"Someone might accept both the connection between privacy and autonomy asserted in Section I, and the Interest Theory of rights developed and applied here, and yet still be unwilling to concede the existence of a right to privacy. One objection might be that privacy interests can be recognised without being elevated into the subject-matter of a right. The “de facto” enjoyment of freedom from interference with one's privacy is not, assuredly, the same as a right to privacy. Why, it might be asked, is “de facto” freedom not enough? Why must moral rights and duties come into the picture? The case for a right to privacy has so far rested on: (I) the crucial importance of privacy for personal autonomy; and (ii) the relatively undemanding nature of privacy-related duties: we have seen that this ensures the compatibility of privacy rights with human autonomy and with other important individual and social values, some of which (including, for example, human dignity, family ties, and particapatory democracy) derive positive reinforcement from the security of private life. The missing link in the chain of argument, on which this first objection fastens, is the affirmative case for elevating privacy interests into privacy rights."