"What does a claimant need to show in order to succeed on a theory of duress by threat? The Restatement Second suggests four requirements.' First, there must be a threat. Second, the threat must be of a kind that the law condemns. Third, the threat must induce the victim's manifestation of assent. Fourth, the threat mustbe sufficiently grave to justify the victim's assent. First, what is a threat? Though the Restatement Second attempts no definition, it may be of interest to consider that question in passing here. To begin with, a threat is a manifestation of an intent to do or not to do something in the future ("I'll break your arm" or "I'll break our contract"). But a promise is also a manifestation to do something in the future. Suppose a contractor says to a landowner, "I'll build the house." That is a promise. How does a threat differ from such a promise? Ordinarily, at least, a significant difference between a threat and any other statement of intention is that a threat manifests an intention to do or not to do something that is less desirable from the promisee's point of view than if the alternative were the case. Suppose that after the landowner has gotten the contractor to agree to build the house, the contractor says, "I will not build the house." You would call that a threat because his not building the house is less desirable from the landowner's point of view than his building it. Or suppose I say, "I'll give you a kiss." You might well ask, "Is that a threat or a promise?" And I would say that the answer depends on you: I have made a statement of intention, and whether it is the kind of a statement that is described here as a threat depends on whether my kissing you is less desirable from your point of view than my not kissing you."