"One of the reasons why privacy might be considered a weak(ish) right is that the focus of the literature on the right to privacy in criminal justice contexts has been largely on the second and third cases. The effect of a single search – even an intimate search – may not be too serious when compared with an interfeence with lifestyle that lasts far longer. Successive stops, searches or arrests may amount to a campaign of harassment, but that simply raises issues about their legality and legitimacy. Targeted surveillance that is unknown to the suspect, causes no direct interference with his/herif. Even the knowledge that at any given time the police might be engaged in targeted surveillance is not something which need impact tremendously upon the suspect's enjoyment of life. It is the endurance of the invasion that bears upon the seriousness of the invasion far more than any transient indignity. However strong the claim is that the kinds of police powers which would be necessary to enforce a policy of criminalisation of drugs are intrusive and unpleasant, even in this area it is the lifestyle impact which the legislation has upon the people both who obey and who do not that is the more significant issue. It is therefore critically important that the European Convention on Human Rights should generate examination of substantive as well as procedural law. Similarly emphasis in the US federal courts upon the notion of privacy in the procedural cases compared with its slight and probably diminishing influence in the substantive law cases is difficult to defend."