Unification in science and mathematics

99 Zitate
0 Likes
0Verified
vor 2 MonatenLast Quote

Timeline

First Quote Added

April 10, 2026

Latest Quote Added

April 10, 2026

All Quotes by This Author

"Since the ancients made great account of the science of Mechanics in the investigation of natural things; and the moderns, laying aside substantial forms and occult qualities, have endeavoured to subject the phænomena of nature to the laws of mathematics; I have in this treatise cultivated Mathematics... The ancients considered Mechanics in a twofold respect; as rational, which proceeds accurately by demonstration, and practical. To practical Mechanics all the manual arts belong, from which Mechanics took its name. But as artificers do not work with perfect accuracy, it comes to pass that Mechanics is so distinguished from Geometry, that what is perfectly accurate is called Geometrical, what is less so is called Mechanical. But the errors are not in the art, but in the artificers. ...the description of right lines and circles, upon which Geometry is founded, belongs to Mechanics. ...To describe right lines and circles are problems, but not geometrical problems. The solution of these problems is required from Mechanics; and by Geometry the use of them, when so solved, is shewn. And it is the glory of Geometry that from those few principles, fetched from without, it is able to produce so many things. Therefore Geometry is founded in mechanical practice, and is nothing but that part of universal Mechanics which accurately proposes and demonstrates the art of measuring. But since the manual arts are chiefly conversant in the moving of bodies, it comes to pass that Geometry is commonly referred to their magnitudes, and Mechanics to their motion. In this sense Rational Mechanics will be the science of motions resulting from any forces whatsoever and of the forces required to produce any motions, accurately proposed and demonstrated. ...we consider chiefly those things which relate to gravity, levity, elastic force, the resistance of fluids, and the like forces whether attractive or impulsive. And therefore we offer this work as mathematical principles of philosophy. For all the difficulty of philosophy seems to consist in this, from the phenomena of motions to investigate the forces of Nature, and then from these forces to demonstrate the other phenomena."

- Unification in science and mathematics

• 0 likes• mathematics• philosophy• history-of-science•
"Mathematics and logic, historically speaking, have been entirely distinct studies. Mathematics has been connected with science, logic with Greek. But both have developed in modern times: logic has become more mathematical and mathematics has become more logical. The consequence is that it has now become wholly impossible to draw a line between the two; in fact, the two are one. They differ as boy and man: logic is the youth of mathematics and mathematics is the manhood of logic. This view is resented by logicians who, having spent their time in the study of classical texts, are incapable of following a piece of symbolic reasoning, and by mathematicians who have learnt a technique without troubling to inquire into its meaning or justification. Both types are now fortunately growing rarer. So much of modern mathematical work is obviously on the border-line of logic, so much of modern logic is symbolic and formal, that the very close relationship of logic and mathematics has become obvious to every instructed student. The proof of their identity is, of course, a matter of detail: starting with premises which would be universally admitted to belong to logic, and arriving by deduction at results which as obviously belong to mathematics, we find that there is no point at which a sharp line can be drawn, with logic to the left and mathematics to the right. If there are still those who do not admit the identity of logic and mathematics, we may challenge them to indicate at what point, in the successive definitions and deductions of Principia Mathematica, they consider that logic ends and mathematics begins. It will then be obvious that any answer must be quite arbitrary."

- Unification in science and mathematics

• 0 likes• mathematics• philosophy• history-of-science•
"A scientific hypothesis may be defined in general terms as a provisional or tentative explanation of physical phenomena. But what is an explanation in the true scientific sense? The answers to this question which are given by logicians and men of science, though differing in their phraseology, are essentially of the same import. Phenomena are explained by an exhibition of their partial or total identity with other phenomena. Science is knowledge; and all knowledge, in the language of Sir William Hamilton is a "unification of the multiple." "The basis of all scientific explanation," says Bain, "consists in assimilating a fact to some other fact or facts. It is identical with the generalizing process." And "generalization is only the apprehension of the One in the Many." Similarly Jevons: "Science arises from the discovery of identity amid diversity," and "every great advance in science consists in a great generalization pointing out deep and subtle resemblances." ...the author just quoted in another place: "Every act of explanation consists in detecting and pointing out a resemblance between facts, or in showing that a greater or less degree of identity exists between apparently diverse phenomena." All this may be expressed in familiar language thus: When a new phenomenon presents itself to the man of science or to the ordinary observer, the question arises in the mind of either: What is it?—and this question simply means: Of what known, familiar fact is this apparently strange, hitherto unknown fact a new presentation—of what known, familiar fact or facts is it a disguise or complication? Or, inasmuch as the partial or total identity of several phenomena is the basis of classification (a class being a number of objects having one or more properties in common), it may also be said that all explanation, including explanation by hypothesis, is in its nature classification. Such being the essential nature of a scientific explanation of which an hypothesis is a probatory form, it follows that no hypothesis can be valid which does not identify the whole or a part of the phenomenon, for the explanation of which it is advanced, with some other phenomenon or phenomena previously observed. This first and fundamental canon of all hypothetical reasoning in science is formally resolvable into two propositions, the first of which is that every valid hypothesis must be an identification of two terms—the fact to be explained and a fact by which it is explained; and the second that the latter fact must be known to experience."

- Unification in science and mathematics

• 0 likes• mathematics• philosophy• history-of-science•