"The NIA filed a chargesheet within six months against Kanhaiya Lal’s murderers. But tragically, these enemies of humanity haven’t been given the death sentence even after three years. On the other hand, a stay order on the film The Udaipur Files was issued in just three hours-without even watching the film-and the copy of that order wasn’t made available to the concerned parties for 21 hours. What does that tell you? What’s wrong with the film? Did the murder not happen? Will Kanhaiya Lal’s son ever get justice? Will he be able to grow his hair back or walk with dignity on his bare feet? Will the murderers ever be hanged? Will Kanhaiya Lal’s ashes ever be immersed with the peace they deserve?"

"The petition to stop the film was filed just three or four days ago, and it’s already being heard. But the petition I filed nearly three years ago, seeking justice for my father’s murder, remains unresolved. There were over 150 witnesses in the case, and 15–16 have not even appeared in court. No fast-track court was set up. Despite ample evidence, not one of the accused has been punished. When someone tries to show the truth through a film, the entire system seems to rise against it. Organisations like Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind and leaders like Maulana Madani demand a ban, and in just three days, the film gets stayed. How efficient that is! But the same urgency is not shown in punishing murderers. This makes us question the system. My father was brutally murdered, and justice has yet to be delivered. When a film is made to awaken the nation about communalism and jihadist ideology, it is being suppressed. Why? What kind of mindset is this? The truth of how terrorists conspired to murder my father is out in the open, yet some organisations seem to side with these anti-national elements. What sympathy do they have for terrorists?"

"Kelly Thiebaud as Amy"

"Thomas Kretschmann as Flemming"

"Dude, they are hot. I bet you they hate their fathers."

"Kip Pardue as Carter"

"Derrick Carr as Mossberg"

"[Electrocuting one of the guards with his own cattle prod] Die, you motherfucker! You die now, motherfucker! [Mockingly] Now I fuck your mother now!"

"Tim Holmes as Beardo"

"Zulay Henao as Nikki"

"The problem is... [pinning Carter's hands to the table] HE'S STILL ALIVE!"

"A pity fuck is still a fuck, dude!"

"John Hensley as Justin"

"Sarah Habel as Kendra"

"Frank Alvarez as Mesa"

"Brian Hallisay as Scott"

"Skyler Stone as Mike"

"Nickola Shreli as Viktor"

"Evelina Turen as Anka (as Evelina Oboza)"

"Chris Coy as Travis"

"Are you telling me that's the best America can do?... No, don't tell me that... That makes me angry. Don't tell the Marines who fought for a month in Najaf that. Don't tell the Marines who are still fighting every day in Fallujah that that's the best America can do. That Moqtada al-Sadr, a terrorist leader is now a rising political figure. That makes me angry."

"I mean, you had huge ammunition dumps that weren't guarded until several weeks, if not a couple of months, after major combat actions ended."

"I joined the army to ah... support my country...and ah... thought it was a good thang to do, ya know..."

"From here we can't change anything, because it's out of control now. I don't have future plans for being in Iraq. I don't see the bit of light at the end of the tunnel yet."

"I just... was waiting for the war to happen because it was the... the only ray of hope I had to look for... And when it happened, I was... excited, that things would move slowly... but... towards better circumstances."

"There is a belief that the Americans actually encourage the looting or wanted to happen, the destruction of our country. How could they let this happen? Whether you're Sunni or Shia, you're outrage about the looting."

"I'm standing there watching these insurgents pull out rockets and mortars and bombs from these weapons caches that the Iraqis had stashed everywhere. And you go to the British or to the U.S., whoever's there, with your little GPS receiver and say; "Hey, guys. We found like 18,000 million tons of bombs", and there are a bunch of Iraqis there with AK-47s taking it away. Probably not the best idea. Here's where it's located. And they say to you, we just don't have enough people to cover it. And it just - I couldn't believe it. It wasn't the right answer. Go there and take care of it, for your security, for the civilians' security - for everybody. It's just a bad idea."

"I joined the Marine because I always thought it as a really important job... and didn't feel I'll be content with myself going through life knowing that other people had fought for my freedom."

"This is not just people stealing from grocery stores. I mean, this was people chipping concrete, walls into little pieces so they can take the rebar out."

"We could certainly have stopped the looting if that was our assigned task."

"The north and the west parts are controlled by the insurgents."

"It was such a confusing, loud, noisy, scary, hopeless place, and it was all put together. I'd see kids with ski caps on that said FBI on it and others would be giving me the big thumbs up. And you'd have other young men who probably fedayeen in civilian clothes giving me very hard stares... and... and... you know, always trying to size me up and always covering up the license plate of the car."

"I've seen people welcoming the Coalition troops, because we thought everything was planned, everything was prepared."

"At best, I think, they were liars. And at worst, they were provocateurs. If it's an NCI source, it was always looked at very, very skeptically by the analysts. But that wasn't the case with the policymakers."

"It was... an honor... to go there and help my fellow soldiers... to do... what they telled us to go and do there maybe... take out a... dictator... out of the... power... to reestablish the democracy. To be in the bucket, if anything happens, you gonna get it."

"We were starting from zero. I mean, if there are no desks, no chairs and no typewriters left... Where do we go and meet the Iraqis to start working? There was no structure left. Physical structure or bureaucratic structure. We had no phone list, we had no phones for a while, so I guess having no phone list was not really that important. We had no information, we had no place to go... we did not know who to contact. Not the best way to... Not the best way to start an occupation."

"The '80s really summed up, in a very foretelling document from 1987, it said, uh; "Human rights and chemical weapons use aside..." uh, comma, [glances upwards in a tic of humorous observance] "...our interests run roughly parallel to those of Iraq."

"When we were first starting the reconstruction, there were 500 ways to do it wrong and two or three ways to do it right. What we didn't understand is that we were going to go through all 500."

"The State Department's "Future of Iraq" project - a 13-volume study on post-war Iraq - was ignored by The Pentagon."

"Chalabi asserted that post-war Iraq would be pro-American and easily stabilized, particularly if Chalabi himself was in charge."

"In the months leading up to the invasion, a debate over troop levels required in Iraq had been privately brewing between the military leadership and Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, believed that a force of under 100,000 troops would be sufficient for the invasion and occupation of Iraq. A month before the invasion, the fight over troop levels became public, as the chief of staff of the Army, Eric Shinseki, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, ignoring pressure from Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz."

"In formulating its views on post-Saddam Iraq, the administration relied heavily on a man named Ahmed Chalabi. Since 1992, Chalabi had been president of Iraqi National Congress, or INC. Widely viewed with suspicion, Chalabi had been convicted in Jordan of a huge bank fraud. The intelligence community found his information unreliable, or even fraudulent."

"The Iraq National Museum in Baghdad, number one on ORHA's list, contained some of the world's most important artifacts of early human civilization. The museum was never protected."

"When you see the same architects of those policies... on the one hand, talking about getting right what they had gotten wrong, back in 1991, you know... finishing the job. I was tempting to say, well... maybe they've learned."

"A number of the most generals came to the Channal Hotel, the UN headquarters and they were very explicit of the consequences of letting this order stand and of marginalizing this incredibly powerful segment of society would be an insurgency. A Lebanese diplomat named Hassan Salami turned to his colleagues as the generals walked away after one of their meetings and said; "I see bullets in their eyes" [Repeats Salami quote for dramatic emphasis]."

"14... out of Iraq's 18 govenors (provinces)... were under rebel control... when general Schwartzkopf... allowed... Saddam Hussein to use... helicopter gunships... to massacre... the rebels... men, women and children."

"[Archival footage] Think what's happened in our cities when we've had riots and problems... and looting. Stuff happens!"

"[Archival footage] ...said one was guerrilla war, another was insurgency. Another was unconventional war. [Man calls out; "quagmires?"] Pardon me? No, that's someone else's business, quagmires. I don't do quagmires."

"Baghdad gets 10 bombings, 10 to 15 bombings a day and it's maybe 50 KIA. But I suspect that's drastically under-reported. We're probably only capturing a third of what's actually happening."

"During World War Two, the United States started planning the occupation of Germany two years in advance. But the Bush administration didn't created the organization that would manage the occupation of Iraq until 60 days before the invasion. ORHA, the organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance reported directly to defense Secretary Rumsfeld."