Foreign ministers

863 quotes found

"My labor had not been easy nor light; our Masonry had spun a most intricate net of anti-religious activity; it dominated the currents of thought; it exercised its influence over publishing houses, over teaching, over the administration of justice and even over certain dominant sections of the armed forces. To give an idea of how far things had gone, this significant example is sufficient. When, in parliament, I delivered my first speech of November 16, 1922, after the Fascist revolution, I concluded by invoking the assistance of God in my difficult task. Well, this sentence of mine seemed to be out of place! In the Italian parliament, a field of action for Italian Masonry, the name of God had been banned for a long time. Not even the Popular party — the so-called Catholic party — had ever thought of speaking of God. In Italy, a political man did not even turn his thoughts to the Divinity. And, even if he had ever thought of doing so, political opportunism and cowardice would have deterred him, particularly in a legislative assembly. It remained for me to make this bold innovation! And in an intense period of revolution! What is the truth! It is that a faith openly professed is a sign of strength. I have seen the religious spirit bloom again; churches once more are crowded, the ministers of God are themselves invested with new respect. Fascism has done and is doing its duty."

- Benito Mussolini

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"The conquest of Riga is of the greatest importance not only from the military, but also form the political point of view.... Our military situation was never more glorious than it is at present. Meanwhile, there is also the U-boat war, which is taking its course. The destruction of enemy tonnage that was expected of it on the basis of official predictions, has not only been achieved, but partly exceeded by more than half.... Time is working for us. Britain to-day is fighting the war with a watch in her hand, and it is in this that I see the fundamentally decisive effect of the U-boat weapon for us and the approach of peace.... If we are to achieve anything through compromise and understanding, then the Government must not be forced to make any statements renouncing something from the outset. For this reason the tactics by which it has been and is still being tried to make the Government declare its disinterestedness in Belgium, are wrong. Even those who share the attitude of Herr Scheidemann ought to fight for the last stone in Belgium, in order to exploit to the utmost that which possession has made into a dead pledge.... However, the fact that we are going to have peace—and, we hope, soon—will in my conviction be due, apart from our military achievements, to the effects of unrestricted U-boat warfare, of which I have repeatedly said before the Main Committee that while I reject the formula that it will force Britain to her knees, I believe as firmly in the formula that it will force Britain to the conference table."

- Gustav Stresemann

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"We... would nevertheless make it clear that entirely independent political structures are impossible here [in the Baltic].... They cannot lead an isolated existence between the colossi of West and East. We hope that they will seek and find this support with us. The German occupation will have to continue for a long time, lest the anarchy we have just been combating should arise again. We shall have to safeguard the position of the Germans, a position consistent with their economic and cultural achievements.... Herr Scheiddemann, said that we have made ourselves new enemies in the world through our push in the East.... Had we continued the negotiations, we should still be sitting with Herr Trotski in Brest-Litovsk. As it is, the advance has brought us peace in a few days and I think we should recognise this and not delude ourselves, particularly as regards the East, that if by resolutions made here in the Reichstag or through our Government's acceptance of the entirely welcome initiative of His Holiness the Pope, we had agreed to a peace without indemnities and annexations, we should have had peace in the East. In view of our situation as a whole, I should regard a fresh peace offer as an evil. My chief objection is against the detachment of the Belgian question from the whole complex of the question of peace. It is precisely if Belgium is not to be annexed that Belgium is the best dead pledge we hold, notably as regards England. The restoration of Belgium before we conclude peace with England seems to me an utter political and diplomatic impossibility.... There is a great difference between the first set of terms at Brest-Litovsk and the ultimatum that we have now presented, and the blame for this change rests with those who refused to come to an agreement with Germany and who, consequently, must now feel her power. We are just as free to choose between understanding and the exploitation of victory in the case of the West, and I hope that these eight or fourteen days that have elapsed between the first set of peace terms in Brest-Litovsk and the second set, may also have an educational effect in that direction."

- Gustav Stresemann

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"Many people believed that the Treaty of Locarno was of importance, and Austen Chamberlain received the Order of the Garter in recognition of his services in concluding it. People believed that it had brought Germany back into the comity of nations and that it would serve as the basis of her future relations with France and England. But the Germans saw it merely as a step towards recovering the strength they needed to wage a war of revenge, and they broke its terms as soon as it suited them to do so. Their true intentions were made perfectly plain to the ex-Crown Prince of Germany at the time by Stresemann, who had signed the treaty on behalf of Germany. Later, when I came to know Grandi while he was Italian Ambassador in London and before we had driven Italy into the arms of Germany, he told me that during the Hague Conference he had seen a great deal of Stresemann and would often go back with him to his hotel after the day's work was over. Stresemann would always drink a bottle of champagne before going to bed, and in the course of one of their late conversations he said to Grandi with unusual solemnity: "I am an old man, and I am dying, but you are young and you will live to see the second Punic War." This was told to me long before the formation of the Axis or the advent of Hitler to power, and should be remembered by those who are inclined to attribute all the crimes of Germany to the Nazis."

- Gustav Stresemann

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"Stresemann was as determined as the most extreme nationalist to get rid of the whole treaty lock, stock, and barrel: reparations, German disarmament, the occupation of the Rhineland, and the frontier with Poland. But he intended to do this by the persistent pressure of events, not by threats, still less by war.... There was a great outcry in allied countries against Stresemann after his death when the publication of his papers revealed clearly his intention to destroy the existing treaty-settlement. The outcry was grotesquely unjustified. Given a great Germany—and the Allies had themselves given it by their actions at the end of the war—it was inconceivable that any German could accept the treaty of Versailles as a permanent settlement. The only question was whether the settlement would be revised, and Germany become again the greatest Power in Europe, peacefully or by war. Stresemann wanted to do it peacefully. He thought this the safer, the more certain, and the more lasting way to German predominance. He had been a bellicose nationalist during the war; and even now was no more inclined to peace from moral principle than Bismarck had been. But, like Bismarck, he believed that peace was in Germany's interest; and this belief entitles him to rank with Bismarck as a great German, even as a great European, statesman. Maybe even as a greater."

- Gustav Stresemann

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"Nor was Stresemann the enthusiast for whom he passed. He changed his predatory instincts but not all his spots, and said sotto voce that he was playing for time... Germany kept a free hand eastward, and Stresemann wanted "the recovery of Danzig, the Polish Corridor and correction of the frontier in Upper Silesia"—makings of the second war... As late as May 11, 1953, Winston believed that "the Locarno Treaty was the highest point reached between the wars". Joy pealed louder than at the birth of the Entente. Righteousness and peace kissed each other for photographs. Bouquets, gold pens and Nobel Prizes all round. Stresemann got his just when his duplicity leaked out... Stresemann asked for evacuation of the Cologne sector and early withdrawal of the Control Commission. It reported that the Germans had never meant to disarm. The Allies suppressed the report. Their sin entailed connivance in German sins no longer secret but unavowed. Holding-companies for German weapons sprang up in Turkey and Finland, in Rotterdam, Barcelona, Bilbao, Cadiz. Krupp muscled into Swedish Bofors. German tanks came forth at Grusonwerk and an Economic General Staff for total war in Berlin. Stresemann knew... Germany's defence estimates went up with a bang. More outlay was concealed by budgetary juggling, but normally the British think no evil of neighbours unless they are allies."

- Gustav Stresemann

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"Gustav Stresemann had come a long way since the war-time period when, as the spokesman of Hindenburg and Ludendorff in the Reichstag, he had thundered in support of annexationist claims and jingo policies... He was still at heart a monarchist and a Conservative, but, like von Seeckt, he had realized that, if Germany was to be restored to a position of greatness and power among the nations, it must be through the existing republican structure and in collaboration with the rest of Europe... Stresemann had at last realized the truth which, in the field of military policy, had been revealed to Gröner and to von Seeckt long before. If Germany was to be great again she must be strong, and to be strong she must have a period of peace and recuperation, and peace would not be forthcoming until the fears and suspicions of the Allies had been, at any rate to some extent, allayed. Both von Seeckt and Stresemann had turned their backs upon the glamorous but unattainable dreams of monarchist restoration and Conservative dictatorship. They had decided to use the democratic and republican form of government provided by the Weimer Constitution as a convincing weapon in their campaign of reassurance to the West. Though neither of them was a sincere Republican, they were both deeply sincere in their several efforts to rehabilitate and protect the Republic. What both believed in and laboured for was the future greatness and might of Germany, an aim which transcended all lesser cause and minor loyalties."

- Gustav Stresemann

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"In September 2013, a month after Obama backed down from launching strikes against Assad to punish him for using chemical weapons, he and President Rouhani spoke on the phone while they were both at the UN General Assembly. The Iranian foreign minister, Javad Zarif, and the US secretary of state, John Kerry, sat down for a tête-à-tête. It was the highest level of contact between the two countries since 1979. The Saudis were shocked and felt deeply betrayed. They had long since moved on from the era of détente in the 1990s and had a particular aversion to back channels between Iran and the United States. They’d felt betrayed before by such talks, and it made them feel deeply insecure about their place in the Middle East and their role as America’s top ally in the Arab world. The Saudi-US alliance, based on oil for security, had its limitations, and the relationship had been sorely tested by events like the September 11 attacks. Meanwhile, there were policymakers in Washington who felt Iran held more promise of turning into a democracy than a desert kingdom with an absolute monarchy. The Saudis were apoplectic when they heard such musings. The Obama administration also believed that if a deal could be reached while the reformers were in power, an improved economy would further strengthen the reformers and show how much the hardliners had failed the people."

- Mohammad Javad Zarif

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