"[In 2023, "on 16 March 1978, you passed through Via Fani shortly before the ambush on Aldo Moro and his security policec?"] I had to catch the bus to university; my moped was broken. I stopped at the newsagent’s to pick up the Messaggero. I was reading the front-page news about Juventus managing to beat Ajax thanks to Zoff, when the gunfire started. I ran to the opposite side of the street and, with a neighbour, we hid in a side alley. It didn’t last long. When I went back, there were victims on the ground, bullet casings, blood. It looked like a film. But I realised the gravity of the situation at home: there was nothing else on the telly."

"[In April 1978, while Moro was still alive, albeit in the hands of the Red Brigades] Firmness is therefore justified. But it will be even more justified if accompanied by concrete signs indicating that the State, in whose name this rigor is invoked and exercised, wishes to renew itself."

"Even the P2 wanted Moro dead because he was opening the door to the PCI. And Cossiga was powerless."

"When, with Berlinguer’s PCI, I opted for the line of firmness, I was certain and aware that, barring a miracle, we had condemned Moro to death. Others turned out to be negotiators later on; the Moro family, moreover, took it out only on me, never on the communists. The point is that, unlike many social Catholics, who are convinced that the state is a superstructure of civil society, I was and remain convinced that the state is a value. For Moro, this was not the case: the dignity of the state, as he wrote, was not worth the interest of his grandson Luca."

"The Moro Case continues to live on with its mysteries. The real ones and those artfully created. Whether and when a foreign hand was involved in that affair, no one has ever managed to prove it."

"Bettino Craxi, from an interview by Augusto Minzolini, Per me c'è un'altra lista, La Stampa, 13 October 1999."

"I truly believe the Moro case was the turning point. A leader who was opening up to the communists held captive for 55 days—where could that happen? And then the handling of the manhunt for the kidnappers... the ruse of the séance to pinpoint the hideout where they were holding him... the negotiations involving the Mafia..."

"On the afternoon of the following day, Moro was found in Via Caetani. Some said he had been dumped there deliberately between Botteghe Oscure and Piazza del Gesù. Everyone had to realise that this marked the end of the historic compromise between Catholics and Communists. Scialoja pushed his way through the crowd, waving his press card amidst the dismay, anger and grief. In the boot of the red Renault lay a shrivelled body. This is patricide, thought Scialoja. They shot the old father; they looked him in the eyes as he died. This is patricide. A father’s blood always falls upon his children. That gaunt, bony, bird-like face; that unkempt grey beard had reminded him of his father in the coffin."

"As long as the organization is active, we cannot ask former members to recount what happened, naming the key figures involved."

"I had serious doubts about the Moro kidnapping. I set them aside, thinking of our comrades in prison who were pushing for action."

"[On the decision to kill Aldo Moro at the first sign of a possible opening by the institutions] Because they feared that the opening would be minimal, but sufficient to split the Red Brigades between those who were in favor of the killing and those who were not."

"It is shameful that even today the Christian Democrats are still criticized for the one occasion on which, by sacrificing their leader, they demonstrated the very sense of duty to the state that they have always been accused of lacking. What, in fact, was Moro asking for? In those letters, the “distinguished statesman”—the man who had governed the country for over thirty years—demanded that the state renounce the principles upon which it is founded, its laws, and its institutions, all to save his own skin."

"In any case, the government, led by Andreotti, and the Christian Democrats, with the decisive support of the Communist Party, decided to say no to the blackmail of the Red Brigades and Aldo Moro. And it was the only path to follow. [...] The very survival of the state was at stake. What would the Red Brigades have done if the government had yielded to the blackmail? They would have kidnapped the first Mr. Rossi who came within their reach and started all over again. A downward spiral would have begun, at the bottom of which lay only the dissolution of the state and the victory of the terrorists."

"In any case, if there could have been any doubt about the “line of firmness” at the time the events unfolded, such doubt is no longer valid today. It is no coincidence, in fact, that terrorism began to lose ground precisely after the Moro case and dissolved within a few years. This proves that the line of firmness was right not only from an ethical and legal standpoint but also from a practical one. If we had listened to Craxi, Mancini, Signorile, Pace, Liguori, and Deaglio, that is, to the entire faction that flirted with terrorism, today Renato Curcio would be the master of the country."

"There are countless gray areas. Several parliamentary commissions have been established, and even within these, there are gray areas. There appear to be extremely serious failures on the part of the state, and it is impossible to accept that the state could have been so inefficient. This leads one to believe that, rather than state inefficiency, there was “deliberate” inefficiency—and as such, in effect, complicity."

"We were in favor of negotiations, Renato wanted to stay out of it, but we knew that if they killed Moro, they would kill us in prison too; that’s why we took turns in the cell with Curcio, since we believed he would be the first to meet that fate."

"We wanted the closure of Asinara as a starting point for negotiating the release. We wanted the same approach as in the Sossi kidnapping, which for us had been a political victory."

"Probably, if the State had released someone—someone who was ill—I cannot guarantee today that this would have saved Moro, but it certainly would have put those handling the case in serious difficulty. This was, in fact, in my opinion, the only possibility that could have saved Aldo Moro’s life."

"Despite the jokes made, time and again, I can only repeat: it is historically proven that Moro is our doing. That is why we were convicted. The Mafia has nothing to do with it, the secret services have nothing to do with it. The latter may have intervened, but to manipulate the parties and parliament, certainly not us."