"QUESTION: Well, then, isn’t the only difference between the Texas statute and the D.C. statute that the Texas statute does not have the health factor? MRS. WEDDINGTON: That’s correct, which makes it much more difficult for the doctor to tell when it is – when he can -- QUESTION: But in Vuitch, unless the Court is prepared to overrule it, not a fact, the Texas statute would be valid if it was construed to include abortions for the protection of health, treating life as broad enough to do that. MRS. WEDDINGTON: Including mental and physical. But then the question is raised as to the right of privacy, which was not before the Court in the Vuitch case, and is before the Court in this particular situation. As to the Hippocratic oath, it seems to me that that oath was adopted at a time when abortion was extremely dangerous to the health of the woman; and, second, that the oath is to protect life, and here the question is: what does life mean in this particular context? It’s the sort of same vagueness, it seems to me, that you’re – well, okay, life there could be slightly different because of the constitutional implications here. It seems to me that -- QUESTION: Well, the Hippocratic oath went directly and specifically to providing procedures. MRS. WEDDINGTON: To providing a -- QUESTION: However life was defined. MRS. WEDDINGTON: That’s correct."