"Creating new persons exposes them to non-trivial harms. While in other cases harming in this non-trivial fashion might be justified if it is in the service of saving persons from even greater harms, procreators cannot appeal to this possibility. Procreation cannot sensibly be viewed as the act of saving non-existing persons from (greater) harm. Rather, on Shiffrin’s account, procreation can be viewed, at best, as the morally problematic exposure to non-trivial harms in order to offer uninvited and non-essential benefits (that is, "pure benefits") to the person created; at worst, it can be viewed as the morally impermissible imposition of serious, protracted harms upon a patient that are not toward the alleviation of greater harms. Further, and most crucially, children do not have the opportunity to offer their consent to encounter the harms of existence in order to receive the benefits, which entails that it is wrong to procreate."