"[The] empirical origin of Euclid's geometrical axioms and postulates was lost sight of, indeed was never even realised. As a result, Euclidean geometry was thought to derive its validity from certain self-evident universal truths; it appeared as the only type of consistent geometry of which the mind could conceive. Gauss had certain misgivings on the matter, but... the honor of discovering non-Euclidean geometry fell to Lobatchewski and Bolyai. ... From the difference in geometric premises important variations followed. Thus, whereas in Euclidean geometry the sum of the angles of any triangles is always equal to two right angles, in non-Eudlidean geometry the value of this sum varies with the size of the triangles. It is always less than two right angles in Lobatchewski's, and always greater in Riemann's. Again, in Euclidean geometry, similar figures of various sizes can exist; in non-Euclidean geometry, this is impossible. It appeared then, that the universal truth formerly credited to Euclidean geometry would have to be shared by these two other geometrical doctrines. But truth, when divested of its absoluteness, loses much of its significance, so this co-presence of conflicting universal truths brought the realisation that a geometry was true only in relation to our more or less arbitrary choice of a system of geometrical postulates. ...The character of self-evidence which had been formerly credited to the Euclidean axioms was seen to be illusory."