People Of The Cold War

"The time when Russia could be kept out of the world's oceans has gone forever. We shall sail all the world's seas; no force on earth can prevent us."

"Attention must be given to the study of the given operations. Their study with due allowance made for the existing means of warfare will make it possible to reach a number of useful theoretical conclusions for conducting operations in the initial phase of a war."

"With the emergence of nuclear-missile weaponry, cybernetics, electronics, and computer equipment, any subjective approach to military problems, hare-brained plans, and superficiality can cause irreparable damage."

"There are also many instances where people hostile to the Soviet state are attempting by means of deceit and provocation to poison the minds of our citizens and compel them to believe in monstrous lies."

"I admit I distorted intelligence to please Stalin because I feared him."

"Golikov was a perfect choice. While he himself likely saw Stalin as a guardian angel, Stalin surely saw in him an individual on whom he could rely completely."

"We still have many shortcomings and failures to fulfill the Party's demands, especially as regards the liquidation in some of our people of survivals of the accursed past in consciousness and conduct and the fulfillment of the demands of our Soviet ethics and military discipline."

"The German army is a machine, and machines can be broken!"

"Has a strong will. Decisive and firm. Often demonstrates initiative and skillfully applies it. Disciplined. Demanding and persistent in his demands. A somewhat ungracious and not sufficiently sympathetic person. Rather stubborn. Painfully proud. In professional terms well trained. Broadly experienced as a military leader... Absolutely cannot be used in staff or teaching jobs because constitutionally he hates them."

"In Russia, they say I'm a Pole, in Poland they call me Russian."

"The troops of the Don Front at 4pm on February 2nd, 1943 completed the rout and destruction of the encircled group of enemy forces in Stalingrad. Twenty-two divisions have been destroyed or taken prisoner."

"I have been placed under surveillance, and I can't take a step without it being known to the Polish minister of internal affairs."

"I am a citizen of the Soviet Union and I think sharp measures need to be taken against anti-Soviet forces that are trying to make their way into the leadership. In addition, it is vitally important to maintain the lines of communication with Germany through Poland."

"The policy of large-scale repression against military cadres led also to undermined military discipline, because for several years officers of all ranks and even soldiers in Party and Komsomol cells were taught to “unmask” their superiors as hidden enemies."

"Rokossovsky was a different type of general from Zhukov. Although a good soldier, he was not exceptionally brilliant."

"He was tall, blond and handsome, every inch the dashing half-Polish cavalry officer."

"Rokossovsky was an imposing figure, tall, very good-looking, and well dressed; I understand he was a bachelor and was much admired by ladies."

"The engagements in which Zhukov won his reputation were so massive that, inevitably, many outstanding Soviet military men were involved- either under Zhukov's command or in coordinated and associated movements. There was then, and there continued for years to be, a raging competition for military glory in these engagements. Deep lines of political cleavage and quarrels also underlay the military disputes. Not only military glory was involved; political intrigue, intra-Party quarrels, high-level Kremlin politics were at issue. The principal military rivals of Zhukov were his fellow marshals, Ivan S. Konev, Rodion Malinovsky, V. I. Chuikov, A. I. Yeremenko, Semyon Timonshenko, and to a lesser extent men like K. K. Rokossovsky, V. D. Sokolovsky, and the staff chiefs, A. M. Vasilevsky, Boris Shaposhnikov and, later on, S. M. Shtemenko. Rivals of a different category were Stalin's cronies, men like Voroshilov and Budenny, and police generals such as L. Z. Mekhlis and G. I. Kulik."

"I have no Suvorov, but Rokossovsky is my Bagration."

"As for me, I had to know exactly what the situation was in Dukla Pass. Moscow had demanded it."

"We plan alone but we fulfill our plans together with the enemy, as it were, in accordance with his opposition."

"I do not want to give any orders to the airmen, but get hold of a Komsomol air unit, and say I want volunteers for the job."

"Our neighbors use searchlights, for they want more light. I tell you, Nikolai Pavlovich, we need more darkness."

"Konev was waiting with his staff outside the gloomy villa he had commandeered for a CP. A powerfully built man with a huge bald head, Konev took me first to his office for a moment of private conversation through our interpreters. I gave him a map I had prepared for the occasion, showing the disposition of every U.S. division across his group front. The marshal started in surprise but did not volunteer to show me his own dispositions. Had he wanted to, he probably would have had to ask permission from the Kremlin. American lieutenants were delegated greater authority on the Elbe than were Russian division commanders."

"After dinner Konev led us into the great hall of his house. A chorus of Red Army soldiers broke into the "Star-Spangled Banner" and their resonant voices filled the room. Konev explained that the chorus had memorized the anthem without knowing a word of English. Then to the accompaniment of a dozen balalaikas, a ballet troupe danced into the room. "Why, that's splendid," I exclaimed. Konev shrugged his shoulders. "Just a few girls," he explained, "from the Red Army." Two weeks later when Konev repaid our call with one to our CP, he was enthralled with the violin virtuosity of a thin khaki-clad man. "Magnificent," cried the marshal in delight. "Oh, that," I said. "Nothing, nothing at all. Just one of our American soldiers.""

"As we left Konev's villa that afternoon, the marshal accompanied me into the garden. An orderly led out a Don Caucasus stallion whose saddle bore a Red Army star. Konev handed me the saddle and a handsomely carved Russian pistol. Anticipating this exchange of gifts, I had carried along in the rear of the Mary Q a new jeep just unloaded from Antwerp. Across the cowling we had painted this inscription in both English and Russian: "To the Commander of the First Ukrainian Army Group from Soldiers of the 1st, 3rd, 9th, and 15th American Armies." A holster was affixed to the jeep with a brightly polished new carbine. And we stuffed the tool compartment with American cigarettes. "I'll probably get stuck by the comptroller and have to pay for this thing 20 years after the war," I told Hansen when he ordered the jeep from Antwerp, "but what the dickens, I don't suppose we can go up empty-handed.""

"Our difficulties with the Russians increased, but I never really blamed Konev. He obviously was merely carrying out instructions. He even had a sense of humor about it occasionally. Once when we were discussing Austrian politics, the name of the Communist party leader, Ernst Fischer, was mentioned. Jokingly, I said: "Well, I don't like him because he is a Communist." Konev grunted. "That's fine," he said. "I don't like him either because he's an Austrian Communist.""

"On another occasion, I decided to give Konev, who liked to hunt, a custom-built rifle, with a silver plate on the stock inscribed "To Marshal Konev, from his friend, General Clark." I wasn't sure he would get it if I simply delivered it to his headquarters, so I had an officer take it to him. I didn't even get an acknowledgement from Konev, although I saw him on several official occasions. Finally, about three weeks after I had sent the gun, I walked to lunch with him after the commissioners' meeting. Speaking through an interpreter, I asked if he had received the gun. "Yes". "Ask the marshal whether he liked it." "Yes". "I just wondered," I said. "I hadn't received any acknowledgement." "Well, you didn't send any ammunition.""

"Once I said to Konev, "You've made ten demands at this Council meeting that we can't meet. But suppose I should say, 'All right. We agree to all ten demands.' Then what would you do?" "Tomorrow," he said, "I'd have ten new ones.""

"On March 31 Stalin received a message from Eisenhower, intended to improve coordination between their armies. The Allied commander stated that his troops were now thrusting toward Leipzig, south of Berlin, rather than the German capital. Given the mindset in the Kremlin, the message was probably dismissed as sinister disinformation. Next day Stalin summoned Zhukov and Ivan Koniev, his two top marshals, and asked: “Who is going to take Berlin: are we or the Allies?” There was one only possible answer, and Koniev gave it immediately: “It is we who shall take Berlin, and we will take it before the Allies.” With his flanks now secured, Stalin cannily unleashed Zhukov and Koniev—two bitter rivals—in their own personal race for Berlin. That same day, April 1, he cabled Eisenhower that Berlin had “lost its former strategic importance” and that the Soviets would send only second-rate forces against it, sometime in May. “However, this plan may undergo certain alterations, depending on circumstances.” Historian Antony Beevor has described this message as “the greatest April Fool in modern history."

"The engagements in which Zhukov won his reputation were so massive that, inevitably, many outstanding Soviet military men were involved- either under Zhukov's command or in coordinated and associated movements. There was then, and there continued for years to be, a raging competition for military glory in these engagements. Deep lines of political cleavage and quarrels also underlay the military disputes. Not only military glory was involved; political intrigue, intra-Party quarrels, high-level Kremlin politics were at issue. The principal military rivals of Zhukov were his fellow marshals, Ivan S. Konev, Rodion Malinovsky, V. I. Chuikov, A. I. Yeremenko, Semyon Timonshenko, and to a lesser extent men like K. K. Rokossovsky, V. D. Sokolovsky, and the staff chiefs, A. M. Vasilevsky, Boris Shaposhnikov and, later on, S. M. Shtemenko. Rivals of a different category were Stalin's cronies, men like Voroshilov and Budenny, and police generals such as L. Z. Mekhlis and G. I. Kulik."

"No Prime Minister before me has been attacked more viciously than I am today."

"[From as early as 1979, P. W. Botha], in his capacity as president of apartheid South Africa, was the real architect of the secret talks that ultimately led to De Klerk’s historic announcement in February 1990. ... Nelson Mandela started the process of persuading [[w:Kobie_Coetzee|[Kobie] Coetsee]] that the time was ripe for the government to talk to the ANC, and that he was prepared to lead the initiative in prison even before consulting Lusaka. ... Botha’s response was to ... commence secret talks with the ANC to explore possible negotiations with the enemy. ... The South African conflict had reached a stalemate [with] no possibility of victory for either side. ... It was in this toxic environment that Mandela and Botha rose to the occasion, both without a mandate. Mandela defied the ANC and engaged the enemy without a mandate because he knew that the hawks in the ANC would have stopped his initiative. Botha [authorised secret talks] without informing his Cabinet because it was too risky to do so. ... White voters still viewed the ANC as terrorists controlled by Moscow in the context of the Cold War. Reports of Botha talking to the ANC would have sunk him as leader of the National Party and president of South Africa."

"Uri Friedman: Why did the South African government, in the mid-1970s, decide to embark on a nuclear-weapons program?"

"President P.W. Botha’s notorious “Rubicon” speech on 15 August 1985 at the National Party Congress in Durban was probably one of the most significant speeches in the history of South Africa. It was supposed to break the political and military deadlock between the apartheid government and the banned liberation movements, notably the ANC. Botha was widely expected to announce new policies that could possibly have ended the political conflict in the country. However, that did not happen. Instead the speech was a total fiasco. ...the South African government and P.W. Botha were not ready for such policy breakthrough announcements and had never planned to make them."

"The white people who came here lived at a very much higher standard than the indigenous peoples, and with a very rich tradition which they brought with them from Europe."

"I never have the nagging doubt of wondering whether perhaps I am wrong."

"Half a century ago in this court I was sworn in as the Member of Parliament for George. And here I am today … I am not better than General De Wet. I am not better than President Steyn. Like them I stand firm in my principles. I can do no different. So help me God."

"The idea of an Afrikaner people as a cultural entity and religious group with a special language will be retained in South Africa as long as civilisation stands."

"I am not against the provision of the necessary medical assistance to Coloured and natives, because, unless they receive that medical aid, they become a source of danger to the European community."

"I am sick and tired of the hollow parrot-cry of “Apartheid!” I’ve said many times that the word “Apartheid” means good neighbourliness."

"Because you could not translate the word apartheid into the more universal language of English, the wrong connotation was given to it."

"Our history is responsible for the differences in the South African way of life."

"The free world wants to feed South Africa to the Red Crocodile [communism], to appease its hunger."

"Most blacks are happy, except those who have had other ideas pushed into their ears."

"I feel more welcome among the black communities than I do among Coloureds"

"Never in the history of this country have so few people done so much for so many without acknowledgement by the international community."

"Many refugees – White, Brown and Black – flee to South Africa. Why? Here they know they have safety."

"I am one of those who believe that there is no permanent home for even a section of the Bantu in the white area of South Africa and the destiny of South Africa depends on this essential point. If the principle of permanent residence for the black man in the area of the white is accepted then it is the beginning of the end of civilisation as we know it in this country."

"You could not claim for yourself that which you were not prepared to grant others."