"There were two things that especially attracted me to the ideas of renormalization and quantum field theory. One of them was that the requirement that a physical theory be renormalizable is a precise and rational criterion of simplicity. In a sense, this requirement had been used long before the advent of renormalization theory. When Dirac wrote down the Dirac equation in 1928 he could have added an extra ‘Pauli’ term ... which would have given the electron an arbitrary anomalous magnetic moment. Dirac could (and perhaps did) say ‘I won’t add this term because it’s ugly and complicated and there’s no need for it.’ I think that in physics this approach generally makes good strategies but bad rationales. It’s often a good strategy to study simple theories before you study complicated theories because it’s easier to see how they work, but the purpose of physics is to find out why nature is the way it is, and simplicity by itself is I think never the answer. But renormalizability was a condition of simplicity which was being imposed for what seemed after Dyson’s 1949 papers ... like a rational reason, and it explained not only why the electron has the magnetic moment it has, but also (together with gauge symmetries) all the detailed features of the standard model of weak, electromagnetic, and strong, interactions, aside from some numerical parameters. The other thing I liked about quantum field theory during this period of tremendous optimism was that it offered a clear answer to the ancient question of what we mean by an elementary particle: it is simply a particle whose field appears in the Lagrangian. It doesn’t matter if it’s stable, unstable, heavy, light — if its field appears in the Lagrangian then it’s elementary, otherwise it’s composite."