Law

"The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, or vice versa."

"The fact is that science itself must change, as it discovers that its net of evidence is equipped only to catch certain kinds of fish, and that it is constructed of webs of assumptions that can only hold certain varieties of reality, while others escape its bet entirely."

"Human nature constitutes a part of the evidence in every case."

"No possibility, however seemingly fantastic, should revolt the truly skeptical mind. It all depends on the evidence. The evidence decides everything."

"The weight of evidence for an extraordinary claim must be proportioned to its strangeness."

"That said, the lack of proof against something does not count as evidence for it."

"A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence", and "No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish."

"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting experimental testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."

"The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."

"The S.G. [Salem Gentlemen] will by no means allow, that any are brought in guilty, and condemned, by virtue of spectre Evidence... but whether it is not purely by virtue of these spectre evidences, that these persons are found guilty, (considering what before has been said,) I leave you, and any man of sense, to judge and determine."

"When the afflicted do mean and intend only the appearance and shape of such an one, say G. Proctor, yet they positively swear that G. Proctor did afflict them; and they were allowed to do so; as though there was no real difference between G. Proctor and the shape of G. Proctor."

"However much men may honestly endeavour to limit the exercise of their discretion by definite rule, there must always be room for idiosyncracy; and idiosyncracy, as the word expresses, varies with the man. But there is, besides this, that of which every student of legal history must be aware, the leaning of the Courts for a certain time in a particular direction, balanced at least, if not reversed, by the leaning of the Courts for a certain time in a direction opposite. The current of legal decision runs often to a point which is felt to be beyond the bounds of sound and sane control, and there is danger sometimes that the retrocession of the current should become itself extreme."

"I was brought up under a system in which discretion when given was practically absolute. It was the unbroken tradition of Westminster Hall. I believe that system worked justice and saved expense. I hope I may be forgiven if, with what energy remains to me, I strive after many years' experience and drawing near the close of my judicial career, to preserve this unfettered discretion which in my opinion, was given me by Parliament, and which I have never, at least intentionally abused."

"A Judge must have discretion, because without it the business could not go on, the criminal justice of the country could not be administered."

"It is not the practice of this Court to interfere with the exercise of a judicial discretion."

"It appears to me wrong in principle for any Court or Judge to impose fetters on the exercise by themselves or others of powers which are left by law to their discretion in each case as it arises."

"We are to exercise a just discretion and not to promote vexation."

"The word "discretion" has been frequently used. . . . What does it mean? In honest, plain language it means "do as you like." A direction which is to be actively exercised must be exercised honestly and intelligently, but the discretion which a man chooses to exercise by remaining supine is a duty, if it is a duty, of imperfect obligation. If no shadow of suspicion can be brought against him, if no culpable negligence can be alleged against him, what liability does a man in whom the discretion is vested incur by doing nothing? Attention should be paid to the meaning of the word, and the effect of it in the various cases in which its operation is called in question."

"It is true, as Mr. Folkard put to us, as the Judges of old felt, there are instances in which discretionary power might be grievously abused, and was abused in times such as I trust this country will never see again. At the same time, men are open to the infirmities which unfortunately attach to human nature. There may be dishonest and corrupt Judges among us, though I trust to God that will never happen. I agree you are to frame your rules so as to keep the administration of justice as far as you can beyond the possibility of corruption. On the other hand, if a rule is essential for the convenient administration of justice, you must trust to the honesty of those to whom you commit that most important department of the State. You must trust to the means you have of punishing corruption and dishonesty if you find it operating on the minds of those judicial officers."

"Discretion is a science of understanding, to discern between falsity and truth, between wrong and right, between shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses and pretences, and not to do according to their (men's) wills, and private affections; for, as one saith, talis discretio diseretionem conundit?"

"A Judge must determine, not by the crooked cord of discretion, but by the golden mete-wand of the law! I admit that corruption is not to be imputed or supposed in any Judge, but fallibility must be admitted—humanum est errare; neither would I subject the opinion of a Judge upon matters of fact to be canvassed before, or submitted to the consideration of juries."

"I must not forget that the discretion given to me must be exercised judicially, not fancifully or arbitrarily."

"The exercise of a discretion has been characterised as odious; but where the necessity exists for its exercise, a Judge is not bound to shrink from the responsibility devolving on him."

"The discretion of the Judges ought to be thus described: Discretio est discernere per legem quid sit Justum; this is prov'd by the Common Law, in the case of a special verdict, et sup' totain materiam petunt discretionem Justiciariorum; i.e. they desire that the Judges would discern by law what is just, and so give judgment accordingly."

"I leave it to your discretion to strike or not, but the American colors must not be pulled down over my head today."

"At times discretion should be thrown aside, and with the foolish we should play the fool."

"Eine der wichtigsten Tugenden im gesellschaftlichen Leben, die täglich seltener wird, ist die Verschwiegenheit."

"There have been women I have loved … A lot, as discreetly as possible."

"The policeman on the beat or in the patrol car makes more decisions and exercises broader discretion affecting the daily likes of people every day and to a greater extent, in many respects, than a judge will ordinarily exercise in a week."

"It shew'd discretion, the best part of valor."

"La discrétion est le plus habile des calculs."

"In excited states of the public mind they have scarcely a discretion at all; the tendency of the public perturbation determines what shall and what shall not be dealt with. But, upon the other hand, in quiet times statesmen have great power; when there is no fire lighted, they can settle what fire shall be lit. And as the new suffrage is happily to be tried in a quiet time, the responsibility of our statesmen is great because their power is great too."

"Discretion is a perfection of reason, and a guide to us in all the duties of life."

"A decision of the House of Lords upon a question of law is conclusive, and binds the House in subsequent cases. An erroneous decision can be set right only by an Act of Parliament."

"I trust I have not misinterpreted the views of the Court of Appeal in a matter of so much importance, and, further, that if I have, any misconceptions of mine may be speedily removed by the decision of a higher tribunal."

"It is a great satisfaction for me to find, that this matter will undergo investigation elsewhere, before it is finally decided."

"I am desirous that the case should be brought under the consideration of a higher tribunal, without any unnecessary delay, and to afford every facility in my power for the correction of any error into which I may have fallen."

"I should be desirous that my opinion should not be conclusive on the parties, if there were any mode by which our judgment could be reviewed in a Court of error."

"A solemn decision of a competent Judge is by no means to be disregarded, and I ought not to overrule it without being clearly satisfied in my own mind that the decision is erroneous."

"A decision of the House of Lords requires no sanction."

"If no appeal were possible, I have no great hesitation in saying that this would not be a desirable country to live in. . . . It is quite true that there is enough difficulty in appealing as it is; but if there is to be no appeal at all possible the system would be intolerable."

"It has not been deemed improper by the best of Judges to say that it would be a satisfaction not to them only, but to the profession at large, if a point of novelty and difficulty were taken to the Court of Appeal."

"It is needless to enter into many reasons for quashing the conviction, when one alone is fully sufficient."

"I think it beyond question that it is generally the duty of an appellate Judge to leave undisturbed a decision of which he does not clearly disapprove. I conceive that, in our Court, as in the civil law, it is the rule that "gravely to doubt is to affirm.""

"A rule of such general adoption shows that there is nothing in it inconsistent with the relative rights and duties of principal and surety, and that it accords with a common sense of justice and the natural equity of mankind."

"In coming to that conclusion, as I do upon principle, I am much strengthened by the American authorities to which my attention has been called."

"A number of American authorities were cited in the course of the argument, which may be briefly noticed, seeing that they were made the subject of comment in both Courts below."

"It is the glory and happiness of our excellent constitution, that to prevent any injustice no man is to be concluded by the first judgment; but that if he apprehends himself to be aggrieved, he has another Court to which he can resort for relief; for this purpose the law furnishes him with appeals, with writs of error and false judgment."

"Those who sit in judgment merely give utterance to the prejudices which they have imbibed at home, and think they have duly performed their part if they do not order punishment to be inflicted on any one until convicted, either on his own confession, or on legal evidence. But of what crime convicted? “Of that condemned doctrine,” is the answer. But with what justice condemned? The very essence of the defence was, not to abjure the doctrine itself, but to maintain its truth. On this subject, however, not a whisper is allowed!"

"APPEAL, v.t. In law, to put the dice into the box for another throw."