"Now, in the present case, the only opportunity for cooperation in abortion occurs in connection with the initial transfer of tissue. Today, when a person receives a vaccine injection, there simply is no cooperative action with whoever performed the abortions. The vaccine user provides no material assistance in the abortion nor acts in such a way as to will that the abortions take place. It is true as a matter of fact that the cell lines used to produce vaccines come from abortions, but abortion is not essentially necessary as a means to this end. This does not mean that the use of the vaccine is totally unrelated to abortion, but only that the distinctions that help to assess cooperation in evil do not provide a coherent moral analysis. Considering the independence—not only in time and place, but also morally—of vaccination from abortion, one comes to see that one achieves a morally coherent understanding of vaccination without essential relation to one’s moral condemnation (or for that matter, approval) of abortion. The use of these cell lines for the production of vaccines is somewhat akin to the use of the organs of a murder victim for transplantation in order to benefit others. A murder victim’s organs are available because of a morally reprehensible deed, but their use to benefit someone else does not make the transplantation team or the recipient complicit in the murder. Once again, there simply is no cooperative action between the murderer and the organ recipient or even the transplantation team. Acknowledging that it is distasteful to draw personal benefit from another’s suffering, one must yet recognize that taking advantage of this situation in this manner is not, as such, morally evil or morally incoherent. Just as it would be preferable to receive organs without any murder having occurred, in the same way, it would be preferable if the vaccines had no connection with abortion. Nevertheless, the use of the vaccine is accidentally, not essentially related morally to those two abortions."