Boethius's Consolation of Philosophy

"৳ IN flower of youth, with love of learning blest, My verse was wont in cheerful strains to flow; But now, by Fortune's cruel rage-opprest, I mourn in numbers suited to my woe.The sacred Nine, companions of my grief. Their soften'd features wet with many a tear. Try all their pleasing art to give relief, And whisper verse mellifluous in my ear,They, faithful friends, still trace my woful ways, Regardless of the haughty tyrant's rage, Whilom, the glory of my youthful days. Now, the chief solace of my drooping age.Silver'd my hairs, and furrow'd deep my brow. Unbrac'd each nerve, tho' scarce beyond my prime. With rapid haste borne on the wings of wo. Old age advances, not on wings of time.Happy the man, with health and affluence blest, Into whose halcyon days intrudes not death; From ceaseless wo, still happier who finds rest. And yields to fate, long-wish'd, his willing breath.Death, kind deliv'rer from all grief and pain. Why stays thy hand my weeping eyes to close? Thy aid, ah cruel! I implore in vain; Deaf to my cries, thou wilt not give repose.With gladd'ning beams, while treach'rous fortune, shone, Disease had almost snatch'd my bliss away, With every joy, since now the wanton's flown, Why does slow time still lengthen out my day?Why did you boast of my exalted state? Mistaken friends, were ye not much to blame? Learn this great truth, from my disastrous fate, All human bliss is but an empty name."

"৳ Whilst I vented my grief in these melancholy strains, and, with tears streaming from my eyes, was committing them to paper, I was struck with the appearance of a woman, whose countenance was altogether august and venerable. Her eyes sparkled with fire, and her look was far more piercing than that of any mortal. Her complexion was comely and healthful, and she seemed to possess all the vigour of youth; nevertheless her appearance was such as denoted her to have lived many years, and that her existence began long before the present age. The height of her stature could not be determined, as she varied it at pleasure; now, she seemed to contrast herself to the ordinary size of men; anon, she appeared to reach the skies with her head; nay, she would at times elevate herself still higher, and penetrate so far into the heavens, as to surmount the reach of the most acute and discerning eye. The stuff of which her robe was composed was indissoluble; it was of the finest thread, woven with wonderful art, and was the work of her own hands... But as smoke and dust obscures ancient pictures, so neglect and the rust of antiquity had rendered the beauty of this stuff scarcely to be discerned. On the lower part of her garment was embroidered in a large and strong character the letter P, on the upper G; the former denoting Philosophy; the latter, God; and betwixt these two letters a flight of stairs was delineated, signifying that the ascent to God was by philosophy."

"৳ This admirable garment, however, had been rent by the fury of some violent men, who had torn several shreds out of it, and carried them off. Thus did she appear; and to conclude, she held some writings in her right hand, and a in her left."

"৳ Beholding the Muses, the inspirers of song, standing round my bed, and lending words to my grief, she was displeased; and looking upon them with a stern and threatening aspect..."

"Who gives permission... to these soul-enervating daughters of the theatre, to approach this disconsolate person? So far are they from remedying his woes by any art of theirs, that they nourish them by their soft and enfeebling poisons. It is they who teach their votaries to choke and destroy, by the pernicious brambles of the passions, the most abundant and useful crops of reason. They may... sooth and indulge the mind in its grief; but they cannot restore it to comfort. If by your deceitful caresses... you had seduced one of the profane, as you are daily wont to do, small would have been my concern: I should not thereby have been injured; for it is only in the sons of wisdom I am interested. But whom do you attack? One who has been trained up from his infancy in the principles of Zeno and the Academy.——Be gone! ye baneful sirens, with your strains that enchant to destruction. Be gone! leave him to me; it is only my sober muse that can effectuate his ."

"৳ Struck with these reproaches, the tuneful choir cast down their eyes with respect; and testifying their shame by their glowing cheeks, they immediately left the room, and, filled with sorrow, fled her presence. As for myself, my eyes were blinded by a flood of tears, so that I could not discover who this august dame was, endued with an authority so absolute. I was amazed; with my countenance fixed on the ground, I waited in silence her pleasure. She... approached, and sat down on the foot of my bed; and beholding my dejected eye, and my face disfigured with grief, she bewailed my wretched condition in the following moving strains:"

"Ah! hapless state of human race! How quick do all their pleasures pass! And too, too weak their minds to bear Life's varied scenes of woe and care. When grief's sharp thorn the heart assails. Of wisdom's sons the purpose fails; Their boasted vigour soon gives way, Dark melancholy clouds their day; The helm no longer reason steers, But lawless passion domineers. Too sad a proof of this, alas! Ah, wretched mortal, is your case! Whilst undisgrac'd and unconfin'd, How firm and vigorous was your mind! Still ranging with unwearied view Creation's ample circuit thro'. The sun, refulgent source of day, You trac'd o'er all his radiant way; The moon that shines with borrowed light, And cheers with radiance mild the night, The silver moon's mysterious round Was by your magic numbers bound; The planets too that wand'ring go. And seem no settled course to know, Their periods, various and perplex'd, Were, by your art victorious, fix'd; Your tow'ring genius could resolve, What makes the heaven's vast frame revolve, Whilst all the lights that gild the skies, In order, daily set and rise; You too could tell, where nature forms Her mighty magazines of storms, Which with impetuous fury roll, And shake the earth from pole to pole; Why Spring awakes the genial hours, And decks th' enamell'd field with flow'rs, You knew;—and why kind Autumn's hand Diffuses plenty o'er the land: Thro' all her mazes you pursued Coy Nature, and her secrets viewed. But ah! sad change! that soaring mind Is now disconsolate and blind; To earth-born cares a wretched prey. And all the man is sunk away. Relentless fate has fix'd those eyes To earth, that whilom pierc'd the skies."

"৳ I am... desirous of knowing, whether there is any such thing as Chance, and what you think it is... [T]o learn those things that are so delightfully instructing, will be more refreshing... than rest itself... [Y]our discourse... will rest on the basis of unquestionable truth, and it will not be possible for me to retain any doubt in relation to what shall remain to be discussed."

"If Chance is defined an event produced by motion, operating without design, and not by a chain or connexion of causes, I should then affirm it to be nothing; and, except as a word... I pronounce it an empty sound, without... signification."

"For how can any thing happen without design, when all events, through the influence of Almighty Power, are restrained by order?"

"That from nothing, nothing can proceed, is an , the truth of which none of the antients ever called in question: tho' this axiom be true, only as it relates to all created existences, but by no means true as it respects their efficient cause."

"Now if any thing arises without... a cause, it must proceed from nothing; but as this is evidently impossible, Chance is not therefore what it is asserted to be in the foregoing definition."

"৳ What... is there nothing fortuitous? nothing that may be called Chance? is not there any thing, tho' concealed from the apprehensions of the vulgar, to which these appellations may be applied?"

"Aristotle, my disciple... has in his Physicks explained this question with much precision and probability.—"If any thing... is done for a particular end or purpose, but if a certain concurrence of causes produces some other thing than was intended, it is called Chance.—For instance; if a labourer in digging a piece of ground, with a view to improve it, discovers a concealed treasure, this is said to happen by chance: but this discovery of the labourer does not spring from nothing; it arises from particular causes; the unforeseen and unexpected concourse of which brings about the event. For if the labourer had not trenched the ground, and the person who concealed the treasure had not buried it in that very spot, it had not been discovcred.""

"These then are the causes of this fortuitous acquisition: from these alone it arose, and not from any intention of the human will. For it was not the design, either of the person who hid the treasure, nor of him who laboured the ground, that this discovery should have been made. But as I just now said, the one finding it convenient to dig, where the other had concealed the money, by the concurrence of these two causes, the former obtained the prize. Chance may be therefore defined, an unexpected event, by a concurrence of causes, following an action designed for a [different] particular purpose. ...[T]his concurrence of causes is the effect of that necessary order, which streams from the pure fountain of Providence, and disposes every thing in its proper time and place."

"Where flying Parthians pierce th' astonish'd foe With deathful shafts; from lofty Taurus' side, The rapid Tigris, and Euphrates flow, And o'er the desart pour one current wide.But soon the streams divided trace their way, And winding on, in separate channels glide, Thro' sandy wastes and peopled realms they stray, Till, join'd again, they pour a mighty tide.Whate'er th' impetuous rivers bore along, Boat, ships, and trees, now in their blended stream Are dash'd and huddl'd in tumultuous throng, And by blind Chance the currents guided seem.But Chance capricious holds no empire here; The rolling rivers Nature's laws obey;— Declining still, their downward tracks they steer, And lighter bodies in their streams convey.They mix, and separate, and unite again, By Sovereign Wisdom taught their beds to know:— Rest: then in this; Chance holds no ruling rein. But kind intention governs all below."

"৳ [B]ut in this indissoluble chain of causes, can we preserve the liberty of the will? Does this fatal Necessity restrain the motions of the human soul?"

"There is no reasonable being... who has not freedom of will: for every being distinguished with this faculty is endowed with judgment to perceive the differences of things; to discover what he is to avoid or pursue."

"Now what a person esteems desirable, he desires; but what he thinks ought to be avoided, he shuns. Thus every rational creature hath a liberty of chusing and rejecting. But I do not assert, that this liberty is equal in all beings."

"Heavenly substances, who are exalted above us, have an enlightened judgment, an incorruptible will, and a power ever at command effectually to accomplish their desires."

"With regard to man, his immaterial spirit is also free; but it is most at liberty, when employed in the contemplation of the divine mind; it becomes less so, when it enters into a body; and is still more restrained, when it is imprisoned in a terrestrial habitation, composed of members of clay; and is reduced, in fine, to the most extreme servitude, when by plunging into the pollutions of vice, it totally departs from reason: for the soul no sooner turns her eye from the radiance of supreme truth, to dark and base objects, but she is involved in a mist of ignorance, assailed by impure desires; by yielding to which, she encreases her thraldom; and thus the freedom which she derives from nature, becomes in some measure the cause of her slavery."

"But the eye of Providence, which sees every thing from eternity, perceives all this; and that same Providence disposes every thing she has predestinated, in the order it deserves."

"As Homer says of the sun, it sees every thing, and hears every thing."

"Homer, in mellifluous lays, Sings the sun's all-piercing rays.— Phœbus' beams, whom men adore. Only stream the surface o'er, Reach not Tellus' hidden caves. Pierce not Ocean's rolling waves. But th' Eternal from on high, With his all-perceiving eye, Sees his wide creation through— Starting open to his view; (While her sable mantles, Night Vainly spreads to bar his sight) Darteth He, with piercing ray, Where Sol's beams can never stray; Sees—what's hid in earth's dark caves, Sees—what lurks beneath the waves: All events at once doth see, Present, past, and what shall be. Him the Sun then rightly call— God, who sees and lightens all."

"৳ God's foreknowledge of all events... seems... inconsistent with the free-will of man: for if God foresees all things, and cannot possibly be deceived, then, that which he foresees to happen in future, must necessarily happen: if from eternity God had foreseen not only the actions of men, but their designs and wills, there would be no liberty of choice; as in this case men have it not in their power to do any action, nor to form any will, but those which have been foreseen by God's infallible Providence. In fact, if things could be wrested in such a manner, as to happen otherwise than they have been foreseen, the prescience of God, in regard to futurity, would not be sure and unerring; it would be nothing more than an uncertain opinion: but I esteem it impious to entertain such an idea of God; nor do I at all approve the reasoning made use of by some, for the solution of this perplexing question."

"৳ "Things, say they, do not necessarily befal, because the Divine Providence hath foreseen they were to happen; but rather, because they were to happen. Providence could not be ignorant of them.""

"৳ Now by this way of reasoning, the necessity appears as it were to change sides: for it is not necessary, according to their opinion, that the things which are foreseen should happen; but it is necessary, however, that the things which are to befal should be foreseen; as if the question was, which was the cause of the other—prescience, of the necessity of future events; or the necessity, of the prescience of future events. But I shall now endeavour to demonstrate, that in whatever way the chain of causes is disposed, the event of things which are foreseen is necessary; although prescience may not appear to be the necessitating cause of their befalling."

"৳ For example; if a person sits, the opinion formed of him that he is seated, is of necessity true: but by inverting the phrase, if the opinion is true that he is seated, he must necessarily sit. In both cases then there is a necessity; in the latter, that the person sits; in the former, that the opinion concerning him is true: but the person doth not sit, because the opinion of his sitting is true; but the opinion is rather true, because the action of his being seated was antecedent in time. Thus tho' the truth of the opinion may be the effect of the person taking a seat, there is nevertheless a necessity common to both."

"৳ The same method of reasoning... should be employed with regard to the prescience of God, and future contingencies: for allowing it to be true, that events are foreseen, because they are to happen, and that they do not befal because they are foreseen; it is still neccessary, that what is to happen must be foreseen by God, and that what is foreseen must take place. This then is of itself sufficient to destroy all idea of human liberty."

"৳ But it is preposterous thus to attribute the eternal prescience of God to the event of temporal things: for what difference is there in imagining, that God doth foresee future events because they are to happen; and to suppose that what hath actually happened in time past was the cause of his sovereign prescience? Moreover, as a thing necessarily is, when I know it be, so it will necessarily be when I know it is; the event therefore of a thing foreseen, must necessarily befal."

"৳ Lastly, if a person supposes a thing different from what it is; this is not a knowledge of the thing in question, but a false opinion of it, widely distant from the truth of science: if a thing were therefore to befal in such a way, that the event of it is neither necessary nor certain; how can any one foresee that it is to happen? For as what we really do know is free from all uncertainty, so what is comprehended by science cannot be otherwise than as comprehended: hence... true science cannot err, because every thing must precisely be what her eye perceives it to be."

"৳ What then is the consequence..? How does God foreknow these uncertain contingencies? For if he thinks a thing will inevitably happen, which possibly may not, he is deceived; which one can neither believe, nor say of God, without blasphemy. But if he perceives that things will happen according to their casual circumstances; if he knows that they either may or may not take place; what sort of prescience is this, which comprehends nothing certain..? May it not be... compared with the ridiculous divination of ? Whatever I say, either shall or shall not be. In what... is the prescience of God superior to the opinion of men, if... he judges with uncertainty... the event... not fixed?"

"৳ But if there can be nothing uncertain in his knowledge, who is the source of all certainty... [A]ll things... he... foreknows must be fixed and inevitable. Whence... there can be no liberty... in... designs nor... actions of men; because the Divine mind... with an infallible foresight, constrains and binds them..."

"৳ But if this be granted, how great is the confusion, how miserable... human affairs? For it would be to no purpose to propose rewards or punishments to... good or... bad, when both... are deprived of liberty, and when the will does not influence... actions. Rewards and punishments... now considered... reasonable and equitable, would... become very unjust; when... mankind are not prompted by... their wills to virtue and vice, but in... conduct compelled by a fatal necessity. If things were so constituted, there would be neither virtue nor vice; but such a preposterous mixture... as would produce... horrid and shocking confusion. Now, this is the most impious idea that can possibly enter into the human mind."

"৳ From such extravagant principles,—that man has not the freedom of choice,—and that every event is disposed and constrained by Divine prescience,—we are forced to conclude, that all our vices ought to be ascribed solely to God... the source of every virtue, and of all goodness. Supposing this... it will be of no use either to hope or to pray... for why... do either, when all... is irreversibly predestined? Hope and prayer, becoming... ineffectual, the only intercourse betwixt God and the human race is cut off: for as by offering up our supplications with due reverence and humility, we merit the inestimable reward of the Divine grace and counsel; so it is by means of prayer... that we... associate... with the Deity, and to unite... to that inaccessible light. But if a fixed irrevocable necessity... is admitted, prayer can have no effect; and what other way is there then left, wherewith we can be connected..? Man therefore... being... detached and disunited from the source of his existence, must sink into nothing."

"That God doth all events foresee— That every human aft is free— Are truths, when sep'rate, plain and clear; But join'd,—perplex'd and dark appear. Declare then, what discordant cause Puzzles and clouds perspicuous laws? Can things indisputably true Involve an inconsistence too? Who can the unloose, And this deep mystery disclose? The Heav'n-born mind, perhaps, you'll say, Encumber'd with this load of clay, Cannot perceive the secret ties Of things, and nice dependencies.— Why does she then with ardour glow, Matters beyond her reach to know? Knows she the secret she would gain? Then Sure—She would not toil in vain. If, weak and blind, she knows it not, Why gropes she for she knows not what? None wish for what they never knew, Nor matters wholly hid pursue.— But grant,—that after search profound She finds it;—can she say 'tis found? Each mark unknown of what she sought, Dares she assert—the prize is got? The soul at first, then, shall we say, Illum'd with a celestial ray, From Wisdom's beaming source that springs, Knew all the secret chains of things:— But sent from Heav'n's pure light to dwell In this corporeal sluggish cell; Tho' clouds the intellectual bright O'ercast, and dim her native light. Clear marks of her celestial strain, And Heav'n-taught knowledge, still remain; Truth's outlines fair are still imprest Distinctly on the human breast; Tho' individuals are forgot, The sum of things unknown is not. In Science, then, who strive to grow, Studious reflect on what they know, And calm investigate again The truths their minds did once retain. Hence learn they to philosophize, And open Nature's mysteries."

"This... is the old objection against Providence, so acutely handled by Cicero, in his Book of Divination, and so often anxiously enquired into by yourself; of which neither of you, nor any person... has been able to give a satisfying solution. The cause of this mystery is, that the human understanding cannot conceive the simplicity of the prescience of God; for if it were possible to comprehend this, every difficulty would immediately vanish. I shall therefore first consider the matters that give you uneasiness, and shall then try to explain and solve this perplexing question. I ask you then, Wherefore you do not approve the reasoning of such as think, "That prescience does not obstruct the liberty of the will, because it is not the necessitating cause of future events?" Do you draw any argument of the necessity of what shall happen in future, but from this proposition, "That those things which are foreseen must necessarily befal?" But if the prescience of God imposes no necessity upon events that are to befal... must not the issue of things be voluntary, and man's will free and unconstrained? To render the sequel of my reasoning the more perspicuous, let us suppose there is no prescience: Would then the events which proceed from free-will alone, and from no other source, be under the power of necessity?"

"৳ No... by no means."

"[L]et us admit a prescience... that... imposes no necessity upon what is to happen; the freedom of the will... would... remain uninfluenced and intire. But although prescience, you may say, is not the necessary cause of future events, yet it is a sign that they shall necessarily happen; and hence it follows, that, although there were no prescience, future events would still be bound in the chain of necessity. But here it ought to be considered, the sign of a thing is not really the thing itself, but that it only points out what the individual is. For which reason it must be first made appear, that every thing happens by necessity, before we can conclude that prescience is the sign of this necessity: for if there be no necessity, prescience cannot be the sign of that which does not exist. To prove that nothing happens but by necessity, the arguments for this purpose must not be drawn from signs, or foreign causes; but from causes intimately connected with, and belonging to this neccesity."

"৳ But how is it possible... that those things which are foreseen should not befal?"

"I do not say... that we are to entertain any doubt but the events will take place, which Providence foresees are to happen; but we are rather to believe, that although they do happen, yet that there is no necessity in the events themselves, which constrains them to do so. The truth of which I shall thus endeavour to illustrate. We behold many things done under our view, such as a coachman conducting his chariot and governing his horses, and other things of a like nature. Now, do you suppose these things are done by the compulsion of a necessity?"

"৳ No... for if every thing were moved by compulsion, the effects of art would be vain and fruitless."

"If things then which are doing under our eye... are under no present necessity of happening; it must be admitted that these same things, before they befel, were under no necessity of taking place. It is plain, therefore, that some things... [are] unconstrained by necessity. For I do not think any person will say that such things as are at present done, were not to happen before they were done. Why therefore may not things be foreseen, and not necessitated in their events? As the knowledge then of what is present imposes no necessity on things now done; so neither does the foreknowledge of what is to happen in future, necessitate the things which are to take place. But you may say, you hesitate with regard to this point; whether there can be any certain foreknowledge of things, of which the event is not necessitated? For here there seems to he an evident contradiction. If things are, foreseen, you may contend they are under a necessity of happening; but if their event is not necessary, they cannot possibly be foreseen, because prescience can foresee nothing but what is absolutely certain: and if things uncertain in their events are foreseen as certain, this prescience, you may maintain, is nothing more than a false opinion: for when we comprehend things differently from what they really are, we have but imperfect ideas of them, very remote from the truth of science. To this I would answer, that the cause of this mistake is, that men imagine that their knowledge is derived entirely from the nature of the things known; whereas it is quite the reverse; since things are not known from properties inherent in the object of knowledge, but by faculties residing in the perceiver."

"To give you an example... the globular form of a body strikes the view in a different manner from what it does the touch: the eye, placed at a distance, darts its rays upon the object, and by beholding it, comprehends its form. On the contrary, the object cannot be distinguished by the touch, unless the hand is in contact with it, and feels it all around."

"Man likewise is surveyed in different ways; by the senses, by the imagination, by reason, and by intelligence."

"The senses only perceive his material figure;——the imagination perceives the external figure alone, exclusive of the matter;——reason goes further, and examining existences in general, discovers the particular species of every individual;——the eye of intelligence... rises higher... beyond the bounds of what is general... [and] surveys the simple forms themselves, by its own pure and proper light... [T]he higher power of perception includes the lower; but... the... [lower] can by no means attain to the energy of the... [higher]: for the senses cannot rise to the perception of any thing but matter, nor can the imagination comprehend existences in general; neither can reason conceive simple forms: whereas intelligence, looking down as it were from above, and having conceived the form, discerns all the things which are below it, and comprehends... what does not fall within the reach of the other faculties. For she comprehends existences in general, as conceived by reason, the figure that strikes the imagination, and the matter that falls under the cognizance of the senses, without making use either of reason, or the imagination, or the senses; but she comprehends them all formally, i.e. by beholding their simple forms... by one single effort of the mind."

"In the same way, reason, when she considers a thing in general, apprehends both what is perceived by the imagination and the senses, without the assistance of either."

"For instance, reason defines her general conception, thus, Man is a rational creature with two feet; which, though it be a general idea, yet every person knows that man, thus defined, is perceivable both by the imagination and the senses; notwithstanding that in this instance reason does not make use either of the imagination or the senses, but employs her own proper faculty of perception."

"Thus the imagination, though at first she learned by the senses to distinguish and to form figures, acts afterwards by her own power, and brings all sensible objects to her view without the aid of the senses."

"Do you not see, then, that men attain to the knowledge of things, more by their own faculties, than by the inherent properties of the things themselves? Nor is it unreasonable that it should be so; for as judgment is the act of the person judging, it is necessary that every person should perform his own work, by his own proper faculties, and not by the aid of foreign power."