"Misjudging Moscow had long been the occupational disease of European diplomacy. It cursed alike Swedes, Poles, Napoleon and Hitler. It now blighted a western alliance divided on how to respond to this newly aggressive Russia. The EU had no military arm, though it often toyed with the idea of one. There had been a European ‘defence community’, a Eurocorps, a rapid reaction force, a ‘military action plan’ and even a joint operational headquarters. For good measure, Britain’s prime minister Tony Blair had in a speech in Chicago in 1999 suggested that a concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ be seen as valid wherever democracy and human rights were under threat. To him, there could be no limit to NATO’s responsibility. But who should define threats and responsibilities? After New York’s 9/11 atrocity in 2001 at the hands of Al Qaeda, NATO found itself expected to intervene wherever Washington’s rulers ordained. Armies from virtually all Europe’s states were summoned to fight with varying degrees of enthusiasm and engagement in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya. As America tested its hegemonic muscles, obedience was the price for the continuance of the nuclear umbrella. No one asked, let alone answered, the question of who should police the ever-expanding borders of democratic Europe."