Courts

114 quotes found

"Once in office, Ronald Reagan sought to nominate candidates to the federal judiciary who would roll back liberal judicial decisions and promote his favored constitutional values, which included opposition to abortion. Not entirely coincidentally, the 1984 Republican Party platform “applaud[ed] President Reagan’s fine record of judicial appointments, and … reaffirm[ed] [the party[’s] support for the appointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life.” By the time Justice Lewis Powell retired in 1987, the Supreme Court’s original seven-person majority in Roe had swindled to four Justices who supported abortion rights: William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun (the original author of Roe), and John Paul Stevens, who had replaced William O. Douglas in 1976. Reagan’s first Supreme Court nominee, Sandra Day O’Connor, replaced Potter Stewart in 1981. O’Connor strongly criticized Roe’s trimester framework in her 1983 dissent in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health and argued that abortion restrictions should be tested by a more lenient standard: whether they imposed an “undue burden” on women’s ability to obtain abortions. In 1986, Reagan nominated William Rehnquist, one of the original dissenters in Roe, to become Chief Justice, replacing Warren Burger, and nominated Antonin Scalia, a vocal opponent of Roe, to fill Renquist’s position as Associate Justice. These three Justices joined Byron White, the other original dissenter in Roe. To replace Powell, Reagan nominated D.C. Circuit Judge Robert Bork, an outspoken critic of Roe who championed the jurisprudence of original intention. The choice of Bork appeared to provide the crucial fifth vote to overturn Roe v. Wade. The Bork nomination produced a national controversy, and ultimately the senate failed to confirm him. Pro-choice groups mobilized to help defeat the nomination. Eventually the Senate confirmed Reagan’s third nominee, Anthony Kennedy, a conservative circuit judge from California who was generally regarded as more moderate than Bork. In hindsight, the failure of the Bork nomination was a turning point in the constitutional struggles over abortion. It raised the stakes in succeeding Supreme Court nominations and showed that they could be bitter and politically costly to a president. Bork’s defeat also demonstrated that pro-choice forces had considerable muscle that could be harnessed in the political arena if the public thought that abortion rights were truly threatened. It gave notice that Republican politicians might pay more heavily than they had previously believed if they tried to overturn Roe."

- Supreme Court of the United States

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"It was said by a very learned Judge, Lord Macclesfield, towards the beginning of this century that the most effectual way of removing land marks would be by innovating on the rules of evidence; and so I say. I have been in this profession more than forty years, and have practised both in Courts of law and equity; and if it had fallen to my lot to form a system of jurisprudence, whether or not I should have thought it advisable to establish two different Courts with different jurisdictions, and governed by different rules, it is not necessary to say. But, influenced as I am by certain prejudices that have become inveterate with those who comply with the systems they found established, I find that in these Courts proceeding by different rules a certain combined system of jurisprudence has been framed most beneficial to the people of this country, and which I hope I may be indulged in supposing has never yet been equalled in any other country on earth. Our Courts of law only consider legal rights: our Courts of equity have other rules, by which they sometimes supersede those legal rules, and in so doing they act most beneficially for the subject. We all know that, if the Courts of law were to take into their consideration all the jurisdiction belonging to Courts of equity, many bad consequences would ensue. To mention only the single instance of legacies being left to women who may have married inadvertently: if a Court of law could entertain an action for a legacy, the husband would recover it, and the wife might be left destitute: but if it be necessary in such a case to go into equity, that Court will not suffer the husband alone to reap the fruits of the legacy given to the wife; for one of its rules is that he who asks equity must do equity, and in such a case they will compel the husband to make a provision for the wife before they will suffer him to get the money. I exemplify the propriety of keeping the jurisdictions and rules of the different Courts distinct by one out of a multitude of cases that might be adduced. . . . One of the rules of a Court of equity is that they cannot decree against the oath of the party himself on the evidence of one witness alone without other circumstances: but when the point is doubtful, they send it to be tried at law, directing that the answer of the party shall be read on the trial; so they may order that a party shall not set up a legal term on the trial, or that the plaintiff himself shall be examined; and when the issue comes from a Court of equity with any of these directions the Courts of law comply with the terms on which it is so directed to be tried. By these means the ends of justice are attained, without making any of the stubborn rules of law stoop to what is supposed to be the substantial justice of each particular case; and it is wiser so to act than to leave it to the Judges of the law to relax from those certain and established rules by which they are sworn to decide."

- Courts

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"In a community, the constitution of which provides for a legislator and a law, it is the concern of the legislator and of the laws given by him to ascertain the mediation through calculable and attainable rules and to prevent the terror of the direct and automatic enactment of values. That is a very complicated problem, indeed. One may understand why law-givers all along world history, from Lycurgus to Solon and Napoleon have been turned into mythical figures. In the highly industrialized nations of our times, with their provisions for the organization of the lives of the masses, the mediation would give rise to a new problem. Under the circumstances, there is no room for the law-giver, and so there is no substitute for him. At best, there is only a makeshift which sooner or later is turned into a scapegoat, due to the unthankful role it was given to play. A jurist who interferes, and wants to become the direct executor of values should know what he is doing. He must recall the origins and the structure of values and dare not treat lightly the problem of the tyranny of values and of the unmediated enactment of values. He must attain a clear understanding of the modern philosophy of values before he decides to become valuator, revaluator, upgrader of values. As a value-carrier and value-sensitive person, he must do that before he goes on to proclaim the positings of a subjective, as well as objective, rank-order of values in the form of pronouncements with the force of law."

- Constitutional court

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