"Since they are neither great mathematicians nor able experimenters, what are we to call such men as Maxwell, Lorentz and Einstein? If we concede that the name philosopher should apply to those who are concerned with a harmonisation of the whole than with individual facts, or, again, with a general view of things rather than with a restricted view, we must agree that the theoretical physicists must be called philosophers. They are, then, the philosophers of the inorganic world, just as the pure mathematicians might be called the philosophers of abstract relations. Now... the facts which these scientific philosophers are seeking to co-ordinate are of a restricted species; they are mathematical, physical and chemical in nature; hence it is clear that there is room for a more general type of philosopher—a super-philosopher, as it were—whose facts would comprise all the spheres of human knowledge, including consciousness, emotions and the relationships between mind and matter. The traditional philosophers—or shall we say lay philosophers, since we are discussing scientific matters?—aspire to be placed in this category of thinkers. It would appear, then, that theoretical scientists, and lay philosophers have much in common; they differ only in the scope of the facts they are seeking to co-ordinate. But here is where the first breach arises. The theoretical scientist proceeds with the utmost caution and considers himself at liberty to theorise only after a sufficient number of facts have been established by experiment and observation; till then he remains silent. ...It was not one, nor two, nor even three of the negative experiments in electromagnetics that drove Einstein towards his revolutionary theory; it was the whole body of electrodynamics. ... But when we examine the procedure of the lay philosopher who discusses scientific matters, we see that his procedure is entirely different."