Yale University Faculty

"From the very beginning of quantum mechanics, the notion of the position of a particle has been much discussed. In the nonrelativistic case, the proof of the equivalence of matrix and wave mechanics, the discovery of the uncertainty relations, and the development of the statistical interpretation of the theory led to an understanding which, within the inevitable limitations of the nonrelativistic theory, may be regarded as completely satisfactory."

"... when I was a graduate student in the 1950s, I had to learn a lot about cosmic ray physics — because that's where all the information was coming from about new particles. And I remember how surprised I was when a professor — at Princeton where I was a student — Arthur Wightman, told me that pretty soon physicists would no longer be worried about cosmic rays. They would be getting the information about particles from new kinds of s — which would accelerate known particles like s, which are the nuclei of hydrogen atoms, or s to very high energy where they would collide with each other or with stationary targets. And in that collision new matter would be formed."

"The family of mathematical problems discussed here has emerged in recent years as a result of efforts to put a small chapter of quantum field theory, the so-called external field problem, on a sound mathematical footing. The external field problems is special because the partial differential equations for the unknown field is linear, but the coefficients are allowed to vary in space and time and that gives rise to some surprises, which seem to be of general interest. There is a vast and in large part turgid mathematical physics literature on the subject. To make the general wisdom which has accumulated there more readily available to a mathematical audience I have, in the following, tried to place the problems in their physical context, and still to bring out the essential mathematical questions many of which remain to be answered."

"Why was the discovery of the ... so important for the physics of the 1920s and 30s? The answer is manifold. The Dirac equation provided a relativistic description of spin ½ particles and in particular of the electron. In doing so, it gave a relativistic description of spin and opened the way for the application of group theory to the description of particles of arbitrary spin. The reinterpretation of the Dirac equation as a field equation that followed from Dirac's theory of holes was decisive in the conceptual transformation of single particle theory to many particle (quantum field) theory. The resulting quantum electrodynamics of spin ½ particles, refined by two generations of theoretical work, is the best theory we have. Although it is an approximation since it does not include the effects of weak and strong interactions it has survived many stringent experimental tests when applied to electrons and s."

"Vacuum expectation values of products of neutral scalar field operators are discussed. The properties of these distributions arising from , the absence of negative energy states and the positive definiteness of the scalar product are determined. The vacuum expectation values are shown to be boundary values of analytic functions. Local commutativity of the field is shown to be equivalent to a symmetry property of the analytic functions. The problem of determining a theory of a neutral scalar field given its vacuum expectation values is posed and solved."

"… there are other things wrong with these models but the fundamental trouble is the non-uniqueness of the vacuum as was first shown by , , and STEINMANN … Actually, … has shown that the cluster decomposition property is not only necessary but sufficient for the uniqueness of the vacuum, if there is at least one cyclic vacuum. … HEPP, K., JOST, R., RUELLE, D. and STEINMANN, O., Necessary condition on Wightman functions, Helv. Phys. Acta 34 (1961) 542. BORCHERS, H.J., On the structure of the algebra of field observables, Nuovo Cim. 24 (1962) 214"

"In New Haven, in the 60s, I designed some housing using trailers. I had the acquiescence of Mayor Lee, a remarkable mayor indeed. The whole notion of making a project for about 150 people using trailers was difficult to persuade anybody to do. I suppose it was a mistake; it was eventually demolished. People hated it. First of all it leaked, which is a very good reason to hate something, but I think it was much more complicated than that. Psychologically, the good folk who inhabited these dwellings thought that they were beneath them. In other words, the deviation of the dwelling was not something to their liking. I thought, and I suppose the mayor thought, that trailers were perfectly good enough for them. But I should say, in defense of what we built, that it was a pocket court plan and that it provided a separate outside space for each family. There were two stories, with a core at the center. I am very tenacious about certain things, and in the long run it seems to me that with the correcting of mistakes one can make something much more successful."

"The death toll, the sheer sense of human loss experienced in the war, North and South, among blacks and whites, left a profound and haunting pall on American society and culture for generations to come. The old, official count of Civil War dead relied upon for a century and a half was approximately 620,000. According to some remarkable new research, as many as 750,000 American soldiers and sailors may have died in the conflict, the majority from disease. Approximately 1.2 million were wounded, including perhaps 30-40,000 northern amputees (there are no equivalent numbers for Southerners) who struggled with life and livelihood well into the late nineteenth century. There is no reasonable count of civilian deaths, nor of the numbers of freed slaves who perished in the struggle for their own emancipation. Research now suggests that a quarter of all freedmen who made it to contraband camps operated by the Union forces died in the process. Based on the military death count alone, per capita, if the Civil War were fought in the United States today with its ten-fold greater population, 7.5 million soldiers would die. For most Americans that is an unthinkable toll, but such was the equivalence for their kinfolk in the 1860s. Whenever Americans have been compelled to face and understand experiences of great loss and suffering—the World Wars, the Great Depression, the attacks of 9/11—they have returned to the Civil War-era for touchstones of understanding."

"A significant segment of American society hates the President [Barack Obama] and cannot seem to abide a black family living in the White House."

"(everyone should read:) Prophet of Freedom by David W. Blight. Blight’s biography of Frederick Douglass is probably the best biography I have ever read. If you want to understand America, you have to understand Douglass. He is one of the true founding fathers of this country, someone who helped America see what it was, and who helped direct it towards what he believed it could one day be."

"The first American republic, created out of revolution in the late 18th century, was in effect destroyed. A new, second republic took its place, given a violent birth in the emancipation of four million slaves and the re-crafting of the U. S. Constitution in the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments. Those Amendments—ending legal slavery forever, sanctifying birthright citizenship and establishing “equal protection of the law,” and creating black male suffrage—in effect re-made the United States Constitution. This comprised a second American revolution."

"...These men and their party had overseen an unprecedented centralization of power in the federal government as a means of fighting and winning the Civil War. It is worth remembering, especially in America’s current political circumstances in the early 21st century, that these men of the first Republican Party vehemently believed in government."

"Even quite mild acute uncontrollable stress can cause a rapid and dramatic loss of prefrontal cognitive abilities, and more prolonged stress exposure causes architectural changes in prefrontal dendrites."

"There is no difference between a mental-health issue and a neurological issue."

"It was a commonplace in medieval accounts of kings that in fact the Muslims are incarnations of the demons, while the Hindu king who wages war against them is an incarnation of one of the Hindu Gods, whose function it is to descend to earth in human form and extirpate the demons, thus winning one more round in the on-going battle between the Gods and the demons (§). The comparison, then, that the Muslims do no more against the divine images than the demons have always done against the Gods themselves, suggests this deeper identification."

"The Ekalingamahdatmya is clearly sufficiently preoccupied with the Muslim invasions of North India to raise directly the issue of how and why the Muslims could have overrun the land. Indeed as we have just seen it asks forthright how the images of the Hindu Gods, which it regards as the Gods themselves, could have been broken and battered by the unbelievers. The central stories of the text, the stories designed to explain the origins of the holy site and its images, I believe should be understood in this broader context of the text. Doing so reveals the consummate artistry that is at work in the reshaping of the underlying puranic stories to fit its special circumstances: the curse of Parvati, making the hard-hearted Gods into stones, is aptly suited to a period in history when building of more precious materials was a clear invitation to disaster. The Ekalingamabatmya may use the understatement of story telling, but it is nonetheless a valuable testimony to fears and attitudes in this perilous period of Indian religious history."

"Human rights are only a particular modern version of the ancient commitment by Plato and Deuteronomy—and Cyrus—to the cause of justice. Even among modern schemes of freedom and equality, they are only one among others; they were far from the first to make humanity’s global aspirations the central focus. Nor are human rights the only imaginable rallying cry around which to build a grassroots popular movement."

"The true history of human rights matters most of all, then, in order to confront their prospects today and in the future. If they do capture many longstanding values, it is equally critical to understand more honestly how and when human rights took shape as a widespread and powerful set of aspirations for a better and more humane world. After all, they have done far more to transform the terrain of idealism than they have the world itself."

"The drama of human rights, then, is that they emerged in the 1970s seemingly from nowhere. If the Soviet Union had generally lost credibility (and America’s Vietnamese adventure invited so much international outrage), human rights were not the immediate beneficiaries."

"I think we should be snorkeling and swimming on reefs. Because I think people only develop a passion for protecting things if they know what is at risk. I would hardly be one to say that we shouldn’t go near them. That said, its important to manage tourism properly. If you have a lot of people going onto reefs, stepping on reefs, collecting things from reefs, breaking corals off, or throwing anchors on top of reefs, that’s not good. It’s important to properly manage the numbers of people and their behavior when they’re in water. It’s also important to make sure that the hotels that support that tourism have good water treatment for the sewage that they release, and that they aren’t also feeding this large population of visitors critically important reef fish. That is ecologically sound tourism. But you can’t just let it develop willy-nilly. It has to be managed carefully. Otherwise, you end up with lots of people and not much reef."

"Koenraad Elst, a Belgian Catholic of a radical anti-Muslim persuasion who tries to make himself useful as a 'fellow traveller' of the Hindu nationalist movement."

"Historical powerful forces have attempted to restrict democracy to a set of strictly procedural routines for governance and legislation, but once in motion, democratic procedures have over time tended to remold the very form in which a society represents and imagines itself, its institutions and its history. It is my contention that the history of Indian democracy may be fruitfully interpreted in these terms as a gradual and circumscribed questioning of hierarchies and authority, spreading from the political field to other realms in society. As the political field acquired even more prominence due to the weight of the in all spheres of society in the 1970s, a new marked by "" emerged. This gave rise to a new construction of politics as an "amoral vocation," a construction that reflected a widespread discomfort with the proliferating populist techniques of political mobilization and governance, and a disapproval of the new breed of public figures from modest social backgrounds who used their language, manners, and social background to consolidate mass followings. In the face of this "eianization" of the political field, sections of the educated urban and upper-caste groups began to denounce the political vocation, question the legitimacy of the state and discard the principles of democracy and secularism. For decades democracy and secularism meant protection and extension of to the educated Hindu middle classes, and condescending vis-à-vis lower-caste groups and minorities. However, as it became clear that political democracy was slowly giving birth to this new and unfamiliar form of society, the "softness" of the became the target of the Hindu nationalist critique of a "" that was "pampering minorities." attitudes are today widespread in the same urban middle class in India that for years was regarded as the bedrock of political democracy in the country, and the backbone of the nation. Hindu nationalism emerged successfully in the political field in the 1980s as a kind of "" that mainly attracted more privileged groups who feared encroachment on their dominant positions, but also "plebeian" and impoverished groups seeking recognition around a rhetoric of cultural pride, order, and ."

"The Cold War could have produced a hot war that might have ended human life on the planet. But because the fear of such a war turned out to be greater than all of the differences that separated the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies, there was now reason for hope that it would never take place."

"Both the United States and the Soviet Union had been born in revolution. Both embraced ideologies with global aspirations: what worked at home, their leaders assumed, would also do so for the rest of the world."

"Stalin's postwar goals were security for himself, his regime, his country, and his ideology, in precisely that order."

"Learning about the past liberates the learner from oppressions earlier constructions of the past have imposed upon them."

"To judge from what he has to say about the past, he is unlikely to lose sleep over presidential abuses of power in the present or future. Indeed, Gaddis admonishes Americans for placing restrictions on their elected rulers. Describing what he clearly sees as the regrettable overreaction to Watergate and Vietnam in the 1970s, he writes: “The United States Congress was passing laws—always blunt instruments—to constrain the use of United States military and intelligence capabilities. It was as if the nation had become its own worst enemy.” Retrospectively frustrated by such constraints, Gaddis admires the boldness and vision of President George W. Bush. A keen supporter of the recent Iraq war, Gaddis in 2004 even published a guide for the use of American policymakers, showing how preemptive and preventive war making has an honorable place in American history and is to be encouraged—where appropriate—as part of an ongoing project of benevolent interventionism. Thus, while it may seem tempting to dismiss John Lewis Gaddis’s history of the cold war as a naively self-congratulatory account that leaves out much of what makes its subject interesting and of continuing relevance, that would be a mistake. Gaddis’s version is perfectly adapted for contemporary America: an anxious country curiously detached from its own past as well as from the rest of the world and hungry for “a fireside fairytale with a happy ending.” The Cold War: A New History is likely to be widely read in the U.S.: both as history and, in the admiring words of a blurb on the dust jacket, for the “lessons” it can teach us in how to “deal with new threats.” That is a depressing thought."

"No one can be certain where or when the next great earthquake will occur. It is helpful to know, though, that such upheavals take place more frequently in California than in Kansas: that people who live along the San Andreas Fault should configure their houses against seismic shocks, not funnel clouds. Nobody would prudently bet, just yet, on who will play in the 2001 World Series. It seems safe enough to assume, though, that proficiency will determine which teams get there: achieving it, too, is a kind of configuring against contingencies. Not even the most capable war planner can predict where the next war will occur, or what its outcome will be. But is it equally clear that war planning should therefore cease? The point, in all of these instances, is not so much to predict the future as to prepare for it."

"There was no Germanic world before the Carolingian age."

"Experts in Germanic literature... solemnly assent: emigration from Scandinavia is an authentic "tribal memory"..."

"If Europe has had a supreme invented tradition, that of the Germans before Germany is it-so much so that most people who speak about it do not realize that they are dealing with fiction."

"[D]eutsche Altertumskunde... [is a] still honored "science" of German antiquity."

"The faith in Germanic continuity has prevailed for many centuries, damaging everything it has touched: Germans and other Europeans need to be assured that they can dispense with a link to the Germanen, that there is such a thing as historical change, and that the transgressions of national pasts can indeed be outgrown."

"[[w:Gustav Kossinna|[Gustav] Kossinna's]] ideas about the early Germans, which have long circulated apart from his name, have been only superficially purged from the writings of today."

"Superfluous... is the unthinking modern transposition into history of a common "Germanic" language family-a concept borrowed from comparative philology. The history of a language as known to philologists has nothing to do with that of human beings... No discernible benefit comes from our being reminded again and again in modern writings that many of these barbarians at each other's throats probably spoke dialects of the same language. The G-word can be dispensed with."

"[M]any scholars of today in Europe and the United States still cherish the existence of a "Germanic world" long antedating medieval and modern Germany."

"[[w:Herwig Wolfram|[Hewrig] Wolfram]] is listened to with approval in all countries that care about this subject."

"[The] theme-the "early Germans"-is still far from being repudiated."

"As long ago as 1972, I expressed a wish that someone should write a history of the Migration Age detached from German nationalism... Nothing has happened since then to fill this desideratum. On the contrary, the front of the stage has been occupied by talk of "ethnogenesis" and of the importance of ethnicity in late antiquity. Philology, archaeology, comparative religion, etymology, and whatever else have been exploited in the tried and true fashion of deutsche Altertumskunde in efforts to render the "tribes" more tribal than ever. As little thought as possible has been given to making them less resolutely German... This model... found regaining strength after World War II in the Gottingen historian Reinhard Wenskus, in the Cambridge classicist A. H. M. Jones, and in hundreds of scholars outside as well as inside Germany, all agreed in seeing an existing "Germanic world" getting the better of a "Roman world." That vision of outsiders intruding successfully where they were not wanted is an illusion fostered however innocently and festering ever since the sixteenth century."

"The prehistoric Germans never existed... they are an illusion of misguided scholars. The nonexistence of ancient Germans is perhaps the most important thing one can say about the barbarians of late antiquity... The "Germanic world" is a damaging modern invention and usage that badly needs to be abandoned."

"Germanic collectivity exists in linguistics but never existed anywhere else... [A]n "early Germanic world"... had no existence anywhere until it took form in the minds of scholars in sixteenth-century Europe and was thoughtlessly espoused by everyone else."

"The myth of the Germans before Germany is hard to suppress because, owing to its great age and genesis in the sources themselves."

"Strange as it may seem to hear it said, there were no Germanic peoples in late antiquity. The illusion that there were can be outgrown."

"I would be content if "German" and its derivatives were banished from all but linguistic discourse on this subject."

"My central concern in the present book is... to liberate barbarian history from the German nationalism that has suffused it ever since the sixteenth century and, in whatever disguises, continues to do so today."

"What we call the Fall of the Western Roman Empire was an imaginative experiment that got a little out of hand."

"The adjective "German;' an umbrella term for many of the diverse northern barbarians of the late Roman period, is the key to such unifying compounds as "the Germanic world;' "Germanic migrations;' "Germanic peoples;' "Germanic style;' "Germanic law;' "Germanic grave goods": wherever it turns up it simplifies and unifies, and presides over collective actions that did not take place... "German" will not go away by itself; it has to be stubbornly shown the door."

"The main goal of this book is to reform thinking and writing about the barbarians in late antiquity by driving out the anachronistic terms "German" and "Germanic" and the baggage that goes with them."

"There were no Germans until a Germany materialized little by little in the European Middle Ages. Rome faced outward toward multiple and mutually antagonistic peoples. The existence of an ancient common Germanic civilization reaching deep into the B.C. period is a learned invention of sixteenth-century Germans, based on classical sources well known to us... There was no "Germanic civilization" long ripening north and east of the imperial frontiers."

"When Goffart launched his theory of peaceful 'accommodation'... it fell on fertile ground. Goffart himself seems to have intended his book to play down the role of the Germanic peoples in European history... The European Union needs to forge a spirit of cooperation between the once warring nations of the Continent, and it is no coincidence that the European Science Foundation's research project into this period was entitled 'The Transformation of the Roman World'—implying a seamless and peaceful transition from Roman times to the 'Middle Ages' and beyond."