"Nevertheless, these considerations, while plausible, are not compelling. Someone could respond to these arguments, with at least equal plausibility, by saying that a woman deciding whether or not to abort her own child is likely to be completely unconcerned with whether the children of others have been adequately vaccinated. It is hard to imagine any drastic increase in the number of abortions because of vaccines; people have abortions for other reasons. Further, it could be argued that even if a woman were swayed in her decision by the presence of these vaccines, that would amount to no more than an excuse and a way to silence feelings of doubt or remorse. One person is not ordinarily responsible for another’s rationalizations. Finally, this argument would say that the bare possibility that some hypothetical woman might be swayed to have an abortion is not as significant as the genuine responsibility of parents to protect their existing children from harmful, even deadly, diseases. In some cases (e.g., rubella, varicella, and adenovirus), there is not available an equally good vaccine that is produced without the use of cell lines from aborted fetuses. Moreover, the health benefits at issue do not accrue only to their own children, but to all people within the community to which the children belong. In the face of these opposing arguments regarding the relation of the use of these vaccines to future abortions, it would seem that more than one practical option is morally coherent. People who want to make a strong stand against abortion could refuse to use the vaccines, assuming that they could find adequate ways to protect themselves and others from disease. When there are children involved, parents must recognize that they are responsible for reasonable measures to protect the children (and to prevent the children from being a contagious threat to society). This threat is no trivial element of what parents must examine when they consider whether their children will join them in making an equally strong stand against abortion. At the same time, someone else who understands and deplores the accidental relation of these vaccines to abortion, who thinks that his or her use of the vaccine will have no significant effect on any future abortions, and who finds no alternative, equally effective ways to guard against infectious diseases readily available could make use of these vaccines without falling into moral incoherence. No further harm is necessarily generated by using the vaccine; no obvious good is necessarily achieved by refusing it, and there are a variety of other ways parents might communicate the moral character of abortion to their children. Alternatively, some people might want to be especially rigorous in their opposition to abortion, much as some people will participate in public abortion protests. Such public opposition cannot be understood to be morally implied by opposition to abortion since it is unclear how or if those protests have any significant effect on the number of abortions one way or the other."