Military Leaders From The Soviet Union

"It's a bad business. There is no firm front. We have separate strongpoints in which our units are holding off the attacks of superior enemy forces. Communications with them are weak."

"Whoever can lift a rifle, should have one."

"The aggressor too should know that the preemptive use of nuclear weapons would not insure victory. With modern detection systems and the combat readiness of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces, the United States would not be able to deal a crippling blow to the socialist countries. The aggressor will not be able to evade an all-crushing retaliatory strike."

"Frankly, we doubt the veracity and seriousness of the United States in regard to achieving results that would be acceptable to both sides in Geneva."

"If the present White House leadership runs the gauntlet of common sense and the people's will for peace and challenges us by starting MX missile deployment, then the Soviet Union will respond by deploying a new intercontinental ballistic missile of the same class, with its characteristics in no way inferior to those of the MX."

"Could anyone in his right mind speak seriously of any limited nuclear war? It should be quite clear that the aggressor's actions will instantly and inevitably trigger a devastating counterstroke by the other side. None but completely irresponsible people could maintain that a nuclear war may be made to follow rules adopted beforehand, with nuclear missiles exploding in a "gentlemanly manner" over strictly designated targets and sparing the population."

"When my neighbor, who spoke German tolerably well, introduced himself as a former Soviet general, I was somewhat surprised, even under these circumstances in which virtually nothing came as a surprise. ... He told me all kinds of stories, of which the best (one he claimed to have witnessed firsthand) was about Trotsky, who was irked by Voroshilov's arrogant behavior toward him. Trotsky took advantage of a council of war over which he was presiding in Petrograd and, raising his voice, addressed Voroshilov thus: "Commander of the Tsaritsyn front! Comrade Voroshilov!," then, as if giving orders, "ATTEN-TION!" At this, according to the story, Voroshilov, frozen on the spot, stood to attention, and this marked the end of his insolence. Se non è vero... ["Even if it's not true, it's a good story."]"

"The engagements in which Zhukov won his reputation were so massive that, inevitably, many outstanding Soviet military men were involved- either under Zhukov's command or in coordinated and associated movements. There was then, and there continued for years to be, a raging competition for military glory in these engagements. Deep lines of political cleavage and quarrels also underlay the military disputes. Not only military glory was involved; political intrigue, intra-Party quarrels, high-level Kremlin politics were at issue. The principal military rivals of Zhukov were his fellow marshals, Ivan S. Konev, Rodion Malinovsky, V. I. Chuikov, A. I. Yeremenko, Semyon Timonshenko, and to a lesser extent men like K. K. Rokossovsky, V. D. Sokolovsky, and the staff chiefs, A. M. Vasilevsky, Boris Shaposhnikov and, later on, S. M. Shtemenko. Rivals of a different category were Stalin's cronies, men like Voroshilov and Budenny, and police generals such as L. Z. Mekhlis and G. I. Kulik."

"Voroshilov was a hard-riding, hard-drinking military crony of civil-war days."

"Voroshilov was a striking figure, with a great deal of influence among the workers, so that the degree of influence of the committee on the workers and its success as regards recruitment depended primarily on him."

"The Soviet Union, true to the Leninist principles of respect for the rights and national independence of all peoples great or small, has always been and is guided in its relations with other countries by the principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-intervention in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefits, peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation."

"If we enjoy the benefits of peace, it is only because we have an excellent armed force and a fine socialist economy. Let us exert all efforts so that our further development may be strong and mighty, so that our numerous enemies may think well and long before they decide to attack our fatherland, and so that if they attack, they will quickly regret it."

"The engagements in which Zhukov won his reputation were so massive that, inevitably, many outstanding Soviet military men were involved- either under Zhukov's command or in coordinated and associated movements. There was then, and there continued for years to be, a raging competition for military glory in these engagements. Deep lines of political cleavage and quarrels also underlay the military disputes. Not only military glory was involved; political intrigue, intra-Party quarrels, high-level Kremlin politics were at issue. The principal military rivals of Zhukov were his fellow marshals, Ivan S. Konev, Rodion Malinovsky, V. I. Chuikov, A. I. Yeremenko, Semyon Timonshenko, and to a lesser extent men like K. K. Rokossovsky, V. D. Sokolovsky, and the staff chiefs, A. M. Vasilevsky, Boris Shaposhnikov and, later on, S. M. Shtemenko. Rivals of a different category were Stalin's cronies, men like Voroshilov and Budenny, and police generals such as L. Z. Mekhlis and G. I. Kulik."

"Playing down the effective capacity of the USSR to deal a counterblow to the aggressor and exaggeration of their transoceanic capabilities...do not testify to the presence of common sense among the U.S. military."

"Don't touch us, gentlemen imperialists, don't threaten us for you yourselves will fall into the abyss which you are so diligently preparing for us and burn to cinders in nuclear inferno."

"The Soviet Army, Air Force and Navy are strong enough to thwart any attempts of imperalist reaction to disrupt the peaceful labor of our people or the unity and solidarity of the socialist camp."

"Service is service, wherever it occurred. The defense of the fatherland is no small thing."

"We are Communist, you are Capitalist. You have your ideas, we have ours. But I tell you this much: many American generals are very often sorry that they have no ideal to plant in the heart of the American soldier, so he will be willing to die for that ideal. You are jealous of us for this. The Communist soldier, the Red Army soldier, has such an ideal in his heart. He has it because he considers the ideal of the commander his own ideal. Your generals in Korea were sorry that Americans were not fighting willingly. We couldn't tell them why this was so, but I will tell you why. There is a difference between us. We have an advantage over you. We have an ideal for which we are prepared to die. You have not."

"Golikov was a perfect choice. While he himself likely saw Stalin as a guardian angel, Stalin surely saw in him an individual on whom he could rely completely."

"We still have many shortcomings and failures to fulfill the Party's demands, especially as regards the liquidation in some of our people of survivals of the accursed past in consciousness and conduct and the fulfillment of the demands of our Soviet ethics and military discipline."

"I admit I distorted intelligence to please Stalin because I feared him."

"There are also many instances where people hostile to the Soviet state are attempting by means of deceit and provocation to poison the minds of our citizens and compel them to believe in monstrous lies."

"Has a strong will. Decisive and firm. Often demonstrates initiative and skillfully applies it. Disciplined. Demanding and persistent in his demands. A somewhat ungracious and not sufficiently sympathetic person. Rather stubborn. Painfully proud. In professional terms well trained. Broadly experienced as a military leader... Absolutely cannot be used in staff or teaching jobs because constitutionally he hates them."

"The engagements in which Zhukov won his reputation were so massive that, inevitably, many outstanding Soviet military men were involved- either under Zhukov's command or in coordinated and associated movements. There was then, and there continued for years to be, a raging competition for military glory in these engagements. Deep lines of political cleavage and quarrels also underlay the military disputes. Not only military glory was involved; political intrigue, intra-Party quarrels, high-level Kremlin politics were at issue. The principal military rivals of Zhukov were his fellow marshals, Ivan S. Konev, Rodion Malinovsky, V. I. Chuikov, A. I. Yeremenko, Semyon Timonshenko, and to a lesser extent men like K. K. Rokossovsky, V. D. Sokolovsky, and the staff chiefs, A. M. Vasilevsky, Boris Shaposhnikov and, later on, S. M. Shtemenko. Rivals of a different category were Stalin's cronies, men like Voroshilov and Budenny, and police generals such as L. Z. Mekhlis and G. I. Kulik."

"The Red Army must keep its powder dry and be in constant mobilization and preparedness."

"Peoples of all the warring countries are trying to put an end to the war, to establish peace. And we believe that they will get peace. And the sooner they get peace the better."

"The Russians have learned much in this hard war in which the Finns fought with heroism."

"We are harassing them and will go on harassing them until they are totally exhausted. This is not merely tactics of a definite kind—it is a strategy with a broad perspective, directed at definitive and total victory. The Russian defence always had preparation for the counter-offensive as its aim. The Russian war plan here follows the commandmant of Clausewitz, "Swift and powerful transition to the attack—the lightning sword of retribution — that is the most brilliant part of the defense."

"It is necessary to keep in mind the possibility of simultaneously conducting two, if not three, offensive operations of various fronts on a theater of war with the intention of strategically shaking the enemy's entire combat capability as extensively as possible."

"We intend to check up on the fitness of our small units...If each such particle attains real efficiency and brings genuine military skill to our large units, our troops, should they be called upon to fight, will carry out their operations without sustaining heavy losses."

"We'll spin them out like a bobbin thread."

"We have fine troops, they are inured."

"It is possible that the Germans will attack, and it is necessary that the fleet be in readiness."

"No actions are to be taken against the Germans without our consent."

"The engagements in which Zhukov won his reputation were so massive that, inevitably, many outstanding Soviet military men were involved- either under Zhukov's command or in coordinated and associated movements. There was then, and there continued for years to be, a raging competition for military glory in these engagements. Deep lines of political cleavage and quarrels also underlay the military disputes. Not only military glory was involved; political intrigue, intra-Party quarrels, high-level Kremlin politics were at issue. The principal military rivals of Zhukov were his fellow marshals, Ivan S. Konev, Rodion Malinovsky, V. I. Chuikov, A. I. Yeremenko, Semyon Timonshenko, and to a lesser extent men like K. K. Rokossovsky, V. D. Sokolovsky, and the staff chiefs, A. M. Vasilevsky, Boris Shaposhnikov and, later on, S. M. Shtemenko. Rivals of a different category were Stalin's cronies, men like Voroshilov and Budenny, and police generals such as L. Z. Mekhlis and G. I. Kulik."

"On March 31 Stalin received a message from Eisenhower, intended to improve coordination between their armies. The Allied commander stated that his troops were now thrusting toward Leipzig, south of Berlin, rather than the German capital. Given the mindset in the Kremlin, the message was probably dismissed as sinister disinformation. Next day Stalin summoned Zhukov and Ivan Koniev, his two top marshals, and asked: “Who is going to take Berlin: are we or the Allies?” There was one only possible answer, and Koniev gave it immediately: “It is we who shall take Berlin, and we will take it before the Allies.” With his flanks now secured, Stalin cannily unleashed Zhukov and Koniev—two bitter rivals—in their own personal race for Berlin. That same day, April 1, he cabled Eisenhower that Berlin had “lost its former strategic importance” and that the Soviets would send only second-rate forces against it, sometime in May. “However, this plan may undergo certain alterations, depending on circumstances.” Historian Antony Beevor has described this message as “the greatest April Fool in modern history."

"Once I said to Konev, "You've made ten demands at this Council meeting that we can't meet. But suppose I should say, 'All right. We agree to all ten demands.' Then what would you do?" "Tomorrow," he said, "I'd have ten new ones.""

"On another occasion, I decided to give Konev, who liked to hunt, a custom-built rifle, with a silver plate on the stock inscribed "To Marshal Konev, from his friend, General Clark." I wasn't sure he would get it if I simply delivered it to his headquarters, so I had an officer take it to him. I didn't even get an acknowledgement from Konev, although I saw him on several official occasions. Finally, about three weeks after I had sent the gun, I walked to lunch with him after the commissioners' meeting. Speaking through an interpreter, I asked if he had received the gun. "Yes". "Ask the marshal whether he liked it." "Yes". "I just wondered," I said. "I hadn't received any acknowledgement." "Well, you didn't send any ammunition.""

"Our difficulties with the Russians increased, but I never really blamed Konev. He obviously was merely carrying out instructions. He even had a sense of humor about it occasionally. Once when we were discussing Austrian politics, the name of the Communist party leader, Ernst Fischer, was mentioned. Jokingly, I said: "Well, I don't like him because he is a Communist." Konev grunted. "That's fine," he said. "I don't like him either because he's an Austrian Communist.""

"As we left Konev's villa that afternoon, the marshal accompanied me into the garden. An orderly led out a Don Caucasus stallion whose saddle bore a Red Army star. Konev handed me the saddle and a handsomely carved Russian pistol. Anticipating this exchange of gifts, I had carried along in the rear of the Mary Q a new jeep just unloaded from Antwerp. Across the cowling we had painted this inscription in both English and Russian: "To the Commander of the First Ukrainian Army Group from Soldiers of the 1st, 3rd, 9th, and 15th American Armies." A holster was affixed to the jeep with a brightly polished new carbine. And we stuffed the tool compartment with American cigarettes. "I'll probably get stuck by the comptroller and have to pay for this thing 20 years after the war," I told Hansen when he ordered the jeep from Antwerp, "but what the dickens, I don't suppose we can go up empty-handed.""

"After dinner Konev led us into the great hall of his house. A chorus of Red Army soldiers broke into the "Star-Spangled Banner" and their resonant voices filled the room. Konev explained that the chorus had memorized the anthem without knowing a word of English. Then to the accompaniment of a dozen balalaikas, a ballet troupe danced into the room. "Why, that's splendid," I exclaimed. Konev shrugged his shoulders. "Just a few girls," he explained, "from the Red Army." Two weeks later when Konev repaid our call with one to our CP, he was enthralled with the violin virtuosity of a thin khaki-clad man. "Magnificent," cried the marshal in delight. "Oh, that," I said. "Nothing, nothing at all. Just one of our American soldiers.""

"Konev was waiting with his staff outside the gloomy villa he had commandeered for a CP. A powerfully built man with a huge bald head, Konev took me first to his office for a moment of private conversation through our interpreters. I gave him a map I had prepared for the occasion, showing the disposition of every U.S. division across his group front. The marshal started in surprise but did not volunteer to show me his own dispositions. Had he wanted to, he probably would have had to ask permission from the Kremlin. American lieutenants were delegated greater authority on the Elbe than were Russian division commanders."

"Our neighbors use searchlights, for they want more light. I tell you, Nikolai Pavlovich, we need more darkness."

"I do not want to give any orders to the airmen, but get hold of a Komsomol air unit, and say I want volunteers for the job."

"We plan alone but we fulfill our plans together with the enemy, as it were, in accordance with his opposition."

"As for me, I had to know exactly what the situation was in Dukla Pass. Moscow had demanded it."

"I have no Suvorov, but Rokossovsky is my Bagration."

"The engagements in which Zhukov won his reputation were so massive that, inevitably, many outstanding Soviet military men were involved- either under Zhukov's command or in coordinated and associated movements. There was then, and there continued for years to be, a raging competition for military glory in these engagements. Deep lines of political cleavage and quarrels also underlay the military disputes. Not only military glory was involved; political intrigue, intra-Party quarrels, high-level Kremlin politics were at issue. The principal military rivals of Zhukov were his fellow marshals, Ivan S. Konev, Rodion Malinovsky, V. I. Chuikov, A. I. Yeremenko, Semyon Timonshenko, and to a lesser extent men like K. K. Rokossovsky, V. D. Sokolovsky, and the staff chiefs, A. M. Vasilevsky, Boris Shaposhnikov and, later on, S. M. Shtemenko. Rivals of a different category were Stalin's cronies, men like Voroshilov and Budenny, and police generals such as L. Z. Mekhlis and G. I. Kulik."

"Rokossovsky was an imposing figure, tall, very good-looking, and well dressed; I understand he was a bachelor and was much admired by ladies."

"He was tall, blond and handsome, every inch the dashing half-Polish cavalry officer."