20th-century-in-italy

"[Referring to the murder of two MSI militants in Padua, carried out by Paduan members of the BR] The action had nothing to do with what the BR were doing. We didn’t see the fascists as a real danger. I was very worried. There was a risk of distorting the image of the Red Brigades, reducing it to that of a group of rowdy thugs who gave orders to go and kill people at MSI headquarters."

"The Red Brigades cannot be considered a terrorist group. A terrorist is, in fact, someone who plants a bomb on a train, thereby terrorizing ordinary people."

"Good Red Brigades and bad Red Brigades? I never believed in that. I don’t condemn anyone, but I haven’t forgotten the notes the Red Brigades sent us from prison, calling for one murder a day. No one inside ever told us, “Guys, stay calm.” They told us, “It’s time for action; you have to get us out of here no matter what.”"

"Many Red Brigades members weren’t convinced by the choices the others were making. This forced them to push themselves beyond their limits. Some became extremely fragile and underwent a change that erupted at the moment of their arrest."

"Some claimed to belong to the BR without ever having carried out an action. The longest and most painful path—perhaps the most authentic one—is that of those who dissociated themselves before the law reducing sentences was passed."

"(About the relationship with the Italian Communist Party) It was a conflictual relationship because a minority faction of the Communist Party was, in some ways, sympathetic to us, while the majority faction—which we called the “Berlinguerian” faction—didn’t want to change the state all that much. That state, and its democratic rules, suited them just fine."

"The sense of gratification was strong because otherwise we would have given up immediately. For example, during the kidnapping of magistrate Sossi, television coverage focused not so much on us as individuals but on the actions we were carrying out. Clearly, this aspect undoubtedly gratified us, in the sense that it made us feel we were on the same level, on the same footing, as those who ruled the country. We were the "counter-power"."

"The ideology of the Red Brigades has its own history. [...] I can say that this kind of culture, which stems from the resistance, from the armed struggle against fascism and Nazism, was in some respects thought not to end as it actually did. It probably would not have turned into practical action had it not been for the historic rupture represented by 1968 and 1969. Those were years that called everything into question."

"We believed that the right wing was inextricably linked to sectors of the state and those in power. The famous discourse on the coup d’état strategy. In particular, these groups—Ordine Nero, Ordine Nuovo—were entirely instrumental to this project. To the project of the armed forces, in particular, who were seeking a solution, as they said at the time, à la grecque or à la chilena to the Italian crisis."

"There was no one backing us, at least not while I was part of the organization. Certainly, our actions suited someone’s interests. In those years, many people viewed an escalation of violence in Italy favorably."

"It may seem strange now, but for us, the beginning was quite playful—I use that word. A beginning without any bloodshed."

"The experience of the Red Brigades is exhausted and concluded, because a historical period has ended, because a political process has run its course. Likewise, there is nothing to throw overboard and nothing to forget, as seems to be very fashionable these days. :*Prospero Gallinari, from an interview with Radio Città Aperta; quoted in Gallinari su Moro: "Sono in pace con lui, eravamo in guerra", lettera43.it, 1994."

"The Red Brigades had shown themselves to be resolute and efficient, but theirs was not a victory. The decision to kill Moro created serious dissent within their ranks, while outside a deep sense of revulsion spread over what they had done. It is generally acknowledged that the crisis of Italian terrorism began with the killing of Moro. In hindsight, it therefore seems fair to acknowledge that the champions of intransigence were right: if Moro had been exchanged for one or more terrorists in prison, the Red Brigades would have appeared both invulnerable and willing to compromise, with the result that their appeal would almost certainly have grown. [...] After Moro’s death, Italian democracy not only defended itself but grew stronger."

"[About the members of the newly formed Red Brigades] They come from a left-wing background and lucidly pursue their own utopia through criminal acts; in this sense, they do not seem like provocateurs. As for others using their name for other actions, that may well be the case."

"I am convinced that the Red Brigades... our movement has run its course. But since I cannot think in terms of “winners and losers” but rather in terms of a struggle that brought about a transformation, I can say, for my part, that most of our expectations did not come to fruition... they were not successful. But the problem of a movement having run its course—and with it, the Red Brigades as well—did not happen overnight; it unfolded over the course of years. By the end of the 1980s, it became clear that, despite all our efforts, our attempts were producing only divisions and rifts; they were no longer yielding possible and viable answers at the level of movements that were transforming into a society that had itself transformed. And so this experience came to an end. We acknowledged this at a certain point—that much is true. I acknowledged it. I didn’t realize it in an instant; but at a certain point, together with other comrades, we acknowledged it and, responsibly, we told everyone: “Gentlemen, this experience... dear comrades, as far as our ability to assess it is concerned, has run its course and is unrepeatable.” We say this to our comrades, but we also say it to everyone else."

"The theory that the Red Brigades were manipulated from the outside is a theory dear to those who cannot bear the idea that events and initiatives took place in this country, that political projects were carried out outside the games of the Palace."

"The Red Brigades have been gone for years, our comrades are in prison, and yet we remain a thorn in the side. People either remain silent or try to exorcise us. And, worse still, there are those who try to muddy a story that was full of hopes, perhaps illusions, attempts, mistakes, pain, and death—but not filth."

"The Red Brigades brought down the Christian Democrats, but the political factions that have governed since then are worse than those of that era."

"The Red Brigades didn’t understand Aldo Moro; his political stature was far greater than theirs. And I’m not saying this to canonize him."

"The Red Brigades were a minor episode; we shouldn’t attach too much importance to them. Their defeat was inevitable: they started with a sound idea but ended up on the wrong path."

"We tried to put Karl Marx’s doctrine into practice, but only the bourgeoisie knew how to use it effectively."

"The BR function as a superstructure that wants at all costs to coincide with reality without having the strength to realize its error."

"The political defeat of terrorism requires courageous choices: it is the famous rice paddy that must be drained. Taking into account that the boundaries of the rice paddy are better defined today than they were three months ago. And taking into account another decisive factor: the image of the Red Brigades has been overturned; cracks and weaknesses have emerged. And perhaps it is not far-fetched to think that many confessions arise not from fear, but from internal dissent, which is tearing apart the organization and the armed party’s line."

"The Red Brigades members are always fiery, always apocalyptic. They write “active struggle,” they write “dismantle the structures.” They are oracular. The desert fathers have left the sandy expanses of Palestine and have come to the cities, to the universities and factories, to tell, to bear witness, to predict, and to curse."

"Prospero Gallinari, from a meeting with Alfonso Pecoraro Scanio; quoted in Gallinari su Moro: "Sono in pace con lui, eravamo in guerra", lettera43.it, October 1993."

"The Red Brigades had shown themselves to be resolute and efficient, but theirs was not a victory. The decision to kill Moro created serious dissent within their ranks, whilst outside there was a deep sense of revulsion at what they had done. It is generally recognised that the crisis of Italian terrorism began with the killing of Moro. With hindsight, it therefore seems fair to acknowledge that the champions of intransigence were right: had Moro been exchanged for one or more terrorists in prison, the Red Brigades would have appeared both invulnerable and willing to compromise, with the result that their appeal would almost certainly have grown. [...] After Moro’s death, Italian democracy not only defended itself but was strengthened."

"L'uccisione di Moro è avvenuta per mano delle Brigate Rosse, ma anche e soprattutto per il volere di Giulio Andreotti, Francesco Cossiga e del sottosegretario Nicola Lettieri."

"Cossiga was advised by a man sent by the US and by a commission made up largely of P2 members. All people who, in my view, wanted things to go a different way from what all honest people were calling for. Moro had to be destroyed politically and physically: had Moro survived, Italian politics would have taken a different course from the one it did. I believe Moro could have been freed had all the institutions worked towards that end. But the formation of a government, supported by Moro and comprising communists and Christian Democrats, was opposed both by the US and, for other reasons, by the former Soviet Union."

"There is talk of civil war. We have experienced them, but in this case we are not facing the struggle of even a small part of a people against another part. That is not the case. We are facing a handful of professional terrorists who are waging a relentless war against our institutions and our freedoms; we are facing a small group of murderers who are attacking the institutions of Italian democracy."

"History—nor even current events—is made with “ifs.” But it is legitimate to speculate on what might have happened if the Red Brigades, instead of obeying the lust for destruction and death—the very lust that led a militant to dream of the advent of a Pol Pot-style regime, with a massive and salvific bloodbath—had freed Moro: that Moro who had showered his party friends with accusations and recriminations, who had renounced the Christian Democrats, who would have reemerged from the catacomb-like seclusion of Via Montalcini brimming with resentment and eager for cold, calculated revenge. For the Christian Democrats, his presence would have been disruptive, if not devastating. The martyr who had escaped death could have become—as his wife and children would eventually become—the worst enemy of the Christian Democratic Nomenklatura. Forget Cossiga (the Cossiga of 1991, to be clear)."

"The die is cast. And it is cast not only for Moro, to whom we extend our deepest and most respectful sympathy. It is also cast for a “Belle Époque” style of politics, which Moro’s destruction—whether physical or moral—brings to a close. History is regaining its tragic character, and it compels those who make it—or aspire to, or delude themselves into thinking they make it—to conform to the script. We are entering one of those “Iron Ages” in which power is paid for, or can be paid for with iron. No one is obliged to take this risk. Those who do so should know that today it was Moro’s turn; tomorrow it may be theirs. Only if it realizes this and accepts it will the political class find the strength to close the Moro case. And it is time for it to do so."

"The end of Aldo Moro leaves us appalled; the fanaticism of those who killed him slowly, robbing him of hope before taking his life, fills us with horror. We still hope that the arrogance of these criminals will one day be punished. What matters now is that the country, precisely to pay tribute to Moro and in his memory, learn the bitter lesson this tragedy entails. Democracy must not—indeed, cannot—be weak. Freedom, which makes it superior to any other regime but also more vulnerable, must not be compromised by leniency toward enemies, short-sightedness, or carelessness."

"The Italian state has passed this difficult test with honor, but the judiciary and law enforcement agencies have revealed, in their actions, a disheartening inefficiency that allowed the Red Brigades to operate with mocking arrogance. The blame lies not so much with the police as with those who, out of demagoguery, to please the left, or to gain easy popularity, sought to dismantle the secret services, remove the most dutiful officials, and turn prisons into dormitories with daily leave. The subversives of democracy and the opponents of the law were able to preach and wreak havoc unhindered. We hope not to see them now hypocritically joining in mourning for a crime for which they are, ideologically if not materially, jointly responsible. Theirs were not merely words. A young man blown to pieces by a bomb on the Trapani-Palermo railway—the incident occurred yesterday—belonged to Democrazia Proletaria. The bandits who raided a department store in Bologna came from the Student Movement. It is pointless for these groups to now feign consternation and astonishment at the savage acts of the Red Brigades. Terrorism is their own creation."

"Upon the announcement of Aldo Moro’s death, the unions sprang into action, organizing demonstrations and calling for a general strike. We are certain of their profound condemnation and their sincere participation in the national mourning. We believe, however, that workers and their representatives would make a more constructive contribution to the fight against terrorists by keeping a close eye on factory extremists, who are all too often protected and defended. Likewise, the “committed” students, if they truly wish to distance themselves from the Red Brigades, must expel from their ranks the delusional agitators and bombers who hide Molotov cocktails and weapons in the basements of the faculties. Those who turned a blind eye to the “escalation” of violence in recent years should keep their eyes closed today so as not to shed crocodile tears."

"We believed that the assassination of Aldo Moro, as it was carried out, was the height of infamy. We had to change our minds. At the protest rally held in Piazza Duomo in Milan immediately after the macabre discovery in Via Caetani in Rome, a group of ultras shouted: “Moro, fascist!” We prefer the fangs of wild beasts to the drool of jackals."

"I believe that the best tribute one can pay to Moro is to put the episode that marked his end behind us—an episode from which, let’s be honest, his image emerges far from favorable. When I hear that, in addition to the known ones, there are other letters from Moro, I pray to God that they are never found. I already know what they contain, and I prefer not to read them."

"The Moro Case must be a subject of reflection at all times because it serves as a benchmark for our democracy and a constant warning not to lower our guard against all the dangers that might call it into question."

"Io scrivo a voi, uomini delle Brigate Rosse: restituite alla libertà, alla sua famiglia, alla vita civile, l'onorevole Aldo Moro [...] Io non ho alcun mandato nei suoi confronti, né sono legato da alcun interesse privato verso di lui. Ma lo amo come membro della grande famiglia umana, come amico di studi, e a titolo tutto particolare, come fratello di fede e come figlio della Chiesa di Cristo. [...] vi prego in ginocchio, liberate l'onorevole Moro, semplicemente, senza condizioni, non tanto per motivo della mia umile e affettuosa intercessione, ma in virtù della sua dignità di comune fratello in umanità."

"We have been faithful allies of the U.S. and the Atlantic World, but we have also had the courage to express opinions, perspectives, and concerns: after all, Moro was an example. The lessons we learn from the past help us understand how to handle situations today. We have always discussed the relationship between Moro and the PCI’s entry into the government. And the major clash is the Mediterranean, a geopolitical issue that erupts and involves the conflict, for example, between Moro and Kissinger."

"One can evade the Italian police—the Italian police as they are trained, organized, and directed—but not the laws of probability. And according to statistics released by the Ministry of the Interior regarding police operations conducted during the period from Moro’s kidnapping to the discovery of his body, the Red Brigades did indeed evade the laws of probability. Which is plausible, but cannot be true and real."

"I don’t want to attack Andreotti, for heaven’s sake, but how can we forget that he handed the state over to P2 by appointing Grassini, Santovito, and Pelosi as heads of the secret services in 1978? All of them from P2. The three who later conducted the investigation into the Moro murder."

"Younger people identify with the Red Brigades; they are admired. The neurotics are both astonished and admiring. For the psychotics, it is a little more complex, as it is for the paranoids. But the neurotic’s astonishment and admiration are directed at someone who had the courage to do what he had long fantasised about. He took the leap."

"May had descended upon Rome with all the fury of its fading spring. But it was a strange May. A sad one. In a city suspended in a soundproofed anguish, as if under a shower of polystyrene. In a city trapped beneath one of those glass cases where old people keep an image of the Virgin Mary. Or of a Christ with a bleeding heart and the face of Aldo Moro. Scialoja dreamt of Aldo Moro. Millions of Italians dreamt of Aldo Moro. His colleagues dreamt of Aldo Moro. They dreamt of meeting the same fate as the five martyrs of Via Fani."

"These Red Brigades have a curious effect on me, like a fairy tale for silly or sleepy children; and when the magistrates, Carabinieri officers, and prefects start telling it again, I feel a wave of tenderness, because the tale is old, ramshackle, childish, but it’s told with such good faith that you really don’t know how to contradict it."

"I am astonished and totally disagree with the words written (in *Il Fatto* on March 26) by a distinguished magistrate such as Gian Carlo Caselli. He writes: “There is insufficient evidence to say that the Red Brigades were directed from abroad.” I am stunned. There is a mountain of evidence to support this, starting with the hideout on Via Gradoli (owned by the Ministry of the Interior) and ending with the revelations of Pieczenick and Giannino Galloni. To continue with the evidence of dozens of cover-ups originating from various sectors of the state, from Italian and foreign intelligence services, from the statements of Aldo Moro himself before he was captured and killed, from Lago della Duchessa, from the stolen documents, from the deeply tainted biographies of the so-called “servants of the state,” all members of P2, to the testimonies dropped regarding who and how many fired on Via Fani, who was present on Via Fani, how many were there to cover and ensure that everything unfolded as it “was supposed to unfold,” and that they were not members of the Red Brigades."

"It is no coincidence that the actions of the Red Brigades are directed not so much at right-wingers, but at progressives. Their objective is very clear: to bring about a confrontation as quickly as possible, eliminating that reformist buffer which, to some extent, guarantees the survival of this type of society."

"[In 2016] There were nine of them on Via Fani, as Morucci says, including four gunmen; they faced a security police that I don’t believe was incapable of defending Moro. So one wonders how they managed it? My comrades told me, "We did it ourselves, by training in the courtyard at home.""

"[Speech delivered on 16 March 1978, on the occasion of the general strike following the ambush] But on this day of mourning, a dramatic moment in the life of the nation, on this day the turmoil of emotions must not overwhelm us; we must oppose inhuman violence with reason, with the resolute determination not to bow to the blackmail of the murderers, the enemies of democracy and the freedom of our country. There is talk of civil war. We have known such things, but in this case we are not facing a struggle between one, albeit small, section of the people against another. That is not the case. We are facing a handful of professional terrorists who are waging a relentless campaign against our institutions and our freedoms; we are facing a small group of murderers who are attacking the institutions of Italian democracy; it is true, however, it is true and we must take advantage of this circumstance to reflect on this reality: that surrounding this tiny, ferocious gang of criminals there is a certain stratum of acquiescent, passive people, people who, if nothing else, morally disengage or even show solidarity with the criminals, with the terrorists, or who simply stand by and watch. This is not the time to stand by and watch, friends of Rome. We cannot, at this moment, in this trial, stand by passively in the face of the torment being inflicted upon our country’s institutions, democracy, freedom, and the fundamental values of civil coexistence that we have won through our struggle."

"[In 1990, "was the Via Fani operation launched that day partly to influence the parliamentary vote, or not?"] No, the coincidence of the government's formation was entirely accidental. It was no coincidence that that operation was part of a proposal that was a complete alternative to those who believed that development in Italy was linked to a political change, called "National Solidarity". That, yes, that was no coincidence because the project was being launched at that very moment, in those weeks, in those months. Certainly a project that would have brought great trouble to our country."

"[In 2000] My view remains the same as that which I expressed in my Giornale the day after the incident. "If the State, bowing to blackmail, deals with the violence that has already left the five bodies of the security police on the pavement, thereby recognising the crime as its legitimate interlocutor, it no longer has any reason, as a State, to exist". This was the position we took from day one and which, fortunately, found two resolute supporters in Parliament (Berlinguer’s PCI and La Malfa's PRI) and one reluctant supporter amidst tears and sobs (the DC of the Moro-supporting Zaccagnini). This was the "plot" that led to the State’s hesitant ‘no’, to Moro’s subsequent death, but shortly afterwards also to the surrender of the Red Brigades. As for the gossip and suspicions that have been spun around it, and which still resurface from time to time, not a shred of evidence has ever been produced, and they are merely the fruit of the whingeing infantilism of this spineless people, incapable even of conceiving that a State might react, as a State, to those who flout its laws."