"We conclude: 1. For that portion of the pregnancy stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the woman’s privacy right dominates the interests of the state. It follows that, during this period, the abortion decision must be left to the medical judgment of the woman’s attending physician. 2. From that point on, however, the state, in promoting its interest in health, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are appropriately related to maternal health. Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility where the procedure is to be performed; and as to the licensing of the facility. 3. From and after viability, which, we judicially notice, is usually the end of approximately the 26th or 27th week, and which is the point at which the fetus has a reasonable chance of independent life if it were then born or removed from the mother, the state’s interest in protecting the potentiality of human life dominates the woman’s right to privacy. It follows that the state may, if it chooses, regulate and even prohibit abortion, except where it is necessary in appropriate medical judgment for the preservation of the life or health of the mother. 4. The state may define the term physician to mean only a licensed physician, and it may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician We feel that this holding is consistent with the relative weights of the respective interests involved, with the lessons and examples of medical and legal history, with the attitude of the common law toward abortion, and with the demands of the profound problems of the present day. The states are thus left free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy lengthens so long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state interests. The decision, we also feel, vindicates the right of the physician and is consistent with the fact that abortion is essentially a medical decision until, of course, those points in pregnancy are reached when the state interests become dominant. Viewed under this analysis, the Texas statute must fall, and we, therefore, affirm, with one procedural exception, the judgment of the federal court of the Northern District of Texas. In the Georgia case we hold that the procedural requirements for J.C.A.H. accreditation for the hospital, for the hospital abortion committee, and for the additional two-doctor concurrence are unduly restrictive of the patient’s rights and of the attending physician’s rights. Similarly, we do not uphold the provision that the patient be a resident of Georgia. The remainder of the Georgia statute does not conflict with federal constitutional standards."