John Stuart Mill

"His systematic account of the nature and methods of 'science', in the broadest sense, attained an authority in England that was positively papal."

"Mill—it is one of the few things about him one can assert with reasonable security against contradiction—was not Nietzsche. He was not, that is, attempting fundamentally to subvert or reverse his society's moral sensibilities, but rather to refine them and call them more effectively into play on public issues (examples will be noted below). In these circumstances, the moralist runs the risk of priggishness, as he contrasts the consistency of his own position and the purity of his own motives with the logical confusions and self-interested prejudices that he must impute to those who, sharing the same premises, fail to draw the same conclusions."

"Even when J. S. Mill contended that some pleasures are better than others, he continued to assume the axiom, for to Mill as to Bentham the relative value of an object or activity depended on its contribution to the pleasure or happiness of the recipient, not on the intrinsic and peculiar worth of the recipient."

"As every reader of Representative Government soon discovers, it was Mill himself who undermined his own argument for universal inclusion by posing a counterargument based on consideration of competence. In the course of his discussion, he explicitly asserted that the criterion of competence must take priority over any principle, whether categorical or utilitarian, that makes inclusion in the demos a matter of general right among all adults subject to the laws... Mill brought into the open a problem that had been glossed over by some of his most illustrious predecessors. Yet in justifying an exclusionary demos Mill did no more than make implicit what had generally been implicit in all previous democratic theory and practice."

"Mr. J. S. Mill speaks, in his celebrated work, Utilitarianism, (1864, pp. 45, 46), of the social feelings as a "powerful natural sentiment," and as "the natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality." Again he says, "Like the other acquired capacities above referred to, the moral faculty, if not a part of our nature, is a natural out-growth from it; capable, like them, in a certain small degree of springing up spontaneously." But in opposition to all this, he also remarks, "if, as in my own belief, the moral feelings are not innate, but acquired, they are not for that reason less natural." It is with hesitation that I venture to differ at all from so profound a thinker, but it can hardly be disputed that the social feelings are instinctive or innate in the lower animals; and why should they not be so in man? Mr. Bain (see, for instance, The Emotions and the Will, 1865, p. 481) and others believe that the moral sense is acquired by each individual during his lifetime. On the general theory of evolution this is at least extremely improbable. The ignoring of all transmitted mental qualities will, as it seems to me, be hereafter judged as a most serious blemish in the works of Mr. Mill."

"Ah! I see; the finishing governess!"

"Neither Hayek nor Mill accurately or consistently stated the libertarian standard for appropriate coercive involvement in the lives of others. This standard is exclusively to prevent harm to others."

"At first glance, On Liberty stands the principle of utility on its head. Mill was less concerned to promote the welfare of the majority, it seems, than to protect an eccentric minority from mass mediocrity. On closer inspection, however, his arguments reveal something other than a snobbish obsession with talented individuals. Only through the public influence of an enlightened minority, he believed, might common people aspire to self-improvement. This belief also shaped his attitude to representative government. Although acknowledging that universal suffrage provided an essential safeguard of individual interests, he rejected the Benthamite proposition that everyone should exert an equal influence upon politics. Democracy, he feared, was potentially an elective dictatorship which failed to restrain the inclination of the majority to enact ignorant and capricious measures. It would thereby reinforce the tendency of the modern age to stifle individuality in mass conformity."

"You must be aware of the fact, but I think can hardly appreciate the reality, that in all parts of this country (and wherever our tongue is spoken) there are thousands of earnest men and women to whom your name is as familiar as a household word, and who do not merely admire your ability and appreciate your work, but regard you with all the feeling due to that highest of all characters,—the "great, good man"."

"The Saint of Rationalism."

"No one has ever been so right about so many things so much of the time as John Stuart Mill."

"The founding utilitarians, Bentham and Mill, were not just armchair philosophers. They were daring social reformers, intensely engaged with the social and political issues of their day. Indeed, many familiar social issues became social issues because Bentham and Mill made them so. Their views were considered radical at the time, but today we take for granted most of the social reforms for which they fought. They were among the earliest opponents of slavery and advocates of free speech, free markets, widely available education, environmental protection, prison reform, women's rights, animal rights, gay rights, workers' rights, the right to divorce, and the separation of church and state."

"John Stuart Mill was the saint of rationalism for a good reason. Mill's ideas are the roots of the self-destructive character of a rationalist or constructivistic view of how civilization could be organized. Since Mill, this muddle about facts has guided policy and most of the strivings of people of good will, who were inspired by a false picture, based on a worldwide division of labor, of how a society worked. It was from Mill's muddle (and the similar deceptions of Marx) and from the confusion of those pretended defenders of liberty who proclaimed a new moral postulate which required a complete suppression of individual freedom that the whole muddle of the middle derived. The ideal of freedom was increasingly relegated to second place by the idea of social justice. However, the two are incompatible. If one accepts the principle of social justice, one cannot preserve the market economy which provides that which social justice would like to distribute. The two principles are antagonistic and irreconcilable. There can be no halfway house between them. As the promise of social justice cannot be generally satisfied and also cannot be refused to all others once it has been conceded to some, there can be no question about where one's choice must be if one really wants to help the poor."

"It was only the 'marginal revolution' of the 1870s that produced a satisfactory explanation of the market processes that Adam Smith had long before described with his metaphor of the 'invisible hand', an account which, despite its still metaphorical and incomplete character, was the first scientific description of such self-ordering processes. James and John Stuart Mill, by contrast, were unable to conceive of the determination of market values in any manner other than causal determination by a few preceding events, and this inability barred them, as it does many modern 'physicalists', from understanding selfsteering market processes. [...] John Stuart Mill perhaps played the most important role in this connection. He had early put himself under socialist influence, and through this bias acquired a great appeal to 'progressive' intellectuals, establishing a reputation as the leading liberal and the 'Saint of Rationalism'. Yet he probably led more intellectuals into socialism than any other single person: fabianism was in its beginnings essentially formed by a group of his followers."

"When the term “Western civilization” is equated with racism, cultural superiority and pervasive oppression, and students in my political philosophy class refuse to study the works of John Stuart Mill or John Locke (or any other white thinker) because they consider them white supremacists, there is no lower level of educational hell."

"[T]he greatest and best man of this century – I allude of course to John Stuart Mill."

"In regard to what I have said of Mill... I should not have expressed so strong an opinion had I been thinking only of his political economy. There is much that is erroneous in his Principles, and he never had an idea what capital was, but the book is not the maze of self-contradictions which his logic undoubtedly is. If you have not examined his logical theories very critically, you will hardly be aware that upon the principal points he usually holds from three to six inconsistent views all at the same time."

"I believe that he was literally the only person who was in the least impressed by her. Mrs. Grote said briefly that she was a stupid woman; Bain said she had a knack of repeating prettily what J.S.M. said and that he told her it was wonderful.... If she was he thought, someone else at least should have given us indications."

"Although his nineteenth-century reputation depended only slightly upon his fame as an economist, his Principles of Political Economy... was one of the most influential texts of any time. As late as 1919 it was still being used at Oxford...Mill's single point of originality was the distinction between the laws of production and the laws of distribution...In contrast to Ricardo, Mill had read widely. In his... discussion of Russian, Prussian, English, and Austrian systems of , he cited Richard Jones... who has come to be regarded as a precursor to historical economics. On peasant proprietorship in Switzerland, North America, and elsewhere, his authority was Sismondi, a pioneer student of industrial fluctuations. He quoted... Tooke on the perils of inflation. He refuted Attwood, a leading member of the inflationist Birmingham currency school. Mill relied upon Babbage on division of labor, and Wakefield on colonization and the relative advantages of large and small landholdings. On , he employed John Rae's New Principles of Political Economy. Although the major influences remained Malthus, Smith, and Ricardo, the book gave abundant evidence of Mill's endeavor to keep up with the times. The effort extended to a sympathetic, though ultimately disapproving, association with socialism."

"John Stuart Mill is an epigone of classical liberalism and, especially in his later years, under the influence of his wife, full of feeble compromises. He slips slowly into socialism and is the originator of the thoughtless confounding of liberal and socialist ideas that led to the decline of English liberalism and to the undermining of the living standards of the English people. Nevertheless—or perhaps precisely because of this— one must become acquainted with Mill's principal writings:Principles of Political Economy (1848) On Liberty (1859) Utilitarianism (1862)Without a thorough study of Mill it is impossible to understand the events of the last two generations, for Mill is the great advocate of socialism. All the arguments that could be advanced in favor of socialism are elaborated by him with loving care. In comparison with Mill all other socialist writers—even Marx, Engels, and Lassalle—are scarcely of any importance."

"Reformers like Mill saw women's oppression as a 'relic of the past...discordant with the future and which must necessarily disappear.'"

"liberals such as Mill, and later socialists and feminists of different political sympathies, likened women's situation within marriage and their deprivation of civil rights to the state of slavery. As Mill expressed it in The Subjection of Women, a text that was first published in 1861, the year of the outbreak of the American Civil War, 'no slave is a slave to the same lengths, and in so full a sense of the word, as a wife is'."

"The most virtuous and truth-loving man that I at least have ever known."

"He was a friend of my parents, and I didn't know him through that because my parents died when I was quite tiny; but nevertheless it made me know he existed, and so I read his books. And, well, they were the sort of books that would appeal to me. They were empiricist and liberal and humane. And I liked him very much."

"Mill's discussion of justice is like and unlike Hume's. Like Hume, Mill was an ethical naturalist, looking to the function of the rules of justice in social life. Unlike Hume, Mill went beyond an analysis of the emotions expressed in judgements of justice."

"Wir können nie sicher sein, dass die Ansicht, die wir zu unterdrücken suchen, falsch ist; auch wenn wir sicher sein könnten, wäre die Unterdrückung immer noch ein Übel."

"Ohne Rücksicht auf die tatsächlichen Fähigkeiten des Einzelnen glaubt der Mann, dass er das Recht hat zu befehlen und die Frau die Pflicht zu gehorchen."

"Öffentliche Meinungen über Themen, die dem Verstand schwer zugänglich sind, sind oft richtig, aber selten oder nie die ganze Wahrheit."

"Hat es je eine Herrschaft gegeben, die den Herrschenden nicht natürlich erschien?"

"Es ist zu bezweifeln, ob alle bisherigen technischen Erfindungen die Tageslast auch nur eines menschlichen Wesens erleichtert hat."

"Die verhängnisvolle Neigung der Menschen, über etwas, was nicht mehr zweifelhaft ist, nicht länger nachzudenken, ist die Ursache der Hälfte aller Irrtümer."

"Die Herren der Frauen verlangen mehr als einfachen Gehorsam und wandten die ganze Macht der Erziehung an, um ihren Zweck zu erreichen."

"Die Ehe ist die einzige wirkliche Leibeigenschaft, die unser Gesetz kennt. Es gibt keine Sklaven mehr, außer den Herrinnen jedes Hauses."

"Das Volk, welches die Macht ausübt, ist nicht immer dasselbe Volk wie das, über welches sie ausgeübt wird."

"Alles Gute, das besteht, ist eine Frucht der Originalität."

"Diese Meinung (dass das Volk es nicht nötig hat, seine Macht über sich selbst zu beschränken, Anm.) wurde auch nicht wesentlich durch solche vorübergehenden Verirrungen wie die der Französischen Revolution gestört, deren Schreckenstaten das Werk eines widerrechtlich nach der Macht strebenden Klüngels waren und keinesfalls dem anhaltenden Wirken volkstümlicher Einrichtungen zuzuschreiben sind, sondern einem plötzlichen, krampfhaften Ausbruch gegen monarchisch-aristokratische Willkürherrschaft."

"„Ich wollte nicht sagen, dass Konservative generell dumm sind. Ich wollte sagen, dass dumme Menschen im Allgemeinen konservativ sind. Ich halte das für eine so offensichtliche und unleugbare Tatsache, dass ich kaum glaube, daß ein ehrenwerter Mann sie in Frage stellen wird.“ – In einer Parlamentsdebatte mit dem dem Konservativen John Pakington MP vom 31. Mai 1866 (Hansard, vol 183, col 1592)."

"Es ist besser, ein unzufriedener Mensch zu sein als ein zufriedenes Schwein; besser ein unzufriedener Sokrates als ein zufriedener Narr. Und wenn der Narr oder das Schwein anderer Ansicht sind, dann deshalb, weil sie nur die eine Seite der Angelegenheit kennen. Die andere Partei hingegen kennt beide Seiten."

"Wenn dasselbe zufällige Zusammentreffen sich nie zum zweitenmale ereignen würde, so hätten wir damit eine leichte Probe, um es von einem jeden Zusammentreffen, das ein Resultat von Gesetzen ist, zu unterscheiden."

"Universitäten sind nicht da, um ein Wissen zu lehren, welches erforderlich ist, um zu einer bestimmten Art des Broderwerbs zu befähigen. Ihre Aufgabe ist es nicht, geschickte Rechtsgelehrte oder Aerzte oder Ingenieure zu bilden, sondern tüchtige und veredelte menschliche Wesen."