"The problem...was...how to induce the nations to disarm while they were afraid to do so, because, as Murray all too clearly perceived, "war can still be made, and there is no certainty that the nation attacked will be defended by the rest of the League". Nor were stricter and more elaborate obligations to support the League the answer...because, Murray pointed out, the present obligations were perfectly adequate, if only – if only – the members of the League lived up to them. That a man like Gilbert Murray could see so plainly the paradox on which the League of Nations was insecurely built, and yet remain the League's wholehearted supporter and propagandist, indicates how easy it was for faith in the League to blind the faithful... For the League of Nations itself the Japanese aggression raised as an urgent practical issue that fundamental question of power – military and naval power – which had so troubled Gilbert Murray in theory, but which had always been ignored or played down by most other moralising internationalists. Here was a bandit state engaged in open robbery; now therefore was the time for the law-abiding powers of the world to uphold the law against the wrongdoer; to act as policemen. Unfortunately the policemen had been persuaded to give up their truncheons."