"Castro’s challenges... are not historically unprecedented. Since 2000, pivotal elections have brought down undemocratic governments and ushered opposition parties into power in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, and while none of these countries bears an exact resemblance to Honduras, their transitions yield clues... three issues became stumbling blocks: tackling corruption, reforming the security forces and keeping pro-reform constituencies united. By learning from the past, Castro might steer clear of these other post-authoritarian governments’ mistakes.... The dilemma isn’t so much building democratic institutions as rebuilding them — often under the shadow of entrenched corruption and organized crime. Moreover, elected autocrats know how to linger... after losing office, they tend to keep control of political parties... to sabotage institution -building and thwart justice, while appearing to play by democratic rules.... After the election, Hernandez published an executive decree that turned virtually the entire appointed executive bureaucracy into permanent career positions—a bid to keep his party plugged into power that, although unlikely to succeed, is sure to generate confusion. Meanwhile, the National Party’s delegation in Congress, ...proposed legislation to set up a special unit within the intelligence services and set aside $10 million to fund it. Ostensibly, the unit and funds will be used to set up security details for state officials leaving office, but government critics warn the program amounts to a scheme to make off with cars, houses and public money. Before election day, the National Party... altered Honduras’ law on money laundering, enabling judges to dismiss charges against 10 suspects in corruption cases tied to the Hernandez administration."