"Students of Spinoza will easily trace the connection between his theory of mind and matter and the doctrine set forth in Clifford's essays on "Body and Mind," and "The Nature of Things-in themselves. … Briefly put, the conception is that mind is the one ultimate reality; not mind as we know it in the complex forms of conscious feeling and thought, but the simpler elements out of which thought and feeling are built up. The hypothetical ultimate element of mind, or atom of mind-stuff, precisely corresponds to the hypothetical atom of matter, being the ultimate fact of which the material atom is the phenomenon. Matter and the sensible universe are the relations between particular organisms, that is, mind organized into consciousness, and the rest of the world. This leads to results which would in a loose and popular sense be called materialist. But the theory must, as a metaphysical theory, be reckoned on the idealist side. To speak technically, it is an idealist monism. Indeed it is a very subtle form of idealism, and by no means easy of apprehension at first sight. Nevertheless there are distinct signs of a convergence towards it on the part of recent inquirers who have handled philosophical problems in a scientific spirit, and particularly those who have studied psychology on the physiological side. Perhaps we shall be told that this proves the doctrine to be materialism in disguise; but it is hardly worth while to dispute about names while more serious things remain for discussion. And the idea does require much more working out; involving, as it does, extensive restatement and rearrangement of metaphysical problems. It raises not only several questions, but preliminary (and really fundamental) problems as to what questions are reasonable."