"I never allow my construction of a plain enactment to be biassed in the slightest degree by any number of judicial decisions or dicta as to its meaning, when those decisions or dicta are not actually binding upon me. I read the Act for myself. If I think it clear I express my opinion about its meaning, as I consider I am bound to do. Of course, if other Judges have expressed different views as to the construction, and their decisions are binding on this Court, this Court has simply to bow and submit, whatever its own opinion may be. But when there is no such binding decision, in my view a Judge ought not to allow himself to be biassed in the construction of a plain Act of Parliament (for it appears to me to be plain) by any number of dicta or decisions which are not binding on him. The Judge ought with all due respect to examine into them, but he must not allow any number of dicta, or even decisions which are not binding on him, to affect his judgment, except in one peculiar case. That case is peculiar, and therefore I will mention it. Where a series of decisions in inferior Courts have put a construction on an Act of Parliament, and thus have made a law which men follow in their daily dealings, it has been held, even by the House of Lords, that it is better to adhere to the course of the decisions than to reverse them, because of the mischief which would result from such a proceeding. Of course, that requires two things, antiquity of decision, and the practice of mankind in conducting their affairs."