"As had been the case during Nixon's last years in office, the nation again faced the question of whether the United States should, or even could, maintain separate standards in fighting the Cold War from what it was prepared to accept at home. Events in Chile posed the dilemma most clearly. A successful military coup had finally taken place in Santiago in September, 1973. It left Allende dead—probably by suicide—and a reliably anti-communist government in power headed by General Augusto Pinochet. Direct C.I.A. complicity was never established, but Nixon and Kissinger openly welcomed the outcome and sought to cooperate with the new Chilean leader. By the time the C.I.A. investigations got under way in 1975, however, Pinochet's government had imprisoned, tortured, and executed thousands of Allende supporters—some of them American citizens. Chile, for many years a democracy, now had one of the most repressive dictatorships Latin America had ever seen. What the United States did in Chile differed little from what it had done, two decades earlier, in Iran and Guatemala. But the 1970s were not the 1950s: once the information got out that the Nixon administration had tried to keep Allende from the office to which he had been elected and had sought to remove him once there, "plausible denial" became impossible. That made questions about responsibility unavoidable. Could Allende have remained in power if there had been no American campaign against him? Would he have retained democratic procedures had he done so? Should the United States have refrained, to the extent that it did, from condemning Pinochet's abuses? Had it made a greater effort, might it have stopped them? There are, even today, no clear answers: Washington's role in Chile's horrors remains a hotly contested issue among both historians of these events and participants in them. What was clear at the time, though, was that the C.I.A.'s license to operate without constraints had produced actions in Chile that, by its own admission, failed the "daylight" test. They could not be justified when exposed to public view."
Quote Details
Added by wikiquote-import-bot
Unverified quote
0 likes
Original Language: English
Available Languages (1)
Sources
John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (2006)
https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/1973_Chilean_coup_d'%C3%A9tat
Revision History
No revisions have been submitted for this quote.
Categories
1973 Chilean coup d'état
7 quotes on TrueQuotesView all quotes by 1973 Chilean coup d'état →
Related Quotes
"I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people. T…"
"At midday on September 11, 1973, after months of mounting tensions in the streets of Santiago, Chile, British-made Ha…"
"Chile had known class struggle within a bourgeois democratic framework for many decades: that was its tradition. With…"
"1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile! worth spending; not concerned; no involvement of embassy; $10,000,000 availab…"
"The United States... supported authoritarian regimes throughout Central and South America during and after the Cold W…"
"The armed forces have acted today solely from the patriotic inspiration of saving the country from the tremendous cha…"
"From 1967 to 1973 Haksar, a former protégé of Krishna Menon, was Mrs Gandhi’s most trusted adviser. One of her biogra…"
"In the early 1970s, the KGB presence in India became one of the largest in the world outside the Soviet bloc. Indira …"
"The KGB, in Kalugin’s view, was more successful than the CIA, partly because of its skill in exploiting the corruptio…"
"Suitcases full of banknotes were said to be routinely taken to the Prime Minister’s house. Former Syndicate member S.…"