"[T]o take on the extraordinary risks... without having made the case with the American people.., citing immanent threats that aparently don't exist... that's problematic, and the chances of unintended consequences... are... very serious... [W]e're... using.., in many cases very expensive weapons to take down $20,000 drones. That's not a good equation... over time. ...I'm worried about ...second and third order consequences ...we so deplete our arsenal, and it takes a long time to rebuild ...puts us in a disadvantageous position when it comes to ...a China or ...Russia. ...[M]uch as ...everyone should want to see a change... it may simply ...reinforce the IRGC ...[I]t's very hard to produce regime change from outside. You can't bomb your way to it. ...The red flag ...is that this could be Syria redux or ...Libya redux ...the country fracturing, imploding or even exploding with refugees and migration.., extremist groups taking hold... It's incredibly ...dangerous. ...[I]t's never too late for diplomacy. ... [W]hen Russia is ...reaching a weak point because of its dependence on oil to fuel its war economy ...they get a lifeline, ...the price of oil is going up. The Europeans, in having moved away from Russian gas, are now more dependent on the Middle East. ...If the gets tied up ...that's ...a lot of pressure ...So mapping out, gaming out, planning out and ...making sure you have something in place to deal with ...second and third order effects is ...important, and it's not ...clear ...that was done ...There's been a shifting rationale ...[or] explanation for why this, why now? ...That's why it's so important to have ...laid this out before the American people, and our partners and allies. We might have had less friction with them if there was a compelling case ...and had them on the take-off, not mid-flight or on the landing."