as to frighten his subordinates. In our conversation he stressed the point that the venture on which I was going to Britain would mark the first deliberate attempt by the American fighting services to set up a unified command in the field for a campaign of indefinite length. He assured me that he would do everything within his power to sustain my status of actual "commander" of American forces assigned to me. He said that he wanted no foolish talk about my authority depending upon "co-operation and paramount interest." He insisted that there should be single responsibility and authority and he cordially invited me to communicate with him personally at any time that I thought there might be intentional or unintentional violation of this concept by the Navy."

"We were scarcely well on the beaches when General Marshall, Admiral King, General Arnold, and a group from their respective staffs arrived in England. I arranged to take them into the beachhead during the day of June 12. Their presence, as they roamed around the areas with every indication of keen satisfaction, was heartening to the troops. The importance of such visits by the high command, including, at times, the highest officials of government, can scarcely be underestimated in terms of their value to the soldiers' morale. The soldier has a sense of gratification whenever he sees very high rank in his particular vicinity, possibly on the theory that the area is a safe one or the rank wouldn't be there."

"Admiral King, commander in chief of United States Fleet, and directly subordinate to the President, is an arbitrary, stubborn type, with not too much brains and a tendency toward bullying his juniors. But I think he wants to fight, which is vastly encouraging."

"One thing that might help win this war is to get someone to shoot King. He's the antithesis of cooperation, a deliberately rude person, which means he's a mental bully. He became Commander in Chief of the fleet some time ago. Today he takes over, also, Stark's job as Chief of Naval Operations. It's a good thing to get rid of the double head of the Navy, and of course Stark was just a nice old lady, but this fellow is going to cause a blow-up sooner or later, I'll bet a cookie."

"Lest I look back at this book sometime and find that I've expressed a distaste for some person, and have put down no reason for my aversion, I record this one story of Admiral King. One day this week General Arnold sent a very important note to King. Through inadvertence, the stenographer in Arnold's office addressed it, on the outside, to "Rear Admiral King". Twenty-four hours later the letter came back, unopened, with an arrow pointing to the "Rear," thus: [Here a long, heavy arrow has been drawn in a diagonal line underneath and pointing to the word "Rear."] And that's the size of man the Navy has at its head. He ought to be a big help winning this war."

"King had the brains, all right, but I hated his guts."

"The campaigns in the South Pacific, however, may not be regarded as simply the inevitable products of inexorable political and military logic. Events created a milieu, and others, notably President Franklin D. Roosevelt, made important contributions, but the South Pacific strategy was forged principally by one man, Admiral Ernest Joseph King. Here the strategy and command changes resulting from Pearl Harbor intersected, for the Japanese attack completed the remarkable resurrection of King's career. In 1942, King attained his sixty-fourth birthday and completed his forty-first year as a naval officer. His father was a seaman, a bridge builder, and finally a foreman in a railroad repair shop. Drawn to his father's workplace, young Ernest absorbed the complexities of gears and lathes and the simple unpretentiousness of the workmen. After graduating fourth in a class of eighty-seven from the Naval Academy, King pursued a career remarkable for its versatility, with important work in surface ships, submarines, and naval aviation. He completed all his assignments with distinction, for the brain beneath his balding pate was agile with technical matters and he possessed a prodigious memory."

"Besides intelligence and dedication, one other pillar supported King's professional reputation: his toughness. He regarded exceptional performance of duty as the norm and evinced insensitivity or even callousness to his subordinates, upon whom he also frequently exercised his ferocious temper. But if King proved harsh with subordinates, he was no toady to superiors. Those who fell short of King's standards found he could be hostile, tactless, arrogant, and sometimes disrespectful or even insubordinate. As a junior officer this conduct earned him more than a healthy share of disciplinary action. He defined the span of his concerns beyond his career when he once commented, "You ought to be very suspicious of anyone who won't take a drink or doesn't like women. King, the father of seven, was deficient in neither category."

"Early in World War II, Captain George C. Dyer served on Admiral King's staff and estimated that his headquarters would require a staff of four hundred people. King blew up and said that since he got by with fourteen while a flag officer at sea, fifty would be the maximum he would tolerate on land. Dyer subsequently went to the Pacific, was severely wounded, and was sent to Bethesda Naval Hospital to recover. While Dyer was in the area, King invited him to stop by his office; and when he came in, King handed him a paper that reported current staffing at 416. It was King's way of admitting he was wrong. Admiral King was noted for his caustic personality, although for the most part it seems to have existed apart from his underlying character. It must have been; few sarcastic individuals rise to the top in the military profession- or stay there if they do- especially when the job includes tangling with the President on a frequent basis. Moreover, many officers who served with him for any length of time came to regard him with an affection and respect that belied his personality."

"King also repaired his deteriorating relationship with the press. This relationship had become so bad that journalists were circulating unfounded stories in order to force Roosevelt to relieve him. King's attorney, Cornelius H. Bull, recognized that this dismissal would not be in the country's best interests; so Bull got together with Glen Perry, the assistant chief for the New York Sun, in the Suns Washington office. Together they proposed that King meet privately with a selected group of journalists at Bull's home in Alexandria, Virginia, and level with them off the record. King agreed reluctantly, predicting that there would only be one such meeting. In this he was dead wrong. Those meetings continued for the balance of the war, by the end of which the "members" came almost to revere King. He in turn developed a great deal of respect and regard for them. And he kept his job."

"Dear Ernie, It has been an education, and a very pleasant one, to serve under you this past winter. May I thank you for your patience of me personally and for the professional lessons you have given me- I should be proud to serve under you any time- anywhere, & under any conditions. The best of luck always- may your new job be to your liking- and here's hoping for more stars afloat. Always sincerely yours, Bill Halsey."

"Once the decision to build up the Navy was taken, strong men of clear vision quickly rose to the top of the service hierarchy. Chief among these were Adm Ernest King and VAdm Chester Nimitz, men of such consummate skill that the ennui of the prewar years had virtually no impact upon their abilities and sensibilities as commanders or as men. Others slightly less senior were pulled forward by the enormous suction created by King's and Nimitz's rise to the top."

"Admiral King's role in the development of strategy for defeating Japan is very difficult to evaluate in detail. Officially he approved or disapproved recommendations that came to him as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations and as one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from his own naval planners, and from the joint planners in Washington. Frequently these recommendations had already been influenced by his own views. Still many of the objectives he preferred, most notably Formosa, were bypassed, and much of the time his recommendations were only in terms of areas or island groups. He accepted without question the specific objectives deemed by the operating commands most suitable. The one who came closest to Admiral King in his basic view that the Japanese should be kept under constant pressure was not a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but the Supreme Commander, Southwest Pacific Area, General MacArthur. Although his role was to recommend and then accept a decision from the JCS, and many of his views on strategy differed sharply from those endorsed by the JCS, his repeated efforts to get more support for his area of command and to push ahead as rapidly and with as much force as possible helped to insure that the war against Japan did not become a forgotten war and were largely responsible for the development of the advance on two axes."

"The military leadership styles of these two naval officers are contrasting in several ways. King was an immoral, self-serving leader who was notably brutal to subordinates and abrasive with Allied military leaders and politicians alike. Nimitz, however, was a moral leader who served is country selflessly, and he was engaging and supportive of his staff as well as sister service members and Allied military leaders and politicians. Really, both men serve as dissimilar examples of naval leadership during World War II and Nimitz's style more closely aligns with the leadership style of Marshall and Eisenhower than it does with King."

"The belief that King was well versed in naval surface and aerial warfare and that he was technically competent in the use of naval warfare is widely accepted by authors assessing King as a naval leader and is not in question in this monograph. What is examined in this monograph is King's leadership abilities absent his technical naval skills. This analysis will demonstrate that King was perceived as a toxic leader who was known to be petulant, overly emotional, stubborn, egotistical, and immoral. These leadership traits, more than anything else define King, and these negative traits affected how he engaged those he led, US and Allied leaders, and even his own family."

"Despite his efforts to win over his subordinates, King did not mind overworking his staff. When he was a flag officer, King preferred a small staff of eleven officers who were skilled and competent. He believed that this was the most efficient way to conduct naval planning and the right way to best utilize manpower. Smaller staffs, however, mean greater work for less people, and that is true as much today as it was then. Buell notes that staffers for King worked long hours and frequently on weekends, knew what King expected of them, but always received few comments for or against a submitted plan. In short, King was a difficult leader to develop plans for. He was extremely general and vague in his initial guidance, and the staff therefore had to try and figure out what he really wanted. Buell notes that even after numerous drafts, if King did not like a plan he would rip it up in front of the officer presenting it and write it himself on the spot."